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Abstract 
 
Modern organisations are complex interdependent systems, large-scale technical 
systems. Transport infrastructure systems such as road, rail and aviation, comprise 
intricate components of interdependent „systems and networks,‟ critical segments of 
which require complex coordination arrangements. These systems, which are critical to 
society, are vulnerable to crisis events due to the public aspect and costs of these 
systems. Failure in critical components of these wide area infrastructure systems can 
often result in cascading disturbances with secondary and tertiary impacts - some of 
which may become initiating sources of failure in their own right, triggering further 
systems failures across wider networks. Within road systems, the sources of 
disturbance impacting may not even be directly linked to the physical aspects of the 
infrastructure itself but might be triggered from other incidents such as loss of 
electricity, the business itself or other infrastructure components. Road systems (both 
surface and underground) are prime examples of large-scale technical systems that are 
both locations and potentially sources, for this type of wide-area disturbance.  
 
Challenges exist for transport system operators in the conceptualisation and 
implementation of response and subsequent recovery planning for significant events. 
Disturbances can vary from reduced traffic flow causing traffic congestion throughout 
the local road network(s) and subsequent possible loss of income to businesses and 
industry to a major incident causing loss of life or complete loss of an asset. Many 
organisations and institutions, despite increasing recognition of the effects of crisis 
events, are not adequately prepared to manage crises. It is argued that operators of land 
transport infrastructure are in a similar category of readiness given the recent instances 
of technical failures and unplanned closures in road tunnels and the government 
practice of privatising particular public infrastructure.  
 
These unexpected infrastructure failures, and their ultimately identified causes, suggest 
there is significant room for improvement. Risk profiles for road transport systems are 
often complex due to the human behaviours and the inter-mix of technical and 
organisational components and the managerial coverage needed for the socio-technical 
components and the physical infrastructure. In this sense, the span of managerial 
oversight may require new approaches to asset management that combines the notion 
of risk and continuity management. 
 
This research examined the challenges to applying effective crisis management 
practices in large-scale Australian road transport systems operating under commercial 
private public partnership settings. The specific setting was/is the operational command 
and control practices at the „so-called first response‟ to the higher order of response 
levels of crisis event. The research provided options for enhancing crisis and 
emergency management with all researched sites having different business frameworks 
with varying levels of crisis preparedness within transportation network organisations.  
 
Key Words: Crisis Response, Critical Infrastructure Planning, Business Continuity 
Planning, Transport Infrastructure, Critical Infrastructure, Risk Management, Road 
Tunnels, Roads, Emergency Management, Business Continuity Management, Contract 
Management, Strategic Management, Private Public Partnerships.  
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
1.0 Introduction 
Crises are often critical turning points in a business‟s life. It has been argued that 
whether such events emerge from poor strategic positioning, managerial inertia or 
organisational stagnation as these events suddenly shine the spotlight on any major 
problem in the design and activities of an organisational system (Carmeli & 
Schaubroeck, 2008). The ability of organisations to keep operating in times of crisis is 
significant for any organisation and for a public facility especially when these 
organisations manage public infrastructure as the cascading effect caused by a crisis 
has multiple damaging effects. It is essential that preparation, response and recovery 
planning activities enable organisational functionality to return rapidly to levels of pre-
disaster functionality (Tierney, 2008). 
 
Transport infrastructure systems such as road, rail & aviation, comprise intricate 
components of interdependent „systems and networks‟, critical segments of which 
require complex coordination arrangements. These systems are critical to society and 
are often vulnerable to a range of disturbances. Failure in critical components of these 
infrastructure systems can often result in cascading effects often with impacts that 
themselves cause failure in their own right across wider networks. Road systems (both 
surface and underground) are prime examples of large-scale technical systems that are 
both locations and potentially sources, for this type of rippling disturbance.  
 
How companies manage such systems, and in particular how individual managers, deal 
with such events is an important issue. Research findings suggest (Carmeli & 
Schaubroeck, 2008; Mitroff & Alpaslan, 2003; Wang, Liu, Zhu, & Jiao, 2008) that 
traditional Business management development and personal growth may not adequately 
prepare future leaders for effective decision making under crisis conditions. The 
capacity to effectively mobilise appropriate human and material resources to manage 
the physical, economic, and social dislocation that crises produce is a vital part of the 
response and recovery activity program and is often difficult to comprehend in 
environments requiring the quick and effective decisions of key personnel. 
 
This research examines the challenges to applying effective crisis management 
practices in large-scale Australian road transport systems operating under commercial 
private public partnership settings. It will review the current practices and processes 
that exist within these organisations and present an assessment to the emerging 
literature that currently exists within this market sector.  
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This introductory chapter will provide the background to the research, the thesis 
outline, the significance of the research and the context of the research question. 
Chapter two provides an outline of the current literature that is available on crisis and 
risk management considering specific theoretical and empirically based concepts 
central to risk and crisis management research. The chapter will begin with the 
terminology and core concepts related to this field of research, the chapter will then 
examine early accident theories that set the origins of crisis management; it will then 
discuss risk and business continuity concepts, standards and theories. 
 
Chapter three presents the theoretical basis for this research and the fundamental set of 
principles about how the elements of the research fit together. It will then examine a 
framework for analysing the research for this thesis and introduce an assessment 
approach. Chapter four begins with the discussion of the scientific paradigms and the 
employed scientific paradigm for this research. It then discusses the qualitative 
methodological choice and research design employed in this thesis and concludes with 
a discussion on bias associated with this type of research, the limitations related with 
this research and the commercial issues that needed to be considered. 
 
Chapter five presents the results of the data collected from the online survey, interview 
process and the documentation analysis. This chapter will conclude with a discussion of 
the results and findings from all data collection methods. Finally, chapter six concludes 
and summaries the findings and conclusions with respect to the research questions and 
wider objectives of this thesis. 
1.1 Background 
Recognition of the threat of failure, for even successful organisations, has contributed 
to the emergence of Crisis Management (CM) as a field of inquiry. Early studies of CM 
emerged from the field of disaster response with the focus of research and practice, on 
how to better respond to natural disasters (Johnson & Elliott, 2011). Research now 
takes a holistic view incorporating any threat to the success of an organisation. 
Business continuity planning and risk management tools can assist in defining 
management options, but business survival, in the longer-term, requires the existence of 
capacities to adapt functional decision making effectively, efficiently and rapidly in 
response to emergent crises. Moats, Chermack & Dooley (2008) suggest examination 
of crisis events pose serious questions to people in prevention planning as they provide 
clear examples of the consequences of misreading actions and their potential outcomes. 
Moats et al (2008) further suggest that organisational leaders in crisis situations are 
 Chapter 1: Introduction 
3 
 
often required to make high consequence decisions with incomplete or inaccurate 
information, ill-defined goals and under extreme time pressure.  
 
Critical Infrastructure (CI) is infrastructure (water and energy facilities, transport 
infrastructure are key examples) that are managed by government or private and public 
organisations. Private Public Partnerships (PPP) or organisations are commercial 
arrangements established for a specific purpose by a government department but 
managed by a private/commercial organisation. CI is of major significance to society 
and the economy of any country and as defined by Rothery (2005), is infrastructure that 
would significantly impact on the social or economic wellbeing of the nation, or affect 
Australia‟s ability to conduct national defence and ensure national security. As this 
infrastructure systems are shared and vital to society they must be protected against 
periods of breakdown, including the complex networks that interface each system and 
any purposeful actions by human intent. As a result, risk profiles for such systems are 
often difficult to ascertain due to the interplay of human behaviour and the-intermix of 
technical and organisational components. There are core challenges in managing these 
CI systems, and any risk management options need to be capable to ensure the 
availability of the CI networks and related systems.  
 
Lalonde (2007) suggests there are new realities (of technology and networks) that 21st 
century organisations will confront requiring a fresh perspective on the issue of crisis 
and risk management. In order to improve long term resilience, Lalonde (2007) 
contends that research needs to further explore how one can ensure the long term 
incorporation of the learning that takes place during a crisis, and/or incidents. Risk 
management practices and Business Continuity Management (BCM) may be applied to 
focus on the sustainability of key business objectives and improve an organisations 
resilience and subsequent ability to recover and manage crisis situations. BCM can 
provide for the availability of processes and resources in order to ensure the continued 
achievement of critical objectives. (SAA, HB 2006).  
 
1.1.1 The Research Setting – Transport Sector 
Critical Infrastructure, such as surface and underground transport systems, are essential 
transport corridors for a modern city. The availability of this infrastructure has demands 
and expectations from the public and when this infrastructure is not available due to 
congestion or asset damage, it can reduce or stop city services therefore increasing 
costs to business and possibly costing lives.  
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Roads, bridges and tunnels are costly to design, construct and maintain and in the past, 
were generally supplied by government organisations only. In recent decades, all levels 
of government have used a mechanism called Private Public Partnerships (PPP) to 
reduce the governments cost of delivery of these types of assets and improve service 
delivery, utilisation and availability of the infrastructure being privatised (Doloi, 2012; 
Fischer, Leidel, Riemann, & HansAlfen, 2010).  
 
1.2 Objectives  
A key objective of this research is the enhancement of crisis response capability related 
to large-scale system failures within transportation networks. The means to do this 
entails an investigation of recent theories and concepts of crisis management and 
evaluation of current emergency crisis response practices within the researched 
transportation organisations against the intent of these models and frameworks.   
 
This research specifically seeks to examine impediments to effective risk and crisis 
management within selected Transportation Network organisations. This research seeks 
to detail: 
 What gaps exist within the current crisis planning protocols in large 
technical systems (such as surface and underground transport systems), and 
 Options that might be adopted to manage and enhance crisis preparedness 
and response in organisations managing such systems. 
 
More generally the research seeks to increase understanding of impediments to the use 
of Business Continuity and Risk Management practices as part of Corporate 
Governance within the transport sector, and their application among operators of large-
scale road transport systems (RTS).  
 
A wider strategic context for this work is to provide information on enhancing crisis 
and emergency management within Australian transport infrastructure managed in 
private public partnership (PPP) organisations. 
1.3 The Thesis Outline 
The thesis examines the contexts of effective crisis management applied to emergency 
events in large-scale road transport systems (RTS) within the Australian private sector: 
in particular PPPs. The research also examines the crisis planning and management 
within the selected RTS‟s and will focus around the practice and use of Emergency 
Management related Plans. The specific setting for this research is the operational 
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command and control practices related to initial response to emergency events by 
senior and middle management at tactical response levels. Broad-based literature 
suggests that organisations generally are ill prepared for crisis events and often do not 
learn from previous crisis events and how crisis planning is an important factor in any 
organisations strategic management process. 
 
1.3.1 Research Significance  
The expectations and demands of transport critical infrastructure will only increase as 
interconnections and the dependency of this type of public infrastructure grows. 
Australia‟s economic benefits depend on transport infrastructure and as populations 
become more densely located within our cities, the public‟s expectation for use of this 
type of transport infrastructure becomes more critical. The reliance on the private sector 
to support government will only expand as governments find different financial 
solutions to funding these expensive assets (Australian Government-C, 2010). With this 
in mind governments need to be aware of private sector motivations and ensure any 
critical transport infrastructure has the correct recovery mechanism should an 
emergency or crisis take place to balance the public requirements and any commercial 
situations. Interdependencies of our transport systems are causing complexity in our 
organisations which are often unknown and having awareness and knowledge can be a 
key element of the successful management of any crisis situation. The cost to society 
due to the unavailability of critical transport infrastructure can be critical to the 
livelihood of the public and subsequently Australia‟s economic well-being.  
 
Risk, Emergency and Business Continuity Management practices are limited within 
most organisations due to many factors from managerial experience to limited 
awareness of the threats and risks associate within these types of organisations (Lee, 
Vargo, & Seville, 2013; S. McManus, Seville, Vargo, & Brunsdon, 2008).  Also little 
research exists and the decision making during crisis events can be limited and not well 
thought through. Managing risk is a becoming a fundamental managerial core activity 
and risk management covers technical, contractual and all aspects of a company‟s 
activities. Benefits to effective crisis management need to be further explained in most 
industries as this research expands incorporating better risk management methods 
which are often an afterthought or a practice if management have the time available. 
Effective Emergency and Business Continuity Management practices rely on the 
discipline of risk management and the associated processes.  
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1.4  Conclusion 
The aim of this thesis is to provide further research on enhancing crisis and emergency 
management within Australian transport infrastructure managed by private public 
partnership (PPP) organisations and better understand any current impediments to 
Business Continuity and Risk Management practices within these organisations. This 
chapter introduced this thesis, the objectives and the research question. It briefly 
discussed crisis management as a field of research and further introduced critical 
infrastructure and its significance within our society. It also summarised the following 
chapters and the purpose of each chapter. The next chapter introduces the current 
literature guiding this research and sets the context of this thesis to answer the research 
question. 
 Chapter 2: Literature Review 
7 
 
Chapter 2 - Literature Review 
2.0 Introduction 
Road systems (both surface and underground) are prime examples of large-scale 
technical systems that are both locations for and potentially sources of wide-area 
disturbances and failures. These road systems are key to our urban and rural economic 
survival and when failures take place in this transport infrastructure, the obvious 
impacts could include reduced traffic flow causing traffic congestion throughout the 
network(s) and subsequent possible loss of income to businesses and industry 
depending on duration and severity of an incident. The sources of disturbance 
impacting road systems may not even be directly linked to the physical failure of 
infrastructure itself but might be triggered from other incidents such as loss of 
electricity, the network of electronic traffic control or other infrastructure components. 
This research will explore four PPP companies managing public road and/or tunnel 
infrastructure in Australia. It will examine crisis management applied to emergency 
events in large-scale RTS‟s which will include crisis planning and risk management 
within the selected private companies.  
This chapter provides an overview of the current literature that is available on crisis and 
risk management and its possible application to enhancing road networks. It will 
outline specific theoretical and empirically-based concepts central to risk and crisis 
management research beginning with Terminology and Core Concepts within this field 
of study. The chapter will then examine early accident theories that underpin the 
origins of crisis management; it will then discuss risk and business continuity concepts, 
standards and models. This chapter will also examine CI issues relating to transport 
networks and management models. It will then conclude with a discussion on media 
issues and the developing research on social media and its emerging use in crisis 
situations and then the issues and benefits of crisis management. 
2.1 Terminology and Core Concepts 
Definition of a number of core concepts and specialised terminology is critical in 
establishing technical contexts for wider examination of literature. 
Business Continuity Management (BCM): BCM can be defined as „the ongoing process 
of ensuring the continual operation of critical business processes through the evaluation 
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of risk and resilience, and the implementation of mitigation measures‟(Brody & 
Schmittlein, 2012). Gibb and Buchanan (2006) also state that BCM is a tool that can be 
employed to provide greater confidence with the output of processes and can be 
delivered in the face of disturbances of risk (Gibb & Buchanan, 2006).  
Crisis: Carmeli and Schaubroeck (2008) suggest an organisational crisis is a disruption 
that undermines participants‟ basic assumption about the system within which they 
work. Pearson and Clair (1998) define an organisational crises as a low-probability, 
high impact event that threatens the viability of the organisation. Crandall, Parnell and 
Spillan (2010) further expands on this definition by characterising the ambiguity of the 
causal factor to the event. Boin (2008) defines a crisis as a threat to core values or life-
sustaining systems which require an urgent response under conditions of deep 
uncertainty. The Standard, AS/NZS 5050 Business Continuity – Managing disruptive 
related Risk (2010), describes a crisis as a situation that is beyond the capacity of 
normal management structures and processes to deal with effectively 
(Standards_AS/NZS5050, 2010).  
Critical Infrastructure(CI): Those „systems‟ (including assets, networks, processes or 
knowledge) which, if destroyed, degraded or rendered unavailable for an extended 
period, would significantly impact on social or economic well-being of the nation, or 
affect Australia‟s ability to conduct national defence and ensure national security. 
The Attorney General‟s Department uses a similar definition at the national level 
Critical Infrastructure (CI) as: 
 
 „those physical facilities, supply chains, information technologies and 
communication networks which, if destroyed, degraded or rendered 
unavailable for an extended period, would significantly impact on the 
social or economic wellbeing of the nation, or affect Australia‟s ability to 
conduct national defence and ensure national security‟.  
                       (Government-E, 2011) (Rothery, 2005)  
Private, Public Partnership (PPP): PPP‟s are models used by governments to fund 
public infrastructure using private or public equity for the establishment of Roads and 
Tunnels (transport) to prisons, hospitals and schools (Wilson, Pelham, & Duffield, 
2010; X.W.Zou, Shouqing, & Dongping, 2008). It is also defined as a long term 
contract based on service outputs where there is a significant risk transfer to the private 
sector. The use and methodologies of PPPs are discussed in more detail within this 
literature review in section 2.4.4. 
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Threat: The intention or likelihood that a „system‟ (as described above) will have an 
incident based on the probability of occurrence will cause a non-desirable event. 
Nosworthy also describes a threat as a course of action which, when active, could 
destroy or damage things of value (Nosworthy, 2000).  
Resilience: The ability of a „system‟ to absorb change gracefully whilst retaining core 
properties or functions. Evolution of the original concept of resilience occurred through 
its application in numerous scientific disciplines and opinions vary (S. McManus et al., 
2008). Kendra et al (2003) and Seville (2006) suggests resilience as an ability to sustain 
a shock without completely deteriorating: that is, most conceptions of resilience 
involve some idea of adapting to but maintaining a degree of functionality and 
“bouncing back” from a disruption. 
Bruneau (2003) describes resilience as the capacity of the system to reduce the 
probability of failure, to reduce the consequences from failure and to reduce the time 
needed to carry out all the response and recovery activities.  
So the definition of resilience differs as a result of different disciplines and also how it 
can be operationally defined but the idea of “bouncing back”, means restoring prior 
order or creating something new or different meaning the organisation has learnt and 
adapted to its new form or status (Brody & Schmittlein, 2012; N. Johnson & Elliott, 
2011). 
Risk: Risk has been imbedded in technical business culture for some years. Nosworthy 
(2000) discusses the multiple definitions of risk as it apparently comes in a number of 
shapes and sizes but summarising her definition is, „risk represents the likelihood of a 
threat happening/causing a problem‟. The Standards1, define risk as, „the effect of 
uncertainty on objectives‟. The International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (2009) 
and Sajeva et al (2006) states risk is the combination of the probability of an event, its 
negative consequences and adverse effects (ISDR, 2009). 
Risk Management: is the identification of threat and the implementation of measures 
aimed at reducing the likelihood of those threats occurring and minimizing any damage 
if they do (Nosworthy, 2000). AS/NZS ISO 31000 & AS/NZS 5050 define Risk 
                                                 
1
 AS/NZS ISO 31000 & AS/NZS 5050 
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Management as the coordinated activities to direct and control an organisation with 
regard to risk. 
Vulnerability: The characteristics or condition of a „system‟ that may render it to 
increase the susceptibility of a community to the impact of hazards. NIPP (Homeland 
Security, 2009) describe vulnerabilities as the characteristics of an asset, system, or 
network‟s design, location, security posture, process, or operation that render it 
susceptible to destruction, incapacitation, or exploitation by mechanical failures, 
natural hazards, terrorist attacks, or other malicious acts. The ISDR
2
 (2009) states 
vulnerability as the condition determined by physical, social, economic and 
environmental factors or processes, which increase the susceptibility of a community to 
the impact of hazards. AS/NZS 5050 (2010) defines vulnerability as the intrinsic 
properties of something resulting in susceptibility to a risk source that can lead to an 
event with a consequence.  
The terms and concepts of crisis and emergency management can set the context and its 
application in this area. Understanding the definitions of these sometimes-common 
words, in the setting of this field of research is still developing as there are no agreed 
meanings on many of these terms and core concepts.  
CM and critical infrastructure protection, as a subject, has expanded in research since 
2001 due initially to terrorist attacks on the USA.  Publication coverage has expanded 
to range from risk management to include Business Continuity Management and Crisis 
Management with typical publications such as the International Journal of Critical 
Infrastructure and the Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management focusing on 
key areas of research and increasing their influence within the academic fields of 
research.  
2.2 Development of Crisis Management (Theory & Practice) 
It is recognised that disasters and crises are normal events in human history. Crises can 
be seen as unthinkable threats that can actually manifest and subsequently tax our 
imagination and outstrip available resources (Lalonde, 2007). They put our society and 
leaders to the test and by their nature place severe strain on the person and/or 
organisation where the crisis is taking place (Boin, 2008). Crisis events can also be 
                                                 
2
 International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR, 2009) 
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measured differently to different organisations and to some extent crisis events in one 
organisation can be opportunities in others. 
Crisis events can originate from many sources. They can be random events or events 
that happen due to ignorance of the rules and regulations thus having the appearance of 
a random event when a crisis can take place due to a person or organisation not 
carrying out or completing a task comparable to a maintenance activity, a regulatory 
report or lack of managerial function (Wheatley & Barnes, 2013). Crises can be 
external or internal to an organisation; they can be natural or man-made. So the nature 
and number of possible crisis events can make them unpredictable but also inevitable in 
behaviour (Al Hour, 2012).  
Riddell (2012) recently viewed crisis management as being based on events that 
threaten normal life: food supplies, homes, or travel and examples are energy strikes in 
the United Kingdom in the 1970‟s, disease outbreaks, London bombings and United 
States of America, September 11
th
, 2001 events. Riddell further suggests that the 
origins of the generic practices in handling emergencies derive from both Cold War 
planning and the challenges posed by a spate of major strikes in the early 1970‟s. All 
emergencies and crises in this historical context have had similar stages especially from 
the perspective of a governmental or regulatory oversight context. These are: 
 A slow initial response to the event 
 Confusion about what is happening 
 Well published meeting of government committees 
 Initially ineffective statements to the media 
 Increasing alarm, the resolution, and a rapid disappearance from the headline. 
     (Riddell, 2012). 
 
This will be further explored as concepts and models are discussed later in this chapter.  
Our political and administrative leaders experience crises as “rude surprises” that defy 
conventional administrative or policy responses and cause collective stress (Boin, 
2008). Governments and organisations must be prepared to meet the challenges of a 
modern society and be prepared to make decisions without causing additional harm. 
Crisis Management is important because without a plan to accomplish goals crises 
grow and relationships can be damaged long term and no organisation is immune 
(Gottschalk, 2002). In a global society, that is, exemplified by complex systems of 
linkages and rapid communication, information and these interconnections often 
intensify the effect of any crisis. As an example, any failure in one operational system 
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triggers failure in other interdependent systems of electrical power, communications, 
transportation, water, gas and/or sewerage distribution and this compounding failure 
can create new dangers for the general population (Comfort, Ko, & Zagorecki, 2004).  
 
The new Information and Communications and Technology (ICT) age started a change 
with the implications on society and industry that would never have been guessed; one 
being when sub-systems fail within these major systems there can be disastrous 
consequences. The interconnected systems in our global society are held together by 
complex systems linked by rapid communications (Gottschalk, 2002). These 
communication systems are often complex, providing linkages of failure by allowing 
other systems, organisations or entities, when failure events occur, to allow these 
failure issues and incidents to transpire to possibly have other effects within their 
organisations or other systems. Early in the ICT revolution these interlinkage effects 
were not well understood due to the rapid growth of these industries. Even today some 
failures occur with no understanding of why because different designers of IT 
engineering systems had different views of reliability and dependability therefore 
unknowingly design possible cascading failures into systems (Boin & Smith, 2006). 
The reliance on information infrastructures by other critical networks and corporate 
systems are also radically accelerating the interdependencies of cities with frequently 
formed critical nodes where these networks intersect and interact (Allenby & Fink, 
2005). The complexity of these types of systems and information networks are 
becoming dependent on each other by the tight coupling of these sub-systems. Many 
industries including transportation and finance are depending on these networks to 
function as a normal part of their operations. To balance this tight coupling, modern 
computer systems are being designed to continuously monitor and tune their own 
performance; adapt to unpredictable conditions, predict or prevent and gracefully 
recover from failure and provide safe, secure computing environments (Allenby & 
Fink, 2005). One of Perrow‟s elements of his Natural Accident Theory (which is 
discussed later in this chapter) is complexity yields unexpected interactions between 
independent failures and these interactions cause failures to escalate rapidly and 
without obstruction (Charles Perrow, 1999). This complexity brings apparent security 
as the monitoring of these computer systems by both operators and technical sub-
systems will prevent failures. This has proven not to be the case with software and 
hardware failures providing good examples of Perrow‟s theory.  
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Organisations in the past have developed disaster recovery procedures to assist in the 
management of events and these processes have improved over recent years into 
disciplines themselves.  The development of BCM lies in Information Systems (IS) 
protection and early publications restricted their attention to IS management and 
security. These business applications of disaster recovery and business continuity 
planning started to form disciplines as disaster recovery was usually applied to IT 
functions and revolved around a procedural response to a system or sub-systems failure 
(Elliott, Swartz, & Herbane, 2010).  
              
Figure 2.1 The BCM evolution (Al Hour, 2012) 
Figure 2.1 above indicates the development of how BCM has moved from being 
reactive to disasters to being proactively involved in an organisations strategic and 
operational management (Al Hour, 2012). This can be seen as there are several 
handbooks and standards developed in Australia and overseas all playing for 
International Standards Organisation recognition (Herbane, 2010). This is an indication 
that the field is still maturing (Elliott et al., 2010). BCM has moved from being 
considered as an isolated project to being part of an organisations ongoing development 
and strategic planning and now serves the organisation as long as it exists.  
2.2.1  What is a Crisis 
Crisis events can originate from many sources (Carmeli & Schaubroeck, 2008; Labaka, 
Hernantes, Laug, & Sarriegi, 2013). As discussed previously, crises can be random 
events or appear to be random events due to people‟s ignorance of the rules and 
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regulations.  Crises can manifest as events external or internal to an organisation; they 
can be natural or man-made (Wheatley & Barnes, 2013). Thus by the nature and 
number of possible causes, crises can be unpredictable.  
If an incident is escalating to the point where it is moving beyond an emergency, 
without a significant management response, the situation can develop into a disaster 
where the organisation or situation is in jeopardy and may not recover. Figure 2.2 
indicates the escalating generic event (Britton, 1986). It indicates what is a disaster 
when compared to the people impacted, the degree of involvement of the population in 
the immediate social space and the amount of disruption by the collective disturbance 
on the population. The triangle represents the escalation and size of the disturbance 
generally. 
 
Figure 2.2 Development of what is a Disaster (Britton, 1986) 
Events or incidents that are managed appropriately from the disturbance can be 
prevented from escalating into a disastrous situation. The difficulty is often when the 
signals of a disaster are ignored or local managerial experience is not aware that a 
situation could easily escalate into a disaster if not managed well from the beginning. 
The Institute of Crisis Management in 2004 suggested that crises from natural disasters, 
catastrophic loss of utility, large industrial accidents or collateral damage following 
acts of violence represent less than 20% of total reported causes of organisational 
crises. Figure 2.3 gives a cross section of the causes of organisational crises 
(Standards_HB292, 2006).  
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Figure 2.3 Cause of Organisational Crisis (Standards_HB292, 2006) 
The vast majority of crisis events arise from the escalation of routine management 
issues to significant disruptive events. Though this statistic information presented in 
Figure 2.3 is ten years old, the core elements of routine events remain unchanged with 
organisational risks increasing due to poor management of human resource issues like 
discrimination, sexual harassment and bullying can still present issues for organisations 
if not managed well. Other issues like fraud and class actions are still on the increase 
due the nature of our litigious society.  
2.2.2 Accident Theories 
In the early 1980‟s two schools of thought developed and debated for decades in the 
complexity and reliability of technical complex systems. These two dominant schools 
of thought on the origins of accidents and reliability, Normal Accident Theory and 
High Reliability Theory are sometimes in conflict but occasionally reach the same 
conclusion when applied to events and generic safety problems (Rijpma, 1997). 
2.2.2.1 Normal Accident Theory  
Charles Perrow‟s Normal Accident Theory (NAT) states that the complexity inherent to 
tightly coupled technology systems makes accidents inevitable (C. Perrow, 1984; 
Shrivastava, Sonpar, & Pazzaglia, 2009). Perrow‟s theory also states some systems are 
more predisposed to accidents because of these complexities and the tight-coupling 
between other systems (Rijpma, 1997). Coupling refers to how tightly the system 
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components are connected and interconnected and when systems are tightly coupled 
disturbances may spread quickly from one component to others. In a tightly coupled 
system, authority should be highly centralised where operatives respond quickly in a 
predetermined and unquestioning manner (Hopkins, 2005). In a loosely coupled system 
authority is de-centralised. 
Complexity can contribute to unexpected interactions between independent failures and 
Perrow‟s hypothesis is that the tight coupling causes interactions to escalate rapidly and 
without obstruction. He referred to these types of accidents as “Normal” and discusses 
centralisation of decision making is necessary for rapid recovery from failure for tightly 
coupled systems. When these accidents or events take place, Perrow also claims that 
such a failure is either so catastrophic or so complex that it shocks people‟s sense-
making capacities so maybe they cannot cope. (Fraher, 2011) Also it is viewed that 
personnel operating the system may have limited awareness of interdependencies and 
therefore a lack of understanding of the overall picture. From another view, no matter 
how effective conventional safety devices such as warning systems, overflow valves or 
automatic shutdown features perform, some accidents are unpredictable because 
failures are simply not „conventional‟ or unexpected. These compound failures become 
inevitable and so can be called “normal” accidents. 
In the NAT view component failure can be avoided though better designed engineered 
safety features, preventative maintenance, operator training and so forth (Shrivastava et 
al., 2009). With this view operators or people are regarded as a system or elements 
within the engineering technical solution.  
Fraher (2011) mentions researchers like Perrow and Reason have contributed 
importantly to understanding the complexity of interrelated factors leading to modern 
disasters in our increasingly technology sophisticated systems. Fraher (2011) further 
argues that to offset the potential for latent errors combining with active errors with 
devastating results in our increasingly complex systems, high-risk organisations must 
cultivate a special form of attentiveness or “mindfulness” in individuals and teams. 
Focusing on training alone is no longer sufficient they now must have an ability to 
think through a crisis. A proactive concern for safety. He goes on the say,  
“Teams must foster a flexible leadership hierarchy that values expertise 
regardless of rank and can flow easily from centralised to decentralised 
climates depending on the demands of the situation”(Fraher, 2011). 
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2.2.2.2 High Reliability Theory 
In High Reliability Organisations (HRO) decision making is reasonably flexible in an 
emerging situation. Operators do not blindly follow rules but negotiate a course of 
action in a collegial fashion based on trust, creditability and their experience. The High 
Reliability Theory (HRT) can support this for HRO‟s as these organisations are 
pervaded by a distractive culture of reliability (Rijpma, 1997). HRT began with a small 
group of researchers studying a distinct and special class of organisation (Boin & 
Eeten, 2013). This research focused on organisations that operated accident free in 
complex hazardous environments while retaining their capacity to meet highly 
unpredictable and demanding production goals promoted an area of reliability research 
which was later called HRT (Shrivastava et al., 2009). The development of HRT was 
carried by studying the operational functionality of complex organisations; specifically 
aircraft carriers, nuclear power plants, electricity generator systems and air traffic 
control systems. These types of organisations were eventually labelled HROs due to 
their focus on reliability and culture of safety. The common threads for these diverse 
organisations was the complexity of the technology in use and the requirement for 
reliability of their operating systems, given the possible dramatic consequences if a 
failure took place like the loss of essential service or threat to human life (Roberts, 
1990). 
For safe operations, complex systems often need a level of redundancy in operations in 
order to improve the reliability of the system; complexity promoted by redundancy 
enhances reliability of a system. This is the same for HROs, if one systems or sub-
system fails, another backs it up (Rijpma, 1997). HROs apply this strategy of 
redundancy, they also de-centralise the authority to make decisions and thus promote 
rapid decision making, the organisation has a learning cycle (learn from their mistakes) 
and often they are not too hastily to make changes within their organisations. Only after 
intense discussion and negotiation does the organisation make a change. Conditions for 
the presence of high reliability in an organisation when [it] possesses are:  
 a strategic priority for safety  
 careful attention to design and procedures  
 a limited degree of trial-and-error learning  
 redundancy in all aspects of the business  
 decentralised decision making 
 continuous training often through simulations 
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 a strong culture that encourages vigilance and responsiveness to potential 
accidents  
This responsiveness and focus on these types of conditions has been termed 
mindfulness which is a preoccupation with failure (Hopkins, 2005). Barrett (2008) 
summarised mindfulness as a useful organisational trait for HROs personnel because it 
increases the comprehension of complexity, reduces the effect of tight coupling by 
identifying early warnings signs of trouble and enables organisations to respond 
quickly before problems escalate. If viewed from a NAT perspective, these 
organisations would be seen as an accident waiting to happen because it is inevitable 
and seen as waiting for accidents to occur for complex organisations. In Barrett‟s 
definition of the organisational trait of mindfulness, an organisation understanding the 
threatening signs and focuses on the possibility of failure, the potential for failure may 
reduce. Therefore this view appears to combine some elements to possibly support both 
theories. Also HROs decentralise the authority of decision making in order to enable 
those closest to the problem at hand solve problems as they occur.  
2.2.2.3 Comparison of NAT and HRT 
The debate about whether redundancy and subsequently complexity contributes to 
accidents (NAT) or prevents them (HRT) is still not agreed between both theories with 
the possible view that the term redundancy has different definitions in each theory 
(Vaughan, 1999). Also the divide on decentralisation aiding organisations to cope with 
complex interactions because the organisation can respond to unanticipated interactions 
quickly is really more complex than the statement suggests (Charles Perrow, 1999; 
Schulman, Roe, Eeten, & Bruijne, 2004). Employees/Operators can be empowered 
when they are closest to a failure and allowed to improvise however they need to be 
well trained and understand the requirement to follow operating procedures so when 
they do go outside those procedures they understand the consequences. However, 
centralisation aids the organisation in coping with tight coupling because of the 
thinking that only the higher echelons of the organisation would be understanding the 
“big picture” to sensibly override local considerations to ensure stability of the entire 
system (Shrivastava et al., 2009). So with the „NAT‟ rationale, an organisation 
operating complexity interactive and tightly coupled systems cannot simultaneously be 
centralised and decentralised therefore those organisations are structurally incapable of 
coping with systems accidents. Perrow (1984) acknowledges there are some 
ambiguities in his theory and overlooks the fact of the human mind, and its ability to 
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problem solve, as he equates the human to be a part of the systems within an 
organisation (Shrivastava et al., 2009).  
In a practical sense HRT seems to have a real world reliability application with NAT 
sometimes providing an explanation for an accident but only reviewing the technical 
aspects without reviewing human factors. NAT, in such cases, sometimes lacks the 
applicability (Shrivastava & Sonpar, 2009). Also the key difference as opposed to 
NAT, HRT believed that accidents are avoidable and focuses on damage prevention as 
opposed to cutting the losses. Comprehensive studies under NAT lead us to believe that 
over the long run probability of accidents increase within a HRO therefore the 
organisation is facing inevitable accidents in the planning of their operations. 
 
“NAT is valuable because it focuses upon system characteristics rather 
than such things as operators errors that may be owing to lack of 
mindfulness, inadequate training, management‟s failure to pursue safety 
goals and all the other things that HRT is concerned with.” 
  (Shrivastava et al., 2009) 
Barrett‟s (2008) view that mindfulness (A trait of HROs and an element of HRT) 
decouples the tight coupling through understanding that if an organisation observes the 
warning signs and focuses on the possibility of failure, the potential for failure may 
reduce. 
2.3 Risk and Business Continuity Management 
The primary objective of an organisation is to maximise shareholder wealth and an 
effective risk management program enhances this corporate value. This extant literature 
contains a respectable body of theories and general acceptance in the market that 
corporate value can be created with a proper understanding and management of risk 
(Olson & Wu, 2010). Private sector organisations that manage public infrastructure 
have added an issue for public management around communication (commercial verse 
government) and ultimately control of this public infrastructure (Boin & Smith, 2006). 
Beyond infrastructure vulnerability assessments, continuity of operational planning and 
other cost effective technologies, the following strategies need to be considered to 
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improve the capacity of the critical infrastructure service providers and public 
authorities to perform their primary functions: 
 Strike a balance between strategies that emphasis anticipation and those 
that emphasis resilience 
 Recognise and support high-reliability organisations and reliability 
professionals 
 Enhance the capability of auto-adaptive response systems of various types 
 Reward information-sharing about technological and organisational 
changes and encourage organisations to emphasise safety 
 Promote dialogue among citizens and stakeholders to define priorities and 
explore options for action 
 Develop incentive programs to induce private investment in security by 
relying on market forces to the extent possible 
(Auerswald, Branscomb, Todd, & Erwann, 2005) 
Nosworthy (2000) indicates that all business operations from commercial organisation 
and financial institutions to government departments will experience a variety of risks 
during the day-to-day operations that cannot be avoided (Nosworthy, 2000). The 
conflict of priorities in managing public Critical Infrastructure in particular for private 
organisations should be a subject for another study however to understand the 
immediate behaviour of the managerial thinking of a commercial organisation, it has to 
be remembered that a contract usually exists between parties. As a result these strict 
contractual guidelines can often get in the way of what are really the basic requirements 
and building blocks of operating a business. Sadly, BCM and risk are still not always 
considered an essential function of running today‟s business. Elements of crisis 
management should form the basis of any agreements between government and the 
private organisation managing the infrastructure so there is a focus on how to solve 
them or how to avoid them however organisations still do not adequately prepare for 
these events.  
 
The recognition (or anticipation) of events that might escalate to crises are difficult. It 
is important for organisations to manage crises as they can severely damage a 
company, its reputation and its brand. Also depending on the type of crises it can cause 
loss of life, assets or availability of an asset of a company or public organisation. The 
following are current concepts and theories across the business industry. 
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2.3.1 Risk Management 
The concept of Risk transcends a number of academic disciplines and also cuts across 
organisational boundaries. These borders and boundaries between any issues are often 
permeable and the effects and consequences of particular hazards can migrate across 
these borders (Smith & Fischbacher, 2009). Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) is 
management capability to manage all business risks in pursuit of acceptable returns 
(Yousef, 2012). To fully address corporate risk exposure with respect to natural 
disasters, companies need a comprehensive risk management process that identifies and 
mitigates the major sources of risk. Formulating a detailed risk program with 
capabilities for risk identification, assessment, measurement, mitigation and transfer is 
necessary in a complete risk management strategy (Olson & Wu, 2010). Risk and 
Operational managers can then use the risk tools to make judgements on what is 
acceptable and their assessments of whether a threat or vulnerability exists within their 
organisation.  
Olsen and Wu (2010) state risk can be viewed as threats, but business exists to cope 
with pressures. This view means that different organisations classify risk differently, a 
risk or threat to one organisation maybe opportunities to another organisation. Olson et 
al (2010) goes on further to explain, „the need to integrate disaster risk management 
into investment strategy is necessary to manage corporate value and reduce risk in the 
future and should be supplemented by effective governance‟ (Olson & Wu, 2010). 
Governance in Olsen‟s et al (2010) example means good policies and procedures. 
Smiechewicz (2001) provides a framework for ERM and generally risk management, 
relying on top management support within the organisation. Many organisations have 
Chief Risk Officers or Managers in official positions. How effective the risk 
management program depends on active participation of the top management to help 
the organisation survive the various risks and crises they encounter (Smiechewicz, 
2001). The framework listed below sets a formal structured process and measures and 
develops a company‟s risk system by: 
 Setting the risk appetite 
 Risk Identification process 
 Identifying the risks 
 Developing Risk matrix 
 Risk Management process  
 Risk Review processes (Feedback)     (Smiechewicz, 2001) 
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The engagement of management within any organisation is critical to ensure risk 
management is appropriately engaged at all levels within an organisation. Leadership is 
a key component and setting the example and “Walking the Talk” is a common 
expression within business. Ng, Tummala and Yam (2003) discuss a similar process 
which is a risk-based maintenance management model being applied to increase 
equipment reliability and availability of Road/Tunnel maintenance operations. It is five 
stage process using a risk management: identification, measurement, assessment, 
valuation and control and monitoring (Ng, Rao Tummala, & Yam, 2003). The primary 
objectives of the toll road management company are to provide reliable, safe, fast and 
cost effective journeys for tunnel users. In their literature review, the objective of risk 
management is to reduce and eliminate certain types of risks facing organisations by 
avoiding, reducing and transferring risks. In the comparison with several risk 
management approaches they developed a risk management process consisting of five 
core elements of risk Identification, Measurement, Assessment, Evaluation and Control 
(Ng et al., 2003). 
There are many principles, frameworks and processes for managing risk and the 
AS/NZS ISO 31000, Risk management - Principles and Guidelines (2009) offers 
guidelines for Australian organisations to follow. There have been a variety of different 
risk management standards around the world. This international standard
3
 is 
predominantly derived from different perspectives of risk management areas. It is the 
first universal risk standard which applies to all areas of risk management, such as 
compliance, operations, financial, strategy etc. This standard also indicates the level of 
risk management maturity and understanding generally across the private and public 
sectors and is intended that this standard harmonised risk management processes across 
all standards (Standards_AS/NZSISO31000, 2009).  
Like the core elements and processes mention in the research above, Standards 
Australia (2009) (subsequently the ISO) risk management process is: 
 Establish the context 
 Risk identification 
 Risk analysis 
 Risk assessment 
 Risk evaluation 
 Risk treatment 
                                                 
3 (Standards_AS/NZSISO31000, 2009) 
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 Monitoring and Review 
 Communication and consultation at every stage.  
(Standards_AS/NZSISO31000, 2009) 
The process and application of risk management is still a practice within general 
business needing application and refinement. Risk management is based on the 
requirement that the people within the organisation need to understand the business; 
consultants should not be employed to complete the risk management plan and 
identifying the organisations risk and apply treatments. The identification and analysis 
of any vulnerability can only successfully be achieved by people within the 
organisation. 
2.3.2 Business Continuity Management  
Unlike Risk Management, Business Continuity Management (BCM) is a process 
concerned with the whole business management, good governance and compliance. 
Companies not planning for incidents, logistic issues, interruptions or crisis events 
stand to lose more than just time and money (Wheatley & Barnes, 2013).  
BCM can provide a degree of assurance beyond an insurance policy 
(Standards_HB292, 2006). What value can be placed on a company‟s reputation, its 
link within a supply chain or the personnel they have working for them? BCM is about 
having a robust process that allows individuals to: 
 better understand uncertainty about the future, 
 realise the potential for different types of disruption, and 
 better plan for the future management of those disruptions, and to put in 
place business improvement to reduce the likelihood and/or consequence of 
significant future disruption.               
 
 (Standards_HB292, 2006).  
 
Public confidence that an organisation can manage crisis events and recover from 
incidents will enhance not only reputation but better long-term outcomes for that 
organisation. Lindström, Samuelsson and Hagerfors (2010) criticises that there is no 
good way to explain methodology of business continuity planning to senior 
management. From the author‟s personal experiences indications are that the practical 
part of senior/executive management awareness is improving as public incidents test 
large company‟s abilities to manage crises. Recent example of this is an incident of a 
tunnel collapse at Lane Cove Tunnel in Sydney. As a result of the crisis experience, a 
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training DVD was developed by Leighton Holdings. This DVD is a confidential 
internal training video used to give awareness of how to implement Crisis Management 
Plans and traps to be aware (Leighton, 2010). This DVD has many points but one point 
repeated several times throughout the video is:  
Be Prepared, Practise and Act Fast. 
From this point of view, the knock-on effects can be limited when organisations have 
Crisis Management Plans or Business Continuity Plans. This due to the fact that 
operational response plans have been considered and triggered into action and all 
essential personnel understands their role. If no one plan fits the crisis scenario at least 
an event has been considered and the team are not starting from the beginning with no 
action plan as they basically understand their crisis emergency roles.  
Business Continuity Planning - Frameworks and Models. Like risk management, 
BCM/Business Continuity Planning now appear to have several different types of 
methodology as it continues to develop (Gibb & Buchanan, 2006; Speight, 2011). 
Speight (2011) mentions business continuity planning may in fact be defined as 
“thinking the unthinkable” and it is about achieving a balance between preparing for 
situations in which contingency plans will have to be used, while at the same time 
doing everything conceivable to stop them ever having to be used. Business continuity 
establishes key process and business functions and determines what resources 
departments will require, and within what timeframes, to recommence their critical 
processes and functions (Booty, 2006; Clas, 2008; Lindström, Samuelsson, & 
Hägerfors, 2010; Speight, 2011).  
The International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) applies the Plan, Do, Check 
and Act (PDCA) model to Business Continuity Management systems. The PDCA 
model is a framework which is applied to many different types of managerial processes 
for general business planning, safety and engineering maintenance. This summary 
offers a framework applied to a BCM process. 
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Plan 
(Establish) 
Establish business continuity policy, objective, targets, control, processes 
and procedures relevant to improving business continuity in order to 
deliver results that align with the organisation‟s overall policies and 
objectives. 
Do 
(Implement and 
operate) 
Implement and operate the business continuity policy, controls, processes 
and procedures. 
Check 
(Monitor and 
review) 
Monitor and review performance against business continuity policy and 
objectives, report the results to management for review, determine and 
authorise actions for remediation and improvement. 
Act 
(Maintain and 
improve) 
Maintain and improve the Business Continuity Management System 
(BCMS) by taking corrective action based on the results of management 
review and reappraising the scope of the BCMS and business continuity 
policy and objectives. 
Table 2.1 The PDCA model. (ISO, 2012) 
Gibb (2006) describes a risk framework developed on experiences in the field of his 
research on various key business activities. The stages are: 
 Programme initiation is the process of senior management accepting and mapping 
BCM and developing guidelines and establishing appropriate monitoring and control 
mechanisms. 
 Project initiation is the phase where prioritisation of the BCM project is initiated 
following standard project management methodologies. The setting of goals and 
understanding the skills that are required to complete the Business Continuity Plan. 
 Risk analysis is the next phase, which is broken down into three distinct areas of risk 
identification, risk evaluation and business impact analysis (BIA). This is similar to any 
risk management process. 
 Selection of risk mitigation strategies phase deal with identifying and evaluating the 
options for dealing with risks identified in the previous phase. This phase deals with 
transferring, minimising, absorbing or pooling risks and also the reactive risks 
identified through scenarios and therefore developing reactive recovery plans.  
 Monitoring and control phase requires an effective communication, command and 
control structure to be in place to ensure that the requirements of the plan are translated 
into actions. 
 Implementation phase deals with improving the operating procedures, infrastructure 
and/or security which assist transfer, minimise or absorb risks. This phase ensures that 
the BCM is integrated with other systems.  
 Testing phase deals with performing tests on the risk mitigations strategies and 
recovery plans. It can be desk top exercises to performing operational tests. 
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 Education and training phase is concerned with ensuring the benefits of BCM strategy 
have been achieved and communicated to the workforce and where required training is 
provided. 
 Review phase is concerned with ensuring the BCM strategy is responsive to changes in 
the business. It is the feedback phase where the review of incidents performed and 
checking that the organisation BCM programme changes as the company changes 
 (Gibb & Buchanan, 2006). 
Many of these stages could be combined together to achieve the same outcome. Gibbs 
framework has additional stages and as the BCM process has improved over recent 
years, it can be seen by his framework that a review process and “closing the loop” 
function is starting to take place and better understanding the lessons learnt.  
Clas (2008) in his research reviewed ten essential elements of Business Continuity 
Management established from Institute of Continuity Management (USA) and the 
Business Continuity Institute (UK) which are guidelines and generally accepted as 
principles of BCM: 
 Program Initiation and Management 
 Risk Evaluation and control 
 Business Impact Analysis (BIA) 
 Business Continuity Strategies 
 Emergency Response and Operations 
 Business Continuity Plan 
 Awareness and Training 
 Business Continuity Plan Exercise, Audit and Maintenance 
 Crisis Communications 
 Coordination with External Agencies          (Clas, 2008) 
Clas (2008) elements starts to add more detail to the BCM literature by bringing 
together two respected guidelines to summarise the ten essential basic building blocks 
of a BCM strategy for an organisation. The key difference is that the risk analysis uses 
different business terms of business impact statements, strategies and responses which 
are now more accepted terminology and tend to be self-explanatory within the business 
environment. The additional key terms like awareness, training, exercise, audit and 
maintenance, communications and coordination start to bring together general 
awareness that a Business Continuity Plan is an ever evolving process requiring 
monitoring, needs continual regular testing and maintained and communicated internal 
and externally to the organisation. 
Speight (2011) describes a four stage cycle of: 
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 Mitigation: Reducing and managing risks 
 Readiness: instituting all measures that need to be in place, especially 
planning and warning systems 
 Response: Managing the emergency or crisis 
 Recovery: Identifying the requirements to return to normality once the 
incident is over.                        
 (Speight, 2011) 
 
Understanding Speight‟s four stages (and later Labaka (2013) Building the Resilience 
Capability) offers a better appreciation when elevating and applying analysis or step by 
step risk evaluation for a BCM process. Each phase or element from Gibb (2006), 
Speight (2011) and Clas (2008) is indicating a pattern which is emerging as to the key 
elements of a good risk management application within a Business Continuity Plan or 
Emergency Response Plan. Some of these keys elements are now within our 
International and Australian Standards and are starting to set essential guidelines within 
the Australian context as this field of study starts to mature. 
2.3.3 Standards and Government Guidance 
There are currently many standards and guidelines within the Risk and Business 
Continuity Management area and risk management is forming that underlining baseline 
of process or procedure. Table 2.2 indicates the development of BCM from a standards 
perspective indicating a form of maturity as standards become accepted. The 
development and acceptance of standards remains especially in the international 
context a debate that continues in the BCM field. Standards and guidelines that have 
emerged recognise the importance of collaboration between organisations in crisis 
responses and harmonising their practices (Herbane, 2010).  
Period Drivers Practice 
Nature of 
Progress 
Mid - 1970‟s to 
Mid - 1990‟s 
Emerging 
legislation 
Disaster Recovery 
Planning to Business 
Continuity Planning 
Development 
Mid – 1990‟s to 
2001 
Emerging 
standards 
Business Continuity 
Management started 
Development 
2002 to 2005 Acceleration 
and focus 
Business Continuity 
Management  
Diffusion 
2006 to 2010 Competing 
standards and 
breakouts 
Business Continuity 
Management on a maturity 
path 
Standardisation 
still developing 
Table 2.2 The development of BCM (Herbane, 2010) 
 Chapter 2: Literature Review 
28 
 
Risk Management – AS/NZS ISO 31000. All organisations manage risk, people in 
their everyday lives many their personal risk. How they cross the road safely. People 
inherently are managing the risk process of identification, evaluation, control and 
review. Organisations often need to demonstrate to current and potential customers that 
they can successfully manage their risk. As mentioned in section 2.3.1 no organisation 
is the same. AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009 defines risk as follows: 
“Organisations of any kind face internal and external factors and 
influences that make it uncertain whether, when and the extent to which 
they will achieve or exceed their objectives. The effect this uncertainty has 
on the organization‟s objectives is “risk”. 
Managing our organisational risks assists in the likelihood of achieving business 
objectives, comply with relevant legal and regulatory requirements and international 
norms and establish a reliable basis for decision making.  
The general 12 principles of the standard are risk management: 
 creates and protects value 
 is an integral part of all organisational processes 
 is part of decision making 
 explicitly addresses uncertainty 
 is systematic, structured and timely 
 is based on the best available information 
 is tailored 
 takes human and cultural factors into account 
 is transparent and inclusive 
 is dynamic, iterative and responsive to change 
 facilitates continual improvement of the organisation  
                                                            (Standards_AS/NZSISO31000, 2009). 
 
Business Continuity Management - AS/NZS 5050. This standard focuses on BCM 
and explains how to apply AS/NZS ISO 31000 to disruption-related risks and includes 
a methodology for determining how disruption can affect the continuity of an 
organisation (Standards_AS/NZS5050, 2010). To achieve this requires a good 
understanding of the business operating environment as well as the business objectives 
and risks. 
This standard uses the 12 principles outlined in the AS/NZS ISO 31000 and also the 
defined risk process of analysis monitoring and review. The standard discusses the 
capacity of the organisation to build contingency and prepare contingency plans. It also 
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explains disruptions can create opportunities and the organisation being ready to exploit 
such possibilities.  
On the surface the Australian Business Continuity standard, AS/NZS5050, looks like a 
duplication of the AS/NZS ISO 31000 Risk Management standard but major elements 
are the Business Impact Analysis (BIA), risk treatments looking at contingency plans 
and community consultation. Similar to Clas (2008) ten essential elements of the BCM 
strategy, this standard starts to add structure to BCM in a formal manner similar to a 
Strategic Business planning process. 
 
Figure 2.4 Business Impact Analysis (Standards_AS/NZS5050, 2010) 
When the BIA is carried out effectively it provides detailed insight into the extent, 
timeframes and mechanisms of disruption consequences and their likelihood. The BIA 
should reveal the critical functions, processes, capabilities and other resources 
(including external dependencies) which if disrupted would prevent the organisation 
achieving its critical objectives. The key stages of a BIA are listed in Figure 2.4 thought 
to be generally a linear step-by-step process but still having a quality function through 
continual feedback. The process is always live as the plan is an active part of the 
business.  
The output of the whole process from risk identification to risk analysis to BIA to risk 
treatments is to improve the organisations ability to respond quickly and optimally to 
events should they occur. This process assists in the development of Contingency or 
Crisis Management Plans which may take many forms but will address: 
Confirm the 
business 
functions to be 
analysed
Process review 
of each 
function
prepare an 
inventory of 
exisiting 
controls
Determine the 
significance of 
when and for how 
long the disruption 
could occur
Determine the 
effect of 
existing 
controls
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 Stabilisation after the event 
 Continuing critical functions, and 
 Recovery.     (Standards_AS/NZS5050, 2010) 
Before an event is the time for preparation, taking the time to implement proactive 
controls that can make potentially disruptive events less frequent or severe or preparing 
plans to activate once an event commences (Standards_AS/NZS5050, 2010). Figure 2.5 
indicates activity level verses time once a disruptive event has commenced. 
 
Figure 2.5 Relationship of Treatments for Disruption-related risk 
The diagram indicates the high level of organisational activity when a crisis event takes 
place and the timing of concurrent activities like stabilisation, critical business 
functions and recovery until the organisation is back to „normal‟ activity. It also 
indicates the routine and non-routine management  
Other Standards. Handbook (HB) 292, A Practitioners guide to Business Continuity 
Management (2006) and HB 293, Executive Guide to Business Continuity 
Management (2006) were developed before the current Business Continuity standard, 
AS/NZS5050 but provide a step by step process showing the emerging practices in 
Australia, USA and the UK at that time. Both standards support the current AS/NZS 
5050 using variations on Risk Management as AS/NZS ISO 31000 was not developed 
when these Guides were issued. The guides assist in a resilience approach to build 
capacity within organisations to not only effectively respond to a crisis, but also be able 
to learn and adapt from an event. This approach moves from the traditional approach of 
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developing plans with a finite set of scenarios (Standards_HB292, 2006). HB 167, 
Security Risk Management provides a better understanding of the nature of security 
threats and their interaction at the individual, organisations or community level. This 
guideline uses the Risk Management process and defines „Security Risk Management‟ 
as the culture, processes and structures that are directed towards maximising benefits 
and minimising disbenefits in security, consistent with achieving business objectives 
(Standards_HB167, 2006). 
 
An International Standard was released in January 2014 called ISO 5500X Asset 
Management – Management System requirements which is also a risk/financial based 
standard. There are three standards within the series of ISO 55000. It is currently 
viewed as a possible financial risk standard to manage an asset over its “Whole of Life” 
through effective capital and operational planning and also focuses asset management 
from a risk perspective. 
2.3.4 Government Strategy documents 
At the National level, the term Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) is used to 
describe actions or measures undertaken to mitigate the specific threat of terrorism 
(Australian Government-A, 2011). The National Guidelines for the protection of 
Critical Infrastructure (CI) provides a framework for a national, consistent approach on 
the protection of this infrastructure from terrorism for the Commonwealth, State and 
Territory governments and business (TISN, 2008). These documents have no authority 
and questionable statements of commitment and best practice, like “Governments and 
business recognise the need to share intelligence and information on threats and 
vulnerabilities” is a key statement but what are the mechanisms for this to take place. 
The commercial and possible legal implications are not addressed or discussed in these 
documents. Private organisations require „real‟ threats to have the finance to invest in 
capital required to ensure more resilience in the public infrastructure. A basic cost 
benefit analyse exercise provides the answer as private organisation usually do not 
invest in theoretical threat prevention upgrades unless there is a real requirement – 
often after the fact.  
The guideline discusses prevention, preparedness, response, recovery and planning 
exercises and also discusses interdependencies between organisations; For example the 
requirement for cooperation between water, power, telecommunications industries. The 
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guideline references the Risk Management standard, ISO 31000 and Handbook 167 
Security Risk Management as how to achieve the guidelines outcomes. 
Having resilient infrastructure is the key goal of the Australian Government which 
includes the important objective of prevention of a crisis or reducing the impact of a 
disruption or accident (Australian Government-B, 2010; Labaka et al., 2013). Figure 
2.6 below briefly oversights the two policies objectives the governments foresees by 
effective managing the foreseeable and unforeseeable risks to the continuity of 
operations.  
 
Figure 2.6 Australian Government‟s approach to CI Resilience Strategy (TISN web site) 
The „Bridges and Tunnels Security Risk Context Statement‟ (2010) is an Australian 
government document that summarises the greatest threat to Australian bridges and 
tunnels comes from terrorist groups associated with global movements. The Statement, 
like National Guidelines for the protection of Critical Infrastructure, points to a risk 
based approach and recommends the process AS/NZS ISO 31000 Risk Management-
Principles and Guidelines and the Security Risk Management Handbook 167. The 
purpose of this statement is to a provide nationally coordinated threat and risk context 
material to assist the development of security planning in the transport sector 
(Australian Government-C, 2010). 
The difficulty with these governmental documents is they fall short of discussing how 
this security or resilience is achieved. As mentioned by Auerswald et al (2005), the 
responsibility for setting goals rest primarily with government however the 
implementation of steps to reduce vulnerability of privately owned assets depends 
primarily on private sector knowledge and action which as previously mentioned 
private organisation often do not have adequate commercial incentive to fund any 
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vulnerability reductions (Auerswald et al., 2005). This appears to be a significant 
weakness within the Australia CI sector. 
2.4 Critical Infrastructure Protection  
The responsibility for setting goals for protecting infrastructure rest primarily with the 
government, but implementation of steps to reduce the vulnerability of privately owned 
and corporate assets depends primarily on private sector knowledge and action 
(Auerswald et al., 2005). Private firms understand their operations and hazards 
however it is clear they currently do not have adequate commercial incentive to fund 
vulnerability reduction.  
Crisis planning is an important factor in any organisations strategic management 
process. Not all managers are convinced that its role is important, and as a result often 
do not have effective crisis management plans in place (Crandall, Parnell, & Spillan, 
2010). The practice of crisis preparedness is not well stated within some organisations 
due to priorities of everyday business practices and the risk of thinking it will not 
happen to me. Crisis management can be viewed as creating tactics to deal with a fast 
developing situation with serious ramifications (Gottschalk, 2002).  
Multiple forces are working against the move from protection to resilience, 
despite governmental and corporate recognition of the importance of the 
move. It is in the interest of the public sector and the private sector to 
embrace resilience despite fiscal tightening.   (Givens & Busch, 2013)  
Critical Infrastructure (CI) by its name suggests that infrastructure performs functions 
that are essential to the public. These essential asset services can easily be applied to 
large private corporations whose services transpire into the private workplace. The 
most efficient operation of a single CI often relies on the effective functioning of 
several other related infrastructures (Brody & Schmittlein, 2012). Chai (2011) argues 
based on the definitions of five governments for determining CI, the functions are 
health, safety, economic well-being, continuous function of government and national 
morale are key criteria (Brody & Schmittlein, 2012). As the inner workings of these 
large scale systems become harder to understand, breakdowns within them become 
harder to manage due to their criticality to perform a public service and the 
interdependencies of critical infrastructure. 
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In recent years, the Australian Government (2010) altered their approach to protecting 
critical infrastructure to go beyond risk management and business continuity planning 
to also address hazards and disturbances that are unforeseen or unexpected, figure 2.6 
(Australian Government-C, 2010). Early 2013, the Victorian government adopted a 
similar approach calling it, „A Roadmap for Victorian Critical Infrastructure 
Resilience‟4. Implementing a similar framework, the Victorian government took an all 
hazards approach to resilience encompassing the idea that planning for one kind of 
hazard or disaster event can also increase the resilience of a community therefore 
different hazard events can have similar consequences on infrastructure. This approach 
also recognises that our CI is highly interdependent in complex ways, both physically 
and through a host of information and communications technologies. Figure 2.7 offers 
an example of the interdependencies of critical infrastructure and its complexities 
(Rinaldi, Peerenboom, & Kelly, 2001). 
 
Figure 2.7 Depiction of the Interdependencies within Critical Infrastructure    
It also recognised that a significant portion of Australians critical infrastructure is 
privately owned or operated on a commercial basis. These governmental documents 
indicate in most cases these private organisations are better placed to manage any risks 
and provide mitigation strategies. This document attempts to discuss threats to the CI 
                                                 
4 Victorian Government. Dept of Premier and Cabinet. „A Roadmap for Victorian Critical Infrastructure Resilience: An All 
Hazards Resilience Framework‟ (2013) 
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however does not prescribe a solution especially in the complexities of 
interdependencies issues. 
2.4.1 Risk Planning for Transport Infrastructure 
Easily assessable research has been limited. In Australia, our dependence on road 
infrastructure has grown commensurate with urban growth with these networks 
forming the logistical life blood on our cities. The motor vehicle has revolutionised the 
world and roads and tunnels are an essential part of their success. The value of a 
countries national road infrastructure can be compared to the value of the world‟s 
largest companies (Robinson, 2000). As a result, public expectations about the 
efficiency and reliability of road networks are critical. Throughout local road 
network(s), when significant disturbances occur the effects may be limited to reduced 
traffic flow causing congestion and possible loss of income to businesses or industry. 
Sources of disturbance impacting road systems may not even be directly linked to the 
physical failure of infrastructure itself but might be triggered by other incidents such as 
loss of electricity, within a business or other infrastructure component (Wheatley & 
Barnes, 2013).  
Our public infrastructure is a key element and core component of our society (Lay, 
2009). Roads are the essences of our human conductivity and ensuring life continues 
with our personal and business plans. For vehicles to reach high speeds safely efficient 
and well-designed infrastructure is required and therefore modern cities require safe 
and well managed infrastructure. Today‟s roads and tunnels have Intelligent Traffic 
Systems (ITS) and Tolling systems that assist management of the road infrastructure. 
This adds to the complexity of the asset.  
The challenges of crisis response planning in organisations managing transport 
infrastructure are many (Wheatley & Barnes, 2013). For example, the application of 
comprehensive risk assessment processes that can identify and inform mitigation 
options for critical sources of disturbance are at the core of effective management. In 
the capital intensive construction industry, the consequences of unidentified or 
unmanaged risks in project execution and design can have significant adverse impact 
on the operational performance of the project (Doloi, 2012). Ng et al (2003) in their 
research on toll road/tunnel operations indicate the failure and effects of equipment 
and the corresponding preventative actions are not communicated well internally 
between departments (engineering and operations) within these road organisations. 
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The increasing demands for tight regulatory requirements, shorter maintenance times 
(shorter operations down times) and lower maintenance budgets have added to the 
complexities and difficulties of maintenance operations significantly. Therefore new 
approaches need to be considered that would assist management to choose the best 
course of action to reduce or eliminate the potential risks of equipment failure (Ng et 
al., 2003) and other threats. 
If risk based assessments are carried out on transport infrastructure, managers will be 
better placed to make informed judgements on the most viable preventive and reactive 
options that suit their needs. This is often a critical requirement when managing the 
operational availability of the asset but is often not considered during the construction 
phase of the project. Often effective project delivery strongly links with efficient risk 
management programs over the construction phase, there is no clear evidence on how 
construction related risks potentially affect the operational performance over the post 
construction phase (Doloi, 2012). Crisis Management and operational critical 
requirements need to be more defined in infrastructure contracts as decisions made 
during construction can last for the life of the asset and therefore the legacy of any 
short term decisions within the design and construction phase can have longer lasting 
effect in the operations phase of an assets life cycle. A more whole of life approach is 
required for public critical infrastructure.  
Private organisations that manage public infrastructure have added a further dimension 
for public asset management, particularly around communication and ultimately control 
of the assets (Boin & Smith, 2006). The communication between private and public 
organisations is often in doubt due to the different apparent priorities between these 
organisations and the possible mistrust. Figure 2.7 indicates the complexities of these 
organisations were a mixture of government and private industries (which is often the 
case). This will also become apparent in the outcomes of this thesis but for different 
reasons. Again CI responsibilities need to be more detailed in any government contracts 
to ensure the public obtains the availability and reliability of these public assets in time 
of crisis and the proper due diligence has been considered between all organisations. 
2.4.2 Managing Risk in Transport Infrastructure 
Critical infrastructure has demands and expectations because of the particular public 
importance and dependency, however brief of a breakdown, any interruption 
undermines the public trust in the ability of organisation management to provide and 
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preserve a sense of security (Boin & Smith, 2006). It is generally understood that 
transport infrastructure is costly to design, construct and maintain. Often maintenance 
budgets are based on assumptions which have no bearing on the condition of the asset 
and requirement for any periodic maintenance (Wheatley & Barnes, 2013). Periodic 
(Routine) maintenance is often the first type of maintenance to be delayed or reduced 
because of budget limitations. When maintenance is delayed or not carried out to 
schedule for special infrastructure types such as Tunnels and Bridges, the asset ages 
faster and its durability or operational life reduces accordingly. As mention in previous 
sections complexity can introduce failure into a system and this can be avoided through 
better designed engineered safety features, preventative maintenance, operator training 
and so forth (Shrivastava et al., 2009) 
Nonetheless, for Tunnels and Bridges, the signs of age are often not obvious until a 
critical failure occurs. Owners or Custodians of public assets need to be aware of the 
consequences of poor design, not performing or delaying routine maintenance and the 
monitoring of traffic loads. These actions can prematurely age infrastructure (consume 
an asset) extremely quickly and introduce potential failures into the asset systems. 
Some examples of asset failures or lack of availability of the asset include: 
 Westgate Bridge collapse: Two years into construction of the Westgate Bridge in 
Melbourne, at 11.50 am on 15
th
 October 1970, a 112 m span collapsed and fell 50 m to 
the ground and water below. Thirty-five construction workers were killed. A Royal 
Commission into the collapse was established, and concluded on 14 July 1971
5
. It 
attributed the failure of the bridge to two causes of the structural design and the unusual 
method of construction. 
 Tasman Bridge collision: On 5th January 1975, a bulk ore carrier travelling up the 
Derwent River, in Hobart collided with several pylons of the Tasman Bridge, causing a 
large section of the bridge deck to collapse onto the ship and into the river below. 
Twelve people were killed, including seven crew on board the ship, and the five 
occupants of four cars which fell 45m after driving off the bridge.
6 
 
 Mont Blanc Tunnel fire. On the morning of 24th March 1999, 39 people died when a 
Belgian transport truck carrying flour and margarine caught fire in the Mont Blanc 
tunnel. As the incident developed, this was not yet a fire emergency; the driver stopped 
in the middle of the 11.6km tunnel and attempted to fight the fire but basically lost 
control. There had been 16 other truck fires in the tunnel over the previous 35 years, 
                                                 
5 http://www.westgatebridge.org/ accessed 19 mar 2013 
6 http://www.parliament.tas.gov.au/history/brd1.htm accessed 19 Mar 2013 
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always extinguished on the spot by the drivers. Other than the issues of the systems and 
fighting the fire most of drivers rolled up their windows and waited for rescue.
7 
 
 Big Dig Tunnel collapse. On 10th July 2006, a concrete ceiling panel weighing 3 tons 
fell on a car traveling on the two-lane ramp connecting northbound I-93 to eastbound I-
90 highways in South Boston Big Dig tunnel, killing one person who was a passenger, 
and injuring her husband. The collapse and closure of the tunnel greatly snarled traffic in 
the city and the resulting traffic jams are cited as contributing to the death of another 
person, a heart attack victim who died en-route to Boston Medical Centre when his 
ambulance was caught in one such traffic jam two weeks after the collapse.
8 
 
 Burnley Tunnel fire. On 23rd March 2007 just before 10am, in the Burnley Tunnel in 
Melbourne, a pile-up occurred in the tunnel involving three trucks and four cars. The 
crash resulted in an explosion and a subsequent fire which reached temperatures in 
excess of 1,000 °C and killed three people. This particular issue was caused by a driver 
who was later goaled. The coroner‟s report was released Mar 2013.9 
 Minneapolis Bridge collapse. On 1st August 2007, the I-35W Bridge in Minneapolis 
buckled. Rush-hour traffic that was stalled on the bridge, went into free fall as dozens of 
vehicles plummeted into the Mississippi River. Thirteen people died, and 145 were 
hurt.
10 This triggered a country wide inspection of America‟s aging infrastructure which 
is still a major concern due to budget concerns.  
 Sasago tunnel fire. On 3rd Dec 2012, Concrete ceiling panels fell onto moving vehicles 
deep inside the Japanese Sasago tunnel, and authorities confirmed nine deaths before 
suspending rescue work. At this stage it is suspected that a steel bracket failure has 
bought down concrete roof panels due to lack of maintenance. The disaster has prompted 
Japanese authorities to order emergency checks on dozens of other tunnels across the 
country that have a similar design, as questions were raised about whether aging parts 
may have contributed to the collapse. 
11
 
 Sydney Harbour Tunnel congestion. On 20th Feb 2013, Motorists were experiencing 
extensive peak hour delays following a truck fire in the Sydney Harbour Tunnel. Traffic 
was backed up at both ends of the tunnel after a freightliner in the southbound lane 
caught on fire just after 4pm, activating a fire alarm and causing the closure of the 
tunnel.
12 
This incident affect Sydney for over eight hours and the financial figures being 
circulated in the press quotes business in the $ millions.  
 
                                                 
7 http://www.mace.manchester.ac.uk/project/research/structures/strucfire/CaseStudy/HistoricFires/ InfrastructuralFires/mont.htm 
accessed 19 Mar 2013 
8 http://www.apegm.mb.ca/pdf/PD_Papers/bigdig.pdf  accessed 19 Mar 2013 
9 http://media.smh.com.au/news/national-news/coroner-calls-for-tunnel-emergency-lanes-3991795.html accessed 19 Mar 2013 
10 http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/engineering/rebuilding-america/the-minnesota-bridge-collapse-5-years-later- 
11254114 accessed 19 Mar 2013 
11 http://edition.cnn.com/2012/12/03/world/asia/japan-tunnel-collapse-bolts accessed 19 Mar 2013 
12 http://www.news.com.au/breaking-news/national/truck-fire-closes-sydney-harbour-tunnel/story-e6frfku9-1226582150849 
accessed 19 Mar 2013 
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From 1995 up to late 2012, major tunnel incidents since have killed 713 people 
worldwide.
13 
This figure does not include other road or bridge infrastructure failures. 
This small selection indicates crises happen in public infrastructure in Australia and 
Worldwide as infrastructure ages and which can often be avoided or better managed. 
None of these examples came from terrorist resulting incidents, major incidents to 
managed tunnel fires, the consequences are often difficult to calculate but have public, 
private and political consequences for some period to follow. The threat of terrorism 
has changed the CI risk management process worldwide and significant investment has 
been added to the protection of national transport assets
14
. 
When a breakdown or failure occurs, the consequences of the initial triggering event 
spread through the interconnected CIs can be catastrophic. In addition, a range of 
unintended consequences that can be associated with real-time interventions have also 
become part of this equation. Ultimately, the interlinkages between critical systems 
allow for the rapid escalation of seemingly modest disturbances. Thus the protection of 
CI, as a result of these disturbances, must take into account the potential domino effect 
of infrastructure failure (Brody & Schmittlein, 2012). The CI network is often a 
complex and dynamic system and by this nature it is difficult to identify direct cause 
and effect relationships (Labaka et al., 2013). However as described in the HRT theory, 
these complex systems and interlinkages could be managed by the criteria discussed in 
Section 2.2.2.3 and having an understanding of the system design and considering what 
could go wrong within the organisations.  
2.4.3  Challenges for Critical Infrastructure  
As Wang (2008) suggests most organisations are found not adequately prepared to 
manage risk or crises. Organisations are most likely to account for vulnerabilities that 
are linked to their own core activities (Auerswald et al., 2005; Givens & Busch, 2013). 
Due to the nature and the intermix of organisations managing critical infrastructure, 
extraordinary levels of co-ordination of the many organisations, public and private, will 
be required to secure improved levels of prevention, response and recovery (Auerswald 
et al., 2005). Public organisations tend to prepare for known and expected emergencies 
                                                 
13 http://international.fhwa.dot.gov/uts/uts_eu06_02.cfm accessed 19 Mar 2013  
14 After Sept 11, some national Australian assets (eg, Sydney Harbour Bridge) were protected by 24/7 security guards. Also 
budgets were allocated to increasing the engineering resilience of significant national transport assets. The exact number in 
unknown due to security requirements. This also took place in America under the recommendations for Bridge and Tunnel 
Security document. 
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(on the basis of a priori-based risk assessments), but the administrative toolbox that is 
used for routine problems is of limited use in the face of the „unannounced‟ crisis or 
preparing for the unknown (Boin & Smith, 2006). A lack of experience can sometimes 
limit management thinking especially in the CM field. CM formed due to „these 
inconceivable threats coming true‟. (Boin, 2008). However as Herbane (2010) says,  
„the crisis management field has not been without it polemics‟ (Herbane, 2010). 
The traditional tools of risk assessment and risk management have become very 
sophisticated as a result of environmental, health and safety regulations. Auerswald et 
al (2005) comments that such tools are still inadequate in coping with high-impact, 
low-likelihood events and the main reason for this is due to the scale and reach of these 
large technological systems have increased, the potential economic and social damages 
of failures has also increased.  
The challenges of planning response and recovery in ageing and new-build 
infrastructure vary due to design considerations and the operational requirements at that 
time of construction. Design of recent infrastructure should consider new technologies 
and issues central to crisis response ranging from terrorism to traffic congestion 
(Wheatley & Barnes, 2013). While crisis response to aging infrastructure will be 
similar to that of new infrastructure, the recovery and setup and the technology 
complexities could be considerably different. Thus making a standard and planned 
response and recovery for all types of situations challenging and often with complex 
technical structures full risk profiles are incomplete. Justification for more complex 
failure modes analysis that can influence infrastructure design or adding more complex 
operational requirements may be limited by budget constraints. The ramifications of 
these decisions are now more far reaching in the interconnected infrastructure that is 
relied upon every day. 
Accountability for and accounting of vulnerabilities differ from core business activities 
for any organisation is relatively uncommon, particular when perceived probabilities of 
occurrences are very low (Auerswald et al., 2005). This is currently the main concern 
when private organisations are charged with the custodianship of critical infrastructure 
as they often only look at their areas of responsibly and contractual requirements. Also 
with the threat of litigation often prevents organisations from revealing or sharing 
information on actual and potential problems that they may have encountered (Speight, 
2011).  
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Management and staff can be embarrassed or afraid of having their employment 
terminated if they reveal concerns as a result personnel tend not to inform management 
of errors they have made (Speight, 2011). Some large organisations (Airservices 
Australia, Lend Lease and Leighton Contractors) have safety programmes that allow 
the reporting of near misses which is a self-reporting process. This process is „no blame 
culture‟ where the company is attempting to improve safety overall by having a 
proactive reporting of near misses which is called a key performance lead indicator 
where the reporting of actual incidents and accidents is a lag indicator. The monitoring 
and positive reduction of lead indicators is then hoped to reduce incidents and accidents 
accordingly through the general awareness of the seriousness of the near misses. 
Perry et al. (2003) suggest there is too much effort on writing the Emergency Response 
Plan which has drawn attention away from the process of planning itself and the object 
of achieving community preparedness. Perry et al. (2003) states the first difficulty is 
the emphasis on the presence of a plan as a document, rather that the emphasis on the 
planning process. A document is not going to give the solution to every contingency 
however planning is required to consider and review current practices. He also states 
the second problem is a general lack of awareness of the literature on planning for 
natural and technological disasters on the part of elected officials, policy actors and 
law-enforcement officials who direct much of the terrorism construction plans (Perry et 
al. 2003).  
2.4.4  Private Public Partnerships 
As defined earlier, Private Public Partnerships (PPP) models are used by governments 
to fund public infrastructure using private and/or public equity. The current research is 
limited and mainly focuses on the construction elements of infrastructure. The aim of a 
PPP is to deliver improved services and better value for money primarily through 
appropriate risk management transfer, encouraging innovation, greater asset utilisation 
and an integrated whole-of-life management, underpinned by private financing 
(Government-D, 2008). There are many different types of PPP funding models that 
change the risk framework between government and private industry which are the 
main two stakeholders (Fischer et al., 2010). The private parties are then represented by 
a bidding consortia or newly established Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV).  
When these PPP type of projects are tendered usually one organisation (construction 
organisation) manages and submits the tender and when the tender is successfully 
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awarded, the project will raise the SPV organisations [private companies with a specific 
purposes – Concessionaire Company, Design and Construct (D&C) organisation and 
the Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Organisation] (Wilson 2010). The 
concessionaire private company will have overall responsibility for the project and 
design, build, own, manage and operate the project (infrastructure) for the tender and 
therefore whole concession period. The D&C organisation will be the organisation 
contractually charged with designing and building the project with the O&M specialist 
organisation being charged with operating and maintaining the infrastructure for the 
duration of the concession. Tender concession periods to operate these types of public 
infrastructure can now vary from 10 to 50 years. This duration is to allow the 
private/public investor who funded the project to build the infrastructure and to make 
their return on investment. Figure 2.8 below indicates a typical structure of a PPP group 
of companies. 
 
Figure 2.8 Example of an organisational structure for a PPP 
Fischer et al (2010) states the implementation of PPP as a procurement method for 
public infrastructure by the public sectors has recently come to be more closely 
examined with attention to risk management. PPPs have been used in Australia for over 
20 years and are still lacking a consistent and common standardised definition of 
named risks and improvements in transparency and credibility of risk management also 
needs to be better understood (Doloi, 2012; Fischer et al., 2010).  
The complexity of PPP and the organisational and contractual structure leaves 
challenges for the government owners. This can also be translated to the crisis 
management area as incentives for any single organisation to invest in prevention, 
response and recovery are often reduced or isolated to their contractual areas. Private 
Concessionaire 
Company 
(reporting to government 
dept)
Design & 
Construction 
Organisation
Operations and 
Maintenance 
Organisation
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decision makers will neither have adequate information nor sufficient motivation to 
undertake investments that are more than justified therefore without a global approach 
to understanding interdependencies and determining any source or possible source of 
disruptions are difficult (Auerswald et al., 2005). 
In both public/private and PPP, the tension between organisational autonomy and the 
interdependence of the constituent units of the large-scale system makes 
communication and coordination critical (Auerswald et al., 2005; Wilson et al., 2010). 
The creation of successful PPPs requires alignment with the strategic goals of the 
public sector and that of the private sector partner. A partnership needs to be created 
rather than simply contractual.  
2.5 Issues in Resilience and Crisis Management 
The resilience of CI systems has become one of the key elements to assure not only the 
continuity of operations but the availability of vital functions for modern societies. 
Cascading faults effects due to local disruptions, caused by multiple CI 
interdependencies, involve different actors and stakeholders along with traditional first 
responders, and make coordination and information sharing key elements of an 
effective crisis management (Labaka et al., 2013; Trucco, 2012). However this is not 
often the situation within the private management of CI as discussed previously.  
2.5.1 Approaches to Organisational Resilience 
Having resilient infrastructure is the key to crisis management and in order to reduce 
crisis events from happening and the likely impact resilience levels of systems should 
be improved. Boin et al (2013) examined the relationship between organisational 
processes and the outcome of resilience and recognises two problems. Firstly, what is 
resilience exactly and secondly it is hard to recognise resilience in action. Creating 
resilient organisations is required by promoting a greater understanding of what 
resilience means to organisations (McManus et al., 2008). Resilience is an importance 
concept and it forms one of the key attributes an organisation is required to have to 
manage a crisis or have an ability to survive a crisis in one form or another. This 
capability of resilience then enhances the critical service and/or infrastructure 
component being maintained. However Klein
15
 (2003) recaps by mentioning resilience 
                                                 
15
 Referenced in (McManus et al., 2008) 
 Chapter 2: Literature Review 
44 
 
still remains a theoretical concept and methods for achieving improved resilience at an 
operational level still challenge both academic and the practitioner.  
The following three models/approaches detail explanations for developing crisis 
management skillsets and, as a result, enhancing understanding of resilience.  
Example 1 – McManus’s Model.  
McManus et al (2008) describes three main attributes of resilience in an 
organisation: 
 Situational Awareness 
 Management of Keystone Vulnerability 
 Adaptive Capacity. 
 
McManus et al (2007) suggests that Resilience Management is designed as an 
iterative process for long-term organisational development and not as a one-off 
crisis management tool. This methodology is similar to a quality process for an 
organisation. The McManus process tool uses three attributes mentioned above 
for evaluation. It is a scalable method of understanding a crisis and improving the 
„organisations‟ situation awareness of a possible crisis event. Figure 2.9 provides 
four stages on a timeline over a crisis event. The three attributes can be seen to be 
applied over the timeline process of Reduction, Readiness, Response and 
Recovery stages. 
 
Figure 2.9 The 4 R‟s to Improving Situation Awareness 
Situational Awareness. The fundamental approach to increasing situational 
awareness is to encourage experience through the use of scenario exercises and 
training. This crisis management technique adds significant value for the 
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organisation particularly if personnel across a wider area are involved (Lee et al., 
2013; McManus et al., 2008). 
Management of Keystone Vulnerabilities. The keystone vulnerabilities are 
components in the organisation systems, which by their loss or impairment, have 
potential to cause exceptional effects throughout the system. Keystone 
vulnerabilities maybe catastrophic due to a sudden loss of a system or just 
insidious. Example can be assets such as buildings or plant to individual 
managers or key subject matter experts.  
Adaptive Capacity. The Adaptive Capacity is a measure of the culture and 
dynamics of an organisation that allow it to make decisions in a timely manner, 
both a day-to-day business and also in crises events. It is also the ability of an 
enterprise to alters its strategy, operations, management systems, governance 
structure and decision-support capabilities to withstand perturbations and 
disruptions (Lee et al., 2013; McManus et al., 2008).  
Using this example, key to improving crisis management is the understanding of 
the stages of a crisis and the application of the attributes.  
Example 2 – Heath’s Model. 
Evaluating crisis management and training exercises is fundamental for the 
improvement of crisis management (Heath, 1998). Heath (1998) discusses by 
using a four stage evaluation components (Figure 2.10), a comprehensive and 
focused approach to evaluating and assessing crisis management can be 
developed. He goes on to detail and explains that each can be broken down into 
four streams of investigation and analysed by looking at the structures, systems, 
processes and people involved. He also indicates the evaluation of a simulated or 
real crisis actually consists of four components. These components are:  
 the crisis environment 
 the crisis incident 
 the pre-impact crisis management 
 the crisis impact management 
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Figure 2.10 Four stage evaluation components (Heath, 1998) 
Heath suggests this systematic approach is more likely to identify contributory 
causes of a crisis for evaluators, professional witnesses, and members of inquiry 
boards and commissions. This process than enables the organisation to better 
understand its situation in a crisis event. Similar process to Example 1. 
 
Example 3 – Labaka’s Model. 
Having a high system resilience level allows the system to be able to absorb the 
triggering event and avoid a crisis (Labaka et al., 2013). A system that has a high 
level of resilience level helps reduce the magnitude of any crisis as well as to 
resolve the crisis sooner. This concept is of critical importance in Crisis 
Management as it enables an organisation or infrastructure asset to be able to 
weather the „storm‟.  
Figure 2.11 below indicates the three stages (pre-crisis, crisis peak and post-
crisis) and four phases (mitigation, preparation, response and recovery) and a 
level (functionality) of resilience for a system.  
 Chapter 2: Literature Review 
47 
 
Figure 2.11 Building the Resilience Capability (Labaka et al., 2013) 
The trigger event shown indicates a level of „impact‟. Events can take 
organisations to functionality levels where they may not recover for whatever 
reason, so an organisation developing a significant resilience level enhances the 
organisation ability to recover (Wheatley & Barnes, 2013).  
A level of resilience can be interpreted as a capability to continue functioning 
while being affected by stressors. Different events will have different effects on 
an organisations ability to maintain operations.  
Figure 2.11 represents an organisations functionality when impacted by a disturbance. 
It depicts a resilient capability into four different phases: mitigation and preparation, 
response and recovery. In the pre-crisis stage, mitigation risks are identified to avoid 
the occurrence of any incident or at least reduce the possibility of negative effects on 
human life or property. The preparation phase includes organisational planning 
activities for dealing with foreseeable events. When the triggering event takes place 
response actions are preformed to immediately minimise the potential impact and to 
reduce any losses as much as possible. Post crisis period is the recovery phase which is 
the return to stable (maybe normal) operations (Labaka et al., 2013). It is also where 
the analysis and learning occurs to ensure that if an event of similar nature occurs again 
it should have a less of an impact (Wheatley & Barnes, 2013).  
In this example again there are stages on an organisation‟s response timeline that assists 
in the understanding and development of improving crisis responses for critical 
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infrastructure. Labaka (2013) in a recent paper describes twelve resilience building 
practices covering four dimensions: Technical, Organisational, Economic and Social.
16
  
Labaka et al (2013) model suggests that organisations can increase their capability for 
resilience by implementing these elements as basic elements of consideration for Crisis 
Management planning. These practices are detailed in Table 2.3. 
 
Technical resilience 
CI design and construction: This refers to the quality, robustness, redundancy and security of the 
design and construction of the infrastructure or element that the CI is responsible for. This should 
include increase security of the system by increasing the number of systems and/or redundancy 
CI maintenance: As part of design is the ability to perform high quality maintenance activities in 
order to improve the systems performance and reliability. Part of this criteria also complies with new 
legislation.  
CI data acquisition and transmission system: This practice deals with the quality, reliability and 
effectiveness of the sensors and computer equipment that should be set up to supervise and control 
the CI. This includes adequate software to control the system. 
Public crisis response equipment availability: The availability, quality, redundancy, reliability and 
security level of the technical equipment belonging to public bodies, first responders and society is 
essential in order to face a crisis, repair damage and respond to emergency situation. 
Organisational Resilience 
CI capacity for crisis detection, communication and analysis: This corresponds to the capacity of 
operators to detect, communicate and analyse a crisis, proposing new preventative measure for the 
future. This includes training and learning systems. 
CI workforce training and commitment: Workers at the CI must be adequately trained prior to the 
occurrence of a crisis so they know how to respond. They should be aware and know of the 
procedures and protocols when something unexpected occurs. Responding in a timely manner and in 
a coordinated manner can reduce time during the crisis and any negative effects. 
First responders training: This training has to do with how first responders are prepared to face a 
crisis. This includes training and familiarity of the organisation/site. „Actions on‟ can detail and 
reduce a dangerous unknown situation to a known and more familiar less hazardous situation.  
Government preparation: A government‟s main role is to properly communicate the situation to the 
public and give advice as this will diminish the public‟s anxiety. They should also lead and 
coordinate all the entities and deal with the crisis. 
Economic resilience 
CI crisis budget: CI‟s should have funds set aside in order to cover repairs and replacements should 
a crisis occur. This assists their economic resilience level but also allows the CI to bounce back by 
reducing their response and recovery times. 
Public crisis budget: Public institutions should also set aside funds in order to assist stakeholders 
and society. This allows organisations, society and first responders to obtain resources in a 
reasonable time. If funding is scarce the respond and recovery can be hampered.  
Social resilience 
Societal preparation: Society also plays an importance role in the resolution of a crisis. Public 
awareness is important in preparing society. This can include support to local hospitals and 
volunteering to assist in personnel resources. 
Legal and regulatory issues: This relates to the maturity level of the crisis regulations in order to 
take preventive measures and define protocols. An incident being caused by a lack of maintenance 
often leads to legalities when not carried out to „best‟ practice. This area also deals with the 
regulations that companies are required to meet. 
 
Table 2.3 Twelve resilience building practices (Labaka et al., 2013) 
                                                 
16
 Originally quoted by (Buchanan & Denyer, 2013) 
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This framework could be also used as a basic measure of an organisation‟s capability to 
be resilient and subsequently measure an organisational ability to recover from a crisis. 
Such considerations need to be considered within the planning and design phases of 
new infrastructure builds to have the most influence as the ability to modify elements 
of these practices may be problematic due to cost implications and construction 
difficulties.  
The three Crisis event examples indicate there are patterns to understanding a crisis 
event therefore developing and documenting these key stages of preparation, the 
incident and the recovery within an organisation can offer an enhanced ability to 
manage and understand the elements of a crisis response. An organisation that develops 
strategies for these stages, documents and tests itself will be better placed to manage a 
crisis event. The processes of considering and developing pre-determine actions will 
assist crisis managers in their thinking and ability to react. 
2.5.2 Communications and the Media 
Crisis communications travels fast and in the age of technology, the bigger the crisis, 
the faster the news travels and more the global impact (Campbell, 1999). Media 
provide crucial channels of communication to both the crisis management response 
network and the outside world. They set the stage on which the performance of crisis 
managers will be evaluated. Yet, crisis managers all too often wield an instrumental 
stick at the media. They often persist in an „us versus them‟ mentality (Boin & Smith, 
2006).  
Focusing on perceptions can be just as important as focusing on the technical crisis 
with different resources because the perception can cause another crisis if not managed. 
Successful management of a crisis situation is about recognising you have one, taking 
the appropriate actions to remedy the situation, being seen to take them and being heard 
to say the right things (Regester & Larkin, 2008).  
In any event it is paramount that a common message is provided to all stakeholders 
including the public (Government-E, 2011). The government‟s view is media activities 
work to: 
 Improve the understanding and confidence of the public, 
 Generate confidence in Australia‟s ability to response to any event or threat 
(including terrorism), and 
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 Create public trust that governments and security agencies are open and 
accountable and will release information when possible in the confines of the 
operational and security environments. (Government-E, 2011) 
The key to successful communication in crisis situations is to establish the organisation 
at the centre of the crisis as the single authoritative source of information about what 
has happened and what is being done about it (Regester & Larkin, 2008). This appears 
to have happened with the Lane Cove emergency discussed later in this section. The 
media will act responsibly if a situation is handled in an open and honest way. Public 
relations activity in crises should never hide the facts of what happened. There are 
many companies littered amongst the history of the newspapers that have been found 
out during the crisis. Regester et al (2008) explains the media should be viewed as 
potential friends. This advice should be cautiously taken, there is a mix of agendas and 
the company‟s reputation is at stake. When an attack does materialize, the media are all 
too willing to help identify the responsible parties (Boin & Smith, 2006). There are 
legal and insurance implications plus other mixes of commercial and possible criminal 
realities. Information mismanagement is a major source of man-made disasters.  
People within organisations especially senior executives need to be trained in how to 
address the media to manage effective communications to the media. Usually the 
communication experts with large companies are able to prepare press releases but this 
is often not what the media want. They would like to see a senior member of the 
company make statement and give reassurance and it is important to understand the 
message that the company needs to transmit.  
Leighton Contractors DVD (Leighton, 2010) labeled “Managing a Crisis - The Lane 
Cove Tunnel Experience” discussing the issues of a tunnel collapse on 2nd Nov 2005 in 
Sydney went through the elements of Crisis Management from an experience base 
explaining the successes. As mentioned previously, the DVD has three points to 
highlight to managers: Be Prepared, Practice and Act Fast. It then focused on the three 
teams that manage the internal and external communications and response; The 
Emergency Response Team (ERT), Crisis Management Team (CMT) and Corporate 
Crisis Team (CCT). The ERT manages the immediate issues of the emergency on site 
making the site safe and securing the emergency. CMT supports the ERT from a 
logistics point of view and provides further resources if required and also manages the 
external „immediate‟ communications to the media, insurance issues and any legal 
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situation. The CMT established a media centre so all the media were aware of the 
communications location and they responded quickly to any queries. CCT manages the 
high level communication with media, shareholders and politicians. In hindsight the 
incident was managed well due to the three points. The project was prepared as it had 
exercised a similar tunnel scenario, it had practiced and everybody knew their action 
and/or reaction. 
Preparing for media responses should be considered during the pre-crisis (normal 
operations) phase. Effective crisis communications requires getting the right message to 
the right stakeholder group (Elliott et al., 2010). During the pre-crisis stage, this is 
when the organisation should identify: 
 Who their possible stakeholders are? 
 What problems can a crisis causes for them? 
 What their initial perceptions of the organisation could be? 
 The best means of communicating with them. 
 The message or information that they may require. (Elliott et al., 2010) 
 
It should be remembered that is the price of reputation? Reputation is a vital 
commercial asset and one which companies squander at their peril (Regester & Larkin, 
2008).  
“Four hostile newspapers are more feared than a thousand bayonets”. 
       Napoleon Bonaparte. 
2.5.3 Social Media in Crisis Readiness 
To aid in preparing for crises individuals and organisations use available knowledge 
and technologies and the main rising technologies is social media. Murray (2010) 
describes social media as web supported technologies used to connect users. Social 
media includes Facebook, Twitter, My Space, Blogs, Wikis and YouTube which are 
different forms of communication, information gathering and applications on the World 
Wide Web (www). Individuals are using social media to meet, share data and 
information, and knowledge. Organisations are using social media to connect with 
customers, advertise, connect with employees and share data and information (Murray, 
2010). Schroeder et al (2013) discusses that smartphones are used for various 
functions; specifically, there has been a growth in the use of smartphone to access the 
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Internet and to communicate with each other which includes accessing social media. 
These devices have supported the social media growth. 
The use of social media is affecting contemporary crisis communications and this has 
been observed during recent major crises (D. R. Johnson, 2012; Schroeder, Pennington-
Gray, Donohoe, & Kiousis, 2013). Social media has the potential to influence the 
manner in which individuals think, behave, and respond to information and situation in 
general and in times of crisis as well (Schroeder et al., 2013).  
Johnston (2012) suggests in his article “Social media: redefining crisis management”, 
that like other aspects of Crisis Management there is a need to come up with a 
gameplan. Social media is unlike anything that has come before: 
 Social media is quick, it moves just about the speed of light, 
 Content is quick hitting, which favours soundbites, over simplification and 
flat out misstatements, 
 Even though there is a single initial event or post, each retweet or post 
becomes a new event, and 
 It enables individuals to come together as a group quickly and as a group 
wield power.    (D. R. Johnson, 2012) 
Traditionally organisations need to prepare media responses and social media is just 
another element of this package. However due to its speed, there is no time to recover. 
Johnson (2012) suggest as a minimum, ensure you have short soundbites to respond to 
safety or quality concerns as people and groups soon bind together for a common 
cause. Boeri (2013) also mentions the two-edge sword. When it works in your favour, it 
is extraordinarily cost effective; however when it turns against you, its events can be 
devastating. Bad news travel fast on the digital grapevine (Boeri, 2013). 
Further to Johnson‟s four points of consideration, Boeri (2013) suggests mitigation 
plans should exist and be rehearsed by key players and approved at the highest levels.  
Reacting without a plan in place is like trying to recapture all the oil spilled 
into the Gulf. However as easy as misinformation can spread, useful 
information can also be shared.   (Boeri, 2013) 
Boeri (2013) goes on to discuss all the technology in the world is only as good as your 
planning. He indicates the use of a Responsible, Accountable, Consult and Informed 
(RACI) matrix would support any crisis event. Responsible, Accountable – one person 
who answers for success or failure. Consult and Informed on the social media crisis 
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management team and status of any event. Misinformation can be a crisis in itself. 
Understanding the accuracy of the first strike can be critical to any response via a social 
media platform. Other aspects of the media of television should be considered to 
support any social media statement. 
Curtin et al (2005) argues, “that the most important piece of advice that can be given 
regarding external communications in a crisis is to be prepared.” The process of getting 
the message right (Curtin, Hayman, & Husein, 2005).  
2.6 Crisis Management Benefits to Road Infrastructure 
Organisations 
Effective preparedness is a critical precondition for successful response. Preparedness 
is the process of identifying the personnel, training, and equipment needed for a wide 
range of potential incidents, and developing jurisdiction - specific plans for delivering 
capabilities when needed for an incident. (US-National Response Framework - 2008).  
Mitroff and Alpaslan (2003) questioned that the tenets of traditional crisis management 
are not serving us well anymore and that something critical is missing. Mitroff et al 
(2003) and Carmeli and Schaubroeck (2008) indicate executives do not know how to 
think randomly about abnormal events. This signifies that executive leaders need to 
think outside their traditional structured thinking when crisis events occur. Carmeli et 
al (2008) further explains that we know little about the culture of learning from failures 
nor its implications for organisational process and outcomes. As Wang (2008) explores 
organisational learning indicating that future research could focus on individual‟s 
reactions to crisis. This suggests that individuals in the organisation greatly affect the 
crisis management environment, this includes leaders in their reactions, decisions and 
preparedness of organisations. The adoption and study of BCM continues to grow and 
the influence of accountability, strategic importance and compliance seem to maintain 
the momentum of this business and management practice of change (Herbane, 2010). 
 
In summary this research will examine areas where Transportation Networks can 
enhance their crisis responses to large scale system failures in: 
 Areas of managerial awareness or current CM practices 
 General organisational preparedness being reviewed and analysed 
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 Better risk management practices being adopted 
 Better planning for the known and unknown risks 
 Better awareness of the interdependencies of CI and the complexities and 
propagation of failures  
 Management of media issues 
Taking an extension of Bion (2006), public authorities must prevent known risks from 
materialising without unintentionally introducing new threats. They must prepare for 
the worst without scaring the population (Boin & Smith, 2006). The businesses that 
prevailed in a crisis were those with comprehensive insurance, business continuity 
plans and swift stakeholder‟s engagement (Regester & Larkin, 2008). In doing this 
preparation and research for critical infrastructure the benefit to the community and 
public will be measured in: 
 Quick response to incidents and emergency events within CI 
 Public confidence in the availability and reliability of CI 
 Improved safety for the travelling public and personnel managing CI 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter provided an outline of the current literature on crisis and risk management 
and its possible application to enhancing road networks. It outlined specific theoretical 
and empirically-based concepts central to risk and crisis management research 
beginning with terminology and core concepts within crisis management; it then 
examined the early accident theories, risk and business continuity concepts, standards 
and theories. Following this, the chapter then analysed the CI issues relating to 
transport networks and three management models. The chapter concluded with a 
discussion on media, social media and then issues and benefits of crisis management. 
 
The following Chapter will examine the Theoretical frameworks and the basis for this 
research. The chapter will also examine a framework for analyse of the research and 
introduced an assessment approach. It will conclude with a summary of the 
contribution of knowledge to the research. 
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Chapter 3 -Theoretical Framework  
3.0 Introduction 
Traditionally the term strategic management is the primary skill available to managers 
to deal with the increase scale and pace of change within and outside organisations 
(Viljoen, 1994). Lalonde (2007) suggests there are new realities that 21st century 
organisations will confront which will require a fresh perspective on the issue of crisis 
and risk management for senior managers. The goals of strategic management in both 
public and private sectors may be seen to focus on the basic philosophies of crisis 
management: 
 Safe guard human life 
 Preserve the environment 
 Protect assets 
 Control business loss 
 Facilitate recovery 
 Maintain organisations reputation. (Herbane, 2010)  
The central aim of business continuity planning is to develop a rich picture of an 
organisations environment and of its competencies ready for the future. A key debate 
relevant to the field of crisis management concerns capturing the essence of strategy 
within the discipline of strategic management, „of what we should do and managing 
what we can‟ (Smith & Elliott, 2006). This chapter will provide a platform for the 
research and understand the mechanism for assessment of the organisations being 
researched and therefore appreciate the organisations ability to react to a crisis. 
 
Chapter 1 introduced the general research, objectives and the research question. 
Chapter 2 gave a brief in-depth overview of the current available literature relevant to 
this research. The aim of chapter 3 is to present the theoretical basis for this research 
and the underlying set of beliefs about how the elements of the research fit together. It 
will then examine a framework for analysing the research for this thesis and introduced 
an assessment approach. It will conclude with a summary of the contribution of 
knowledge to the research. Future chapters will introduce the four PPP companies 
being researched, present the research design, results of the research and conclude with 
a discussion of the findings and analysis of the research question.   
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3.1 Theoretical Basis for Study 
Government concerns for the resilience of infrastructure have gathered prominence 
since September 2001 (Australian Government-C, 2010). The concept of resilience is 
becoming increasingly popular within public management of critical infrastructure 
systems with organisational preparedness being key area of consideration. While the 
purpose of this research is not to explore resilience per se the means to achieve resilient 
capability via crisis readiness and crisis planning is a key to organisational 
preparedness.   
 
As discussed in chapter 2, in the early 1980‟s two schools of thought developed around 
accidents, complexity and reliability of technical systems and how they related to 
organisational dependability or reliability or service. It could be argued that Normal 
Accident theory and High Reliability theory are two theories that have been part of the 
path of development of corporate governance, managerial risk and challenging the 
management of threats and therefore understanding any organisational existence.  
 
As previously mentioned, risk management grew during the 1980‟s and 1990‟s into a 
vital part of organisational planning and strategy, and became integrated with more and 
more organisational functions; again corporate governance and its application also 
developed across a variety of business functions (Fazio, 2010; Smith & Fischbacher, 
2009). Risk management being part of a broader need to demonstrate good governance 
and these processes must operate within a transparent and robust framework and further 
Risk Management is the management capability to manage all business risks in pursuit 
of acceptable returns (Yousef, 2012).  
 
Figure 3.1 below indicates the development path for BCM and subsequently 
Organisational Resilience. A key change in the history of BCM development and 
subsequently the growth of CI protection took place on 11
th
 September 2001. That 
event focused the world not just on terrorism activities but also on other events that 
could dramatically change any organisation. 
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Figure 3.1 Historical Development of Organisational Resilience 
 
Looking at the long term viability of a business or organisation should now be an 
everyday strategy for senior managers using the tools of risk management. All too often 
any planning and development of future strategies are often left on the shelf as the day 
to day operational requirements of a business distract management. Detailed after-the-
fact analysis often reveals that incidents, which at first may seemed to be purely 
technical failures, may be traced to complex economic, social and cultural causal 
elements (Gordon & Barnes, 2008). Those organisations charged with this management 
of critical transport infrastructure need to understand their responsibilities to their 
customers, employees and suppliers otherwise confidence in the management of these 
organisations could be in question. (Brody & Schmittlein, 2012). The planning of 
failures and crises need to be part of the Strategic management of organisations 
especially those charged with management of critical infrastructure. BCM enhances 
crisis management by offering coping mechanisms to the immediate response to a 
disaster, recovery efforts, mitigation and the preparedness efforts to reduce the impacts 
of a crisis (Mehrotra, Znati, & Thompson, 2008).  
3.1.1 Application of Crisis Management to Transport Networks 
BCM is a management practice for enhancing crisis management and responses to 
crisis events. Crisis management is the organisation and coordination of activities in 
Risk Awareness -1970's-1980's
Disaster Recovery (IT)- 1980's plus
Business Continuity Management
Accident & Reliability Theories -
1980s-1990s
Enterprise Risk Management -
1990s-2000s
 Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework  
58 
 
preparation for, and response to, events that prevent or impede normal organisational 
activities (Herbane, 2010). Critical infrastructure are those physical facilities, supply 
chains, information technologies and communication networks which, if destroyed, 
degraded or rendered unavailable for an extended period, would significantly impact on 
the social or economic wellbeing of the nation, or affect Australia‟s ability to conduct 
national defence and ensure national security (Government-E, 2011). 
A business continuity strategy needs to meet several criteria to ensure that the threats 
identified have the appropriate mechanisms of mitigation or elimination (Booty, 2006). 
Through continuous improvement, BCM has moved to a proactive practice involving 
the strategic and operational management of threats and consequences for an 
organisation (Al Hour, 2012). Figure 3.1 displayed a historical path of the development 
of BCM through a risk management approach. Through greater awareness and better 
risk management, the business continuity strategy should seek to add value to the 
company with the ultimate aim for a cost effective and focused business continuity 
infrastructure (Booty, 2006).  
Roads in all countries represent an important national asset (Robinson, 2000). Road 
tunnels constitute essential public-works projects from both a practical and economic 
standpoint because they limit the length of trips and thus reduce transportation times 
and costs (Gandit, Kouabenan, & Caroly, 2009). For many countries the asset value of 
roads and tunnels will be comparable to that value of the world‟s largest companies. 
Management of a road network of such value requires the most careful management 
practices compared to the most successful businesses (Robinson, 2000). Added to this 
complexity is our litigious society when something happens, we look for blame and 
compensation is sometimes a focus.  
The primary objectives of a toll road/tunnel management company are to provide 
reliable, safe, fast and cost effective journeys for tunnel users. The failure of any 
critical equipment in the systems, tunnel ventilation systems, tunnel lighting or any 
essential system may cause disasters or hazards to users and operators (Ng et al., 2003). 
Ng et al (2003) suggested that new approaches need to be considered that would help 
management to choose the best course of actions for reducing or eliminating potential 
risk of equipment failures (Ng et al., 2003). While their research focuses on 
maintenance management for toll roads and tunnel operations, they go on to propose a 
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risk management process that follows risk identification, risk measurement, risk 
assessment, risk evaluation and control and monitoring in line with the organisations 
Business Plan and company objectives (Ng et al., 2003). This six stage process is 
similar to the individual processes of the International Standard ISO 31000. As 
discussed in chapter 2, this six stage risk management process further amplifies the 
suitability of the methodology of Australian Standard, AS/NZS5050 - Business 
Continuity. The standard also states that the business impacts and goals of the 
organisation are critical elements of business planning to ensure a comprehensive 
management process of any disruption or disaster within an organisation improving 
reliability and availability of transport networks is the goal of CM practises within this 
critical infrastructure sector.  
 
3.1.2 Managing a Crisis 
Having an organisational resilience approach assists owners and operators to manage 
unforeseen or unexpected risks and risk management of disturbances associated with 
public infrastructure. The term resilience is used in a broad range of circumstances. 
Chapter 2 has outlined in the literature review this broad perspective. Resilience is not a 
one off program or a management system that can be developed and reviewed annually 
(Australian Government-C, 2010; Boin & Eeten, 2013). It is a requirement of all senior 
managers of an organisation to prepare an organisation for the unforeseen to ensure the 
survival of that organisation. Having the strategic foresight enables senior managers to 
be ready to become crisis managers should the situation occur. Most large organisations 
preform some form of risk management dealing with preventative strategies to 
minimise or reduce the chance of something happening and considering mitigation 
strategies of recovery. However risk management needs to be an everyday practice with 
plans and strategies ready for those unforeseen risks. 
 
Organisations benefit from preparing for unforeseen events as like any strategic 
objective, be good or bad, BCM and risk management have the objective of preparing 
an organisation for the possibility of a negative result and what the organisational 
management will do about it. BCM deals with higher business consequences that 
threaten an organisation and is a mechanism of dealing with that threat and therefore 
increase resilience and capability of the organisation.  
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3.2 Frameworks and Models for evaluation of Crisis Management 
Preparedness  
While resilient functionality is a goal for organisations and systems generally, 
measuring [it] in road transport systems is not the core purpose of this research. The 
previous sections of this chapter briefly discussed the evolution to BCM and how risk 
analysis in its early years transformed to formal risk management and how similar 
processes apply to BCM practices. These organisational processes and techniques are 
key elements of a crisis response capability.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Theoretical Framework to Crisis Readiness (Al Hour, 2012) 
 
Figure 3.2 suggests a BCM strategy for an organisation seeking enhanced crisis 
readiness which includes practices covering proactive risk and threat assessment 
coupled with effective response systems that are self-sustaining, has flexibility with 
systems that are mature and can be activated rapidly. This amended BCM strategy 
forms the theoretical framework guiding the data collection and methodological aspects 
of the research and forms the basis of the approach taken in two key analytical 
evaluation methods to be discussed in the next section. The research questions 
examined in this thesis focus specifically on the presence and degrees of effectiveness 
Business 
Continuity 
Managment
Proactive risk 
and threat 
management
Maintain 
readiness 
state
Agility and 
maturity
Crisis Readiness  
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of existing crisis planning capabilities and details options for improving these 
capabilities. The theoretical basis for seeking industry-based evidence related to these 
questions is displayed in Figure 3.2.  
3.2.1 Assessment Approaches 
BCM and risk management are beginning to play important roles within strategic 
management within the 21
st
 century organisation and are general management tools and 
strategies that if implemented effectively will improve the crisis management capability 
of an organisation. The investigation has been designed to explore the limitations and 
gaps of the PPP transport sector organisations being researched to gain an insight into 
the organisations preparedness. This will enable a better opportunity to enhance the 
organisation capability.     
Figure 3.2 guides the development of two core analytical tools used in this work. The 
first is used to detail crisis readiness and risk management systems in place within the 
organisation. The model by Labaka et al (2013) provides an evaluation framework to 
gauge the level of organisational ability to cope with a crisis. This derivation from table 
2.3 depicts this analytic tool used as a basic assessment tool using ten of the twelve 
practices for this research. The analytic structure of the Key Risk Management 
Evaluation (KRME) will be used to assess the nature and effectiveness of risk 
management and readiness in the RTS‟s in alignment to the theoretical framework.  
Each practice has a description which details further information and can be used a 
basic evaluation criteria from a low to high assessment level. As mentioned in chapter 2 
many of these criteria are set early in an assets life cycle and therefore can be costly to 
improve and develop further.  
The second analytic tool derived from the Aon work (Dillon & Ittner, 2013) is a risk 
maturity matrix. Each organisation is basically assessed against 16 criteria using a scale 
of low to high indicators. An evaluation of the depth and robust nature of existing 
practices is also referenced in the theoretical framework. For this research purpose a 
maturity framework and definitions were developed to capture degrees of 
implementation and self-sustainability of risk and crisis readiness factors in each 
organisation location. Table 3.1 details this risk maturity matrix (RMM).  
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The category measures/definitions were further developed from an Aon and University 
of Pennsylvia research report
17
 which built a framework for objectively assessing 
observable practices and structures related to corporate governance, decision making 
processes and risk management. The assessment general descriptions that were used for 
the categories from 1 to 10 were developed by the researcher inline with data and seven 
themes of the research. The assessment of each orgaisation came from all available 
researched data sources for this thesis; online survey, interviews, key informants and 
documentation analysis. Classification and application of each of the descriptors for 
each organisation was made with the understanding of the literature and professional 
knowledge of the researcher.  
The first ten categories of the 16 criteria had four levels of definition of the category 
where the organisation would be measured on a maturity scale from smallest to highest; 
initial zero baseline level, a basic level, a defined level to an operational level of 
maturity for risk. The „Initial‟ level of measure indicated a component or associated 
activities in a very limited scope, the „Basic‟ level indicated that capabilities existed in 
that category. The „Defined‟ level indicated the organisation had a good degree for 
evaluation criteria or followed the prinicples being discussed well. The final measure 
was „Operational‟ which gave an indication that the organisation had a very good 
capability. Each category, from 11 to 16, had five levels of assessment from poor, fair, 
good, very good and excellent.  
                                                 
17
 (Dillon & Ittner, 2013), 2013 Risk Maturity Index Report - Building a Robust Framework and Realizing Value from Risk 
Management 
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Risk Maturity Matrix 
 
Organisational 
Maturity 
Measurement 
Initial  Basic  Defined  Operational  
 Smallest ---------------------------------------------------------------Scale-----------------------------------------------------------------Highest 
1. Current stage of 
development of 
organisations risk 
strategy and 
framework  
 
Limited risk management 
activities exist, are very 
limited in scope. 
 Capabilities exist to identify, 
assess, manage and monitor 
risks in some business areas.  
(maybe Board direction but 
not drived to all managerial 
levels) 
Sufficient capabilities to 
identify, measure, report and 
monitor major risks. Policies 
and techniques are defined 
across the organisation. 
(Board direction and 
managers are focused on RM). 
Consistent ability to identify, 
measure, manage report and 
monitor risks consistent 
application of policies and 
techniques across the 
organisation are driven at all 
staffing levels. 
Organisational 
Measurement 
Smallest ---------------------------------------------------------------Scale------------------------------------------------------------------Highest 
2. Measuring 
framework and 
review methodology 
Limited Follows Principles of ISO 
standard 
(does not have to be the same 
measure) 
Follows Principles of ISO 
standard and has reviews  
 
Follows Principles of ISO 
standard and has regular 
documented reviews of major 
risks. 
Organisational 
Measurement 
Smallest ---------------------------------------------------------------Scale---------------------------------------------------------------Highest 
Planning  
3. Organisation carries 
out reviews of 
identified risks or 
BIA  
Risks identifed and review 
annually or by Board 
Risks identified and scheduled 
for review but meetings are 
occasionally missed to higher 
business issues 
Risks identified and scheduled 
for review. All meetings are 
minuted. (management and 
other key staff are involved) 
Risks identified and scheduled 
for review. All meetings are 
minuted. Risk management is 
imbedded in the decision 
making of the business 
Organisational 
Measurement 
Smallest ---------------------------------------------------------------Scale--------------------------------------------------------------Highest 
 Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework  
64 
 
4. Application of risk 
processes across 
business 
areas.(business areas 
include support areas like 
safety, legal, environment 
and finance)  
Applied in one area of the 
business only eg Safety or 
OH&S 
Applied in 2 or more areas of 
the business 
Applied in most areas of 
the business 
Applied in all business areas 
and senior management apply 
it in their decision making 
Organisational 
Measurement 
Smallest ---------------------------------------------------------------Scale----------------------------------------------------------------Highest 
5. Processes exist and 
are documented for 
crisis events  
Limited processes exist. Processes and plans exist Documented plans and 
processes exist and are 
exercised 
Well documented plans and 
processes exist and are 
exercised 
Organisational 
Measurement 
Smallest ---------------------------------------------------------------Scale----------------------------------------------------------------Highest 
6. Personnel Culture 
towards risk and 
safety management  
No or little awarenesss within 
the organisation Board has 
issued direction but still to be 
applied at other levels within 
the organisation. 
Board, senior mangement 
understand and apply the RM 
model and its application 
Board, senior management 
and supervisors/some staff 
understand the RM model and 
its application. 
All levels of staff understand 
the RM model and its 
application 
Organisational 
Measurement 
Smallest ---------------------------------------------------------------Scale----------------------------------------------------------------Highest 
7. The organisation 
has regular exercises 
and tests their plans  
No testing or exercise  Has had an exercise but is not 
regularly tested  
Has regular tested exercises Has regular well tested 
exercises including other 
stakeholders and shares the 
learnings 
Organisational 
Measurement 
Smallest ---------------------------------------------------------------Scale----------------------------------------------------------------Highest 
8. Threat identification  One individual identified and 
assessed the threats 
Key managerial individuals 
identified and assessed the 
threats 
A committee of individuals 
from different parts of the 
organisation identified and 
assessed the threats and 
occasional reviewed 
A committee of individuals 
from different parts of the 
organisation identified and 
assessed the threats and 
regularly reviewed 
Organisational 
Measurement 
Smallest ---------------------------------------------------------------Scale----------------------------------------------------------------Highest 
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9. Are risk/safety roles 
identified in the 
organisation 
Eg safety/risk manager  
Little or no roles are identified 
Some roles are identified and 
shared 
One key senior role is 
identified and the rest are 
shared 
Several roles exist with many 
roles shared within the 
organisation 
Management and staff shared 
roles within the organisation. 
Organisational 
Measurement 
Smallest ---------------------------------------------------------------Scale---------------------------------------------------------------Highest 
10.  Reporting of 
hazards and risks  
No reporting exists A 
reporting culture exists but 
little is actioned 
A reporting culture exists and 
hazards and risks are actioned 
when time permits 
A reporting culture exists and 
hazards and risks are reported, 
documented and actioned 
A reporting culture exists and 
hazards and risks are reported, 
documented and actioned. The 
Board monitors reports. 
Organisational 
Measurement 
Smallest ---------------------------------------------------------------Scale--------------------------------------------------------------Highest 
11. How well is risk 
applied in their 
organisation?  
Poor Fair Good Very Good Excellent  
Organisational 
Measurement 
 
12. How effectively is 
the implementation 
of Risk and OH&S 
management 
systems in your 
company?  
Low  Average  High 
Organisational 
Measurement 
 
13. To what level do all 
employees 
understand the 
importance of Safety 
or Risk 
Management?  
Poor  Average  High. The importance 
of safety and risk 
management is part of 
all employees work 
ethic 
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Organisational 
Measurement 
 
14. To what level does 
your organisation 
follow Risk 
Management and 
BCM standards? 
Poor  Average  High. The importance 
of safety and risk 
management is part of 
all employees work 
ethic 
Organisational 
Measurement 
 
15. Managerial 
Support for Risk 
and/or BCM 
practices  
Little or no risk or 
BCM practices in the 
company 
 Risk/BCM receives 
executive and senior 
managerial support but 
not really applied due 
to lack training, 
awareness or just too 
busy. 
 High. Risk/BCM 
receives executive and 
senior managerial 
support and is applied 
within the organsiation.  
Organisational 
Measurement 
     
16. Has the 
organisation 
considered 
Emergency 
Response  
Little or no 
consideration of any 
Emergency response 
 
 Emergency Response 
has been considered 
and is maturing 
 
 Emergency response is 
well considered and 
communicated to staff. 
Consultation with ES. 
Organisational 
Measurement 
     
 
Table 3.1 Risk Maturity Matrix developed for this Research 
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3.3  Contribution to Knowledge 
Herbane (2010) indicates the development of BCM practices continues as standards 
and regulations catch up with the research and current isolated business practices. The 
literature review has identified gaps within the current applications of crisis leadership 
and theory to this research. Lalonde (2007) suggests there are new realities that 
organisations confront requiring a fresh perspective on the issue of crisis management. 
He contends that research needs to further explore how one can ensure the long term 
incorporation of the learning that takes place during a crisis in order to improve 
organisational capability and subsequently resilience. Lalonde (2007) also suggests that 
learning processes fall short, after mitigation actions have been put in places due to 
many factors. Carmeli et al (2008) in their paper states that business need to employ 
and structure learning behaviours from failure in order to respond more effectively to a 
crisis event. Within the transport sector, testing and training is taking place in the 
practical sense however are their learning‟s being fed back into the everyday business 
of the organisation? This research will apply a crisis management framework and its 
application in the evaluation of existing crisis management planning practices. As 
detailed before this theoretical framework guides the data collection and 
methodological aspects of the research and forms the basis of the approach taken in two 
key analytical evaluation methods.  
 
Lalonde (2007) suggests there are new realities that 21st century organisations will 
confront requiring a fresh perspective on the issue of crisis and risk management. He 
contends that research needs to further explore how one can ensure the long term 
incorporation of the learning that takes place during a crisis, and/or incidents, in order 
to improve long term resilience. Therefore management shortcomings and 
organisational aspects have been recognised as major factors in the occurrences of 
accidents and incidents in complex systems (Kazaras, Kirytopoulos, & Rentizelas, 
2012).  
The literature suggests there is little research within roads and tunnels organisations 
that describes a framework of risk management and/or BCM. This thesis seeks to 
enhance to the body of research by understanding the current practices and examine 
current planning and management of emergency crisis response capabilities of PPP 
organisations operating within the transport network sector. This will be achieved by 
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identifying gaps and detailing options to enhance crisis preparedness and response in 
organisations managing such systems.  
3.3.1 Learning  
Evaluating crisis management and training exercises is fundamental for the 
improvement and testing of crisis management (Heath, 1998; S. McManus et al., 2008). 
Adherence to well-structure safety procedures is not sufficient for precursor resilience. 
The traditional quality, safety and environment systems focus has usually given false 
comfort that organisations are safety focused.  
The literature suggests that organisations are generally ill prepared for crisis events and 
don‟t learn from them. Current research suggests the decision making at critical times 
does not appear to be deliberate and appears to be a structure event of following 
flowcharts. A set of procedures that can be pulled off the shelf and applied to obtain an 
agreed solution. The research will define approaches that can be adopted to manage and 
evaluate crisis preparedness and response in organisations managing transport systems. 
In achieving this, the research also hopes to increase resilience of private organisations 
within transport sector and better understand the culture and functional requirement of 
a Resilient Transport Infrastructure Organisation.  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
A resilient organisation will maintain a high level of performance even when 
environmental pressures mount, threats arise and uncertainties deepen (Boin & Eeten, 
2013, Comfort, 2007, C. McManus, Seville, Brunsdon, & Vargo, 2007). Boin et al 
(2013) explains resilience will likely become increasingly important in the face of new 
threats for future organisational capability. An organisation that wants to be resilient 
must transverse simplistic distinctions between anticipation and trial and error learning 
(Boin & Eeten, 2013). Crisis management is becoming a key goal of strategic 
management as crisis management deals with the strategic future capability and 
preparedness of an organisation.   
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This chapter presented the theoretical basis for this research and the underlying set of 
beliefs about how the elements of the research combined together. It then examined a 
framework for analysing the research for this thesis. It concluded with a summary of 
the contribution of knowledge and practice of this thesis. The next chapter will 
introduce four PPP companies being researched, details and validates the scientific 
paradigm, methodological choice and research design employed in this thesis. It will 
then conclude with a discussion on bias, limitations, ethics and the commercial issues 
associated with this research. 
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Chapter 4 - Methodology 
4.0 Introduction 
In previous chapters the research problem, current literature and theoretical frameworks 
for this research have been discussed. The literature review chapter outlined crisis and 
risk management theories and practices and then examined CI issues relating to 
transport infrastructure. Chapter four now introduces the companies being researched, 
details and validates the scientific paradigm, methodological choice and research 
design employed in this thesis. This chapter will conclude with a discussion on bias, 
limitations, ethics and the commercial issues associated with this research. 
4.1 The Organisations Researched 
The Companies. The companies that agreed to participate in this research, were self-
selected from infrastructure management companies in different States of Australia. All 
the projects researched managed large scale public infrastructure with a current 
replacement value exceeding $2B in 2013 figures. This study examined four privately 
operated infrastructure sites that managed public transport infrastructure being a public 
Road Tunnel or Motorway. As of 1 Jul 2013, there are 14 Motorway or Tunnel sites 
managed by private organisations that carry out Operational, Maintenance and Incident 
Response activities on behalf of a state government within Australia. The researched 
sites were all commissioned PPP organisations which represented a significant sample 
size. All four sites involved had a senior executive member plus one or more 
Operational and/or Engineering/Maintenance manager. 
 
As discussed in chapter two, PPP‟s are models used to fund public infrastructure using 
private equity from Roads and Tunnels (transport) to prisons, hospitals and schools 
(X.W.Zou et al., 2008). There are many different types of PPP funding models that 
vary the risk funding model between the government and private company. All 
organisations are not identified through the writing of this thesis due to the commercial 
and sensitivity of issues discussed. 
 
Three of the researched sites are not identified as Critical Infrastructure however are 
essential pieces of infrastructure to the public. One Site is categorised as CI. CI is 
decided by the State and Federal government. The three sites not categorised as CI have 
alternative routes within their location so if they were unavailable would cause serious 
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disruption but would not cause major destabilisation of the region, though this might be 
argued by the respective sites. For this research all organisations were treated as CI in 
the application of this research as the management organisations follow CI guidelines 
where possible. 
 
All the organisations requested not to be identified and two negotiated confidentially 
agreements before any research commenced. Three of the four companies contractual 
had similar PPP models as shown in chapter two, figure 2.8, where the concessionaire 
company reported directly to the government organisation/department. The other 
company model, the Concessionaire and Operations and Maintenance organisation 
were the same organisation. This organisation also reported directly to the government 
department.  
 
One project was over 20 years old with the other three projects being less than ten years 
with the newest project being three years old since it was opened to the public. All 
projects were tollroads that operated road tunnels or open roads. Three of the four site 
projects managed the tolling and collected revenue to repay the original construction 
costs so therefore own the financial risk for the construction of the project. The fourth 
project was funded by the government with the government collecting the tolls and the 
operations project receiving monthly payments under key performance requirements. 
The comparisons between the two PPP models were generally which organisation 
carried the financial risk; government or concessionaire company. In the PPP model 
shown in Figure 2.7 (chapter two), the financial risk rested with the concessionaire 
company. While the fourth company managed all government negotiations, operations 
and maintenance activities however did not have to manage any marketing and sales 
(revenue) as a result of the asset. The government paid the organisation a set amount as 
agreed at opening. Then additions and subtractions which are called rise and fall are 
then considered. Rise and fall is an indicator and is % calculated from many factors as 
set down in the contract. It is usually a % of inflation, the labour index and the possibly 
a commodities index as released by the Australian Government, Bureau of Statistics.  
 
Respondents. Ten people with varying managerial responsibilities participated 
voluntarily in the research across the four organisations. Three organisations had 
subcontracted their operations and maintenance responsibilities to another party in 
accordance with their PPP agreements which was negotiated many years before during 
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their project tendering process. The fourth organisation performed all roles post 
construction and commissioning of their asset. Table 4.1 details the positions of the 
people that participated in the research from the four organisations. Further information 
cannot be supplied as the organisations may be identified.  
 
Location/Company Position interviewed Project  
Site A ( Two companies 
operate the site) 
Concessionaire 
O&M contractor 
 
HR/Risk Manager 
Operations Manager 
Tunnel and Road 
Site B (Two companies 
operate site) 
Concessionaire 
O&M contractor 
CEO 
Engineering/Contracts Manager 
Operations and Maintenance 
Manager 
Tunnel and Road 
Site C -One company General Manager 
Operations Manager 
Engineering/Contracts Manager 
Tunnel 
Site D (Two companies 
operate the site) 
Concessionaire 
O&M contractor 
 
Engineering/Contracts Manager 
Operations and Maintenance 
Manager 
 
Road 
 
Table 4.1 Matrix of Companies participants involved  
 
The access, quality and participation of respondents were exceptional. Each 
organisation had a least one senior executive participate (CEO, GM or senior 
executive) so their knowledge of their organisation was expected to be high and this 
was evident in their responses.  
 
All respondents were open and frank during all discussions and allowed all interviews 
to be recorded which were later transcribed. Most of the interviews were one on one 
except two organisations requested that the two senior managers could be interviewed 
together. The interviews followed the same structure as the survey allowing more 
amplification on each topic and question area. The patterns of incident management for 
all these projects were very similar as their first responsibility was the management and 
recovery of the asset for public safety.  
All organisations/projects had incident response responsibilities from field/road 
breakdowns for members of the public within their project boundaries however one 
organisation contracted this to another external company. This incident response 
requirement usually had response times which varied from 5 mins for an emergency to 
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15 minutes for „standard‟ vehicle breakdowns. All organisations appeared experienced 
in preforming these duties as they have had various levels of serious incidents that had 
escalated into emergency management over the periods of their projects. These 
incidents were mostly in the field and the public environment but to date there had been 
no threat to the organisations existence as a result of these incidents. Two 
concessionaire organisations (from site A and B) had previously financial concerns as 
the traffic projections and subsequently tolling revenue did not eventuate to the 
expected levels. This was a threat to the existence of the concessionaire company but 
not the site asset. The respective government had step in rights (under specific 
conditions) to manage the organisation to ensure the asset remained open to the public.  
This research is examining and investigating models and concepts and their possible 
application to current practices within transport organisations. The study therefore 
anticipates a better understanding of BCM and risk management practices. 
4.2 Justification of Paradigm and Methodology  
The alignment of the theoretical framework to the appropriate methodology is 
necessary in a research investigation to clarify the appropriate research design and 
methods. This framework sets the context of the investigation. These perspectives can 
create issues for conducting research with regard to the merits of one paradigm over 
another (Creswell, 2007; Wisker, 2007). Qualitative researchers approach their studies 
with a certain paradigm or worldview; a basic set of beliefs or assumptions that guide 
their enquires (Creswell, 2007). Paradigm also means a basic orientation to theory and 
research (Neuman, 2003). These assumptions are related to the nature of reality – 
ontology; the relationship of the researcher to that being researched – epistemology; 
and the process of the research – methodology (Creswell, 2007; Denzin & Lincoln, 
1994). The selection and justification of the paradigm is not without argument and can 
be a criticism of qualitative research.  
 
Table 4.2 below indicates the paradigms of the social sciences with characteristics of 
the methodology. The shaded area of the table indicates the selection. Realism being 
the most appropriate fit. Realism paradigm aims to better understand the reality of the 
real world. Realism is the preferred paradigm for case study research because case 
study research is contemporary and realism does not suffer from the limitations of 
relativism. In realism there is often a concern characterised by some researcher 
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objectivity, this makes triangulation of data essential to refine fallible observations of 
that reality (Perry, 1998). Triangulation will be discussed later but it is two or three 
methods of data gathering with the analysis of results and findings drawn from several 
sources which also increases the validity of results (Wisker, 2007).  
 Ontology 
(reality) 
Epistemology 
(relationship of the 
researcher to the 
subject) 
Methodology 
(the process of the 
research) 
 
Logical 
positivism 
Naïve realism 
Reality is the empirical 
world. It sees the world 
as an ordered systems 
and an objective reality.  
 
Objective: the 
correspondence between 
our statements and 
reality through inductive 
verification or deductive 
falsification 
 
Chiefly quantitative 
 
Controlled experiments/ 
surveys/testing 
hypotheses 
 
 
Postpositivism 
Critical realism 
“real” reality but 
imperfect and 
probabilistically 
apprehensible 
Subjective and 
dependent on practical 
consequences. 
 
Qualitative and 
quantitative mix 
 
Case studies/structural 
equation 
modeling/quasi-
experiments 
Subtle realism 
Reality exists 
independent of our 
claims about it, and can 
be presented in multiple 
valid descriptions and 
explanations therefore 
complex. 
Inter-subjectivist: 
Participate in gaining and 
presenting knowledge in 
the real world; however 
independence between 
claims and reality 
maintained. 
 
Qualitative 
 
Instrumental Case 
studies / Convergent 
Interviewing; Focus 
groups 
 
Constructivism 
(Intepretivism) 
Relativism 
Reality exists 
independent of our 
cognition (constructed 
realities). Thus, there is 
no basis to reject the 
metaphysical (epistemic 
fallacy) 
Subjectivist: There is no 
predefined or 
predetermined 
methodology or criteria 
to judge the veracity of 
our knowledge. 
(knowledge is 
constructed) 
 
Qualitative 
 
Hermeneutical / 
dialectical: Grounded 
theory; Basic case 
studies 
 
Critical Theory 
(Postmodernism) 
Historical realism 
 
Reality (Virtual) is 
socially constructed – 
interrelated 
characteristics within the 
world today. 
 
 
Subjectivist: Value 
mediated findings; no 
truth or true meaning 
about any aspects of 
exists is possible, it can 
only be constructed. 
 
Qualitative 
 
Dialogic/ dialectical 
The researcher 
transforms the social 
world within which 
participates live.  
 
Table 4.2 A Comparison of Mainstream Paradigms in Social Science Research (Adapted from Guba and 
Lincoln (1994); Van de Ven (2007); Creswell (2007) and Simmons (2009)) 
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Positivism depends on the belief that human society, like the nature world is subject to 
fixed laws. Also positivism requires that only observable phenomena can and should be 
researched, so realism rather than positivism is a more appropriate epistemological 
guide for case study research.  
 
Table 4.3 indicates the Realism description as being inductive and being more 
prominent than deduction because generally theories are built for case study research 
however some case study research does involve deduction based theory for example 
grounded theory.  
 
Paradigm Deduction/ 
Induction 
Dimension 
Objective/Subjective 
Commensurable/ 
Incommensurable 
Positivism Deduction Objective Commensurable 
Critical 
Theory 
Induction Subjective Commensurable 
Constructivism Induction Subjective Incommensurable 
Realism Induction Objective Commensurable 
 
Table 4.3 A three dimensional framework for categorising four scientific paradigms (Perry, 1998) 
 
Practice-oriented research is defined as research aimed at contributing to the knowledge 
of specific practitioners responsible for a specific practice. A practice is the real life 
situation (Dul & Hak, 2007). Theory-oriented research is aimed at contributing to the 
development of theory. Table 4.4 indicates the differences between practice-oriented 
and theory-oriented research. This thesis will add to the practice-oriented research as 
the analysis starts with exploring current practices (from evidence, application and any 
impediments) and applying the current theories and/or practices in the real world 
context. 
The difference between practice-oriented and theory-oriented research 
Practice-oriented research Theory-oriented research 
Practice-oriented research is research 
where the objective is to contribute to the 
knowledge of one or more specified 
practitioners. 
Theory-oriented research is research 
where the objective is to contribute to 
theory development. Ultimately, the 
theory maybe useful for practice in 
general 
Table 4.4 Difference between practice-oriented and theory-oriented research 
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Again this research will implement the subtle realism paradigm to conduct the study. 
Subtle realism, argues to be applicable to social science research in general, is a middle 
ground between the naive realism of naturalism and the relativism of constructionist 
and postmodern approaches. Subtle realism shares the naive realist ontology that the 
world consists of independent phenomena but argues that we do not have direct access 
to them (Given, 2008).  
4.3 Qualitative Research 
In the past there has been a heavy emphasis on quantification in science. Quantitative 
research emphasizes the measurement and analysis of causal relationships between 
variables, not processes. The qualitative research can be a set of interpretive practices, 
with no single methodology over any other, it has no theory or paradigm that is 
distinctly its own (Denzin & Lincoln, 2008). Goulding (2002) in her research of 
qualitative methods indicates a few contentions with this style of research being the 
researcher is pre-eminently the research tool. The data is filtered through the eyes of the 
data collector and the findings often considered to be subjective, intuitive and value 
laden. However she points out that this is rather a condescending view. Personal 
discipline assists qualitative researchers in avoiding excessive subjectivity. This 
includes managing any bias (Goulding, 2002). Another criticism is that it is novelistic, 
entertaining and descriptive, but is not rigorous and fall short at why things happen. 
This condemnation can be usually connected to poor examples and not linkages of 
incidents and may lack any kind of social-historical context as an explanatory 
framework (Goulding, 2002). 
 
Qualitative research is about asking open ended questions and wanting to listen to the 
participants being studied and then shaping the questions as we „explore‟. The 
backbone of qualitative research is extensive collection of data, typically from multiple 
sources. Qualitative study is often selected because variables cannot be easily 
identified, theories are often not available to explain behaviour of participates 
(Creswell, 2007). This research and subsequent thesis is a study of how the practice of 
private public partnership transport infrastructure operations responses to critical 
failures. The variables are really unknown as each organisation is different and 
operating in isolation. The research information will come from several sources being 
an online survey, internal key informant interviews, group interviews and 
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documentation analysis. The knowledge gained and compared to current research is 
anticipated to enhance responses to future system failures.  
 
4.4 Case Study Research 
A case study is an empirical inquiry that: 
 investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, 
especially when,  
 the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly defined 
(Yin, 2003). 
Case study research has been advocated as a valid research strategy in marketing, 
operations management, management of information systems and strategy (Dul & Hak, 
2007). Dul et al (2007) suggests in their research, most authors consider case study 
research as a useful research strategy when: 
 the topic is broad and highly complex, 
 there is not a lot of theory available, and 
 the context is very important.          (Dul & Hak, 2007) 
Using case studies for research purposes remains one of the most challenging of all 
social science endeavours. The goal is to design good case studies and to collect, 
present and analyse fairly and a further goal is to write a compelling report (Yin, 2003). 
It is through analysis and interpretation of how people think, feel and act that many of 
the insights and understanding of the case are gained. Again the researcher is the main 
instrument in data gathering, interpretation and reporting for this research with the four 
organisations offering value insights into their company risk and crisis management 
practices.  
4.5 Research Design  
A qualitative methodology has been utilised to address the research question. The 
general idea of design is one of situating the researcher in the empirical world (Punch, 
2006). The design is the basic plan for a piece of empirical research, and includes five 
main ideas: strategy, conceptual framework, who or what will be studied and the tools 
and procedures to be used both for collecting and for analysing empirical materials 
(Punch, 2006). Creswell (2007) also mentions the basic reasons for selecting a 
qualitative approach are due to: 
 the nature of the question 
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 the topic that needs to be explored, eg no variables or exact theories may 
exist 
 the need to present a detailed view of a topic 
 studying individuals in their natural setting 
 the interest in writing in a literary style 
 the time and resources to able to spend on extensive data collection 
 audiences being receptive to this style of research 
 to emphasize that researchers roles as an active learner. (Creswell, 2007) 
 
The research method will follow a qualitative, multiple case study approach 
investigating four private public partnership transportation infrastructure organisations. 
The research will examine the rationale behind why these organisations are required to 
prepare and plan for crises. It will also examine the crisis planning and management 
within the selected organisations using the emerging theoretical framework and 
assessments. It will focus around the existence of Emergency Management or Business 
Continuity Plans. 
 
The research design was a two stage process. The first stage of the research included: 
 negotiating timeframes and approvals with the selected private 
organisations 
 meeting with the company senior management and seeking their personal 
consent 
 explanation of any possible ethical and confidentially issues of the research 
and addressing any concerns of the company or individuals 
 establishing a relationship with the company 
 the development of the questionnaire which was tested for clarity. Key 
individuals within the transport sector reviewed the questionnaire before its 
release.  
 
The second stage of the research included:  
 final development of the questionnaire and delivered to the company 
participants  
 collection of questionnaires 
 review and analysis of answers from questionnaires 
 development of interview structure and questions 
 the semi-structured interview with key informants - Executives and senior 
manager 
 interviewing other company members 
 analysis of all data for identifying relevant findings 
 document analysis. 
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4.6 Data Collection Methods 
As previously mentioned, the data for this multiple case study research was collected 
through various sources; online survey, key informant interviews, group interviews and 
documentation analysis. Figure 4.1 shows this process.  
 
Figure 4.1 Case study qualitative organisational data analysis 
 
The data was collected in two stages. Firstly an online secured survey was designed 
with 42 questions within the following themes: 
 General/Governance 
 Planning 
 Role of Management 
 Culture 
 Learning and testing 
 Threat Assessment 
 Employees 
 
A „trial‟ questionnaire was developed by the researcher and was reviewed and tested 
for clarity by selected informants (not involved in the survey). These informants 
commented on its purpose, content and clarity of question. After further consideration 
of the feedback, the questionnaire was refined. The final questionnaire was sent to the 
selected company CEOs/Executives and senior management by a survey tool call Key 
Survey. The questions were framed in three styles depending on the information 
required. Selected questions were likert style 1-5 answers, decisive Yes/No and short 
answer questions. 
Online Survey
Small group 
interviews
Key informant 
interviews 
Documentation 
Analysis
Overall 
Qualitative 
data analysis
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4.6.1 Online survey 
The online survey was established using the web based survey tool called Key Survey. 
This is a commercial off the shelf survey and management tool which is operated by 
QUT under license. Key Survey is intuitive to use and provides extensive features to 
help develop and distribute sophisticated online surveys. QUT provided training and 
the help functions were well supported. Ten participants contributed to the research as 
indicated in table 4.5.  
 
An example of the survey is attached at Appendix A. This survey was the first stage of 
the research process with 42 questions that were developed based on seven broad 
themes of the areas of crisis management. These broad categories covered crisis 
management areas of Governance and General applications, Planning, Role of 
Management, Culture, Learning and Testing, Threat Assessment and Employees. These 
questions were developed from the areas of the Risk Management and Business 
Continuity standards
18
 and the research that supported the baseline concepts and 
theories of Risk Management, Business Continuity Management and Crisis 
Management. Other questions asked within the same categories were awareness and 
general opinions of crisis management issues of the individuals taking the survey.  
4.6.2 Interviews  
The second stage was face to face semi-structured interviews with same key managerial 
and company personnel who completed the online survey. These interviews were to 
further amplifying their responses discussing in more detail the answers to the 
questions and other key roles and responsibilities. The technique of asking questions 
was open-ended to allow the participant to answer the questions as they desired. 
There were two types of interviews; groups of two and key informants from within the 
organisation. The interviews varied in time between approximately one hour to several 
hours. If there was any requirement to seek verification or further information, all 
participates agreed that they could be further contacted. This took place via email 
amplifying gaps that needed clarification that may have appeared in the researched 
data. 
                                                 
18
 ISO 31000 and AS/NZ 5050 
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4.6.3 Documentation Analysis 
Document Analysis was performed at several stages of data collection to strengthen the 
results. Table 4.5 below indicates the documentation made available from each 
organisation. 
 
 
Site Respondent Information Supplied Comments 
A  Risk/HR Manager Researcher had to sign a 
confidential agreement. 
Viewed Crisis Management & 
Recovery Plan, Risk 
Management Plan, Business 
Continuity Plan, Emergency 
Response Procedure, Critical 
Infrastructure Plan (also 
labelled Security Risk 
Management Plan) and 
Incident Management Plan. 
Obtain detailed Index of Plans 
Take Five document for field 
risk assessments 
Observed „testing‟ IT attack 
on the company‟s IT system 
Senior manager in the Concessionaire 
Company. Provided detailed 
information in his interview 
Operations 
Manager 
Senior manager in O&M 
organisation. Provided detailed 
information in his interview 
B  CEO Project Business Continuity 
Plan 
Crisis Management Plan 
Emergency Management Plan 
Incident Management Plan 
Observed a full day exercise  
 
 
 
Senior manager in the Concessionaire 
Company. Provided detailed 
information in his interview 
Engineering/ 
Contracts Manager 
Senior manager in the Concessionaire 
Company and reported to CEO. 
Provided detailed information in his 
interview 
GM/Operations & 
Maintenance 
Manager 
Senior manager within O&M 
organisation reporting. Provided 
detailed information in his interview 
C  General Manager  
Incident Management Plan 
(IMP) 
Emergency Plan included in 
IMP 
No BCP existed 
Senior manager. Provided detailed 
information in his interview 
Operations 
Manager 
Manager reporting to GM. Provided 
detailed information in his interview 
Engineering/ 
Maintenance 
Manager 
Manager reporting to GM. Did not 
complete survey but gave good 
information in his interview 
D  Engineering/ 
Contracts Manager 
Emergency Management Plan 
Incident Management Plan 
Observed a full day exercise 
No BCP existed 
 
Senior manager in the Concessionaire 
Company. Provided detailed 
information in his interview. 
GM/Operations & 
Maintenance 
Manager 
Senior manager within O&M 
organisation reporting. Provided 
detailed information in his interview 
Total 
10 people participated (9 completed the survey, 1 partial 
and another did not start but took place in the 
interviews) 
4 organisations 
 
Table 4.5 Research Information 
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Document analysis was used in this research as it supplies further evidence that the 
researched organisations understand, considered and have implemented crisis response 
or business continuity processes. Also it offers the researcher a better understanding of 
the organisations capabilities following through in a planning process. The document 
analysis and access varied between each organisation due to confidentially and 
commercial issues. The process of the documentation analysis will be discussed in 
section 5.2 of the next chapter. 
4.7 Data Investigation and Analysis 
Online responses, questionnaire interview responses were evaluated by qualitative 
means and compared with details derived from company documents and material 
collected at interviews. Interviews were recorded and transcribed. The data was 
grouped by organisation and cross-referenced between participates of the same 
organisation and the confirmed information gathered in the questionnaire and company 
documents were similar. The interview questions and topics covered either extended or 
confirmed the themes to the responses. As mentioned in previous chapters, the 
questionnaires and interviews were with executives and/or senior management within 
the researched organisations.  
 
When completing the documentation analysis the following process was considered: 
 
 Confirm any significant facts from the online survey and interviews that 
needed to be further investigated. 
 What was the documentation „plan‟ purpose and how did it support the 
organisation with regard to crisis management? 
 Was there a framework or guidance that the organisation followed for this 
document? eg adopted a standard.  
 Each organisation‟s documentation was reviewed for and understanding of 
the phases of crisis management and any consideration of response plans? 
 How was the organisations threat analysis or business impact assessment 
carried out? Was the organisation situational awareness of its threats? 
 Had the organisation considered training, review and learning from 
incidents? 
 How does the organisation test its plans? 
 
4.8 Other Considerations  
4.8.1 Triangulation 
Triangulation is applied to social sciences as a means of better considering the research 
topic from several angles or perspectives than viewing at it from one approach. This is 
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one of the strengths of triangulation within case study research (Neuman, 2003; Yin, 
2003). In this approach the analysis of the results and findings can be drawn from 
several sources. This improves validity of the data. (Simons, 2009; Wisker, 2007). This 
thesis has used triangulation by the use of various data collection methods (online 
surveys, interviews, field notes and documentation analysis) to obtain the appropriate 
information for the research. By researching and performing data collection from 
several sources, the researcher is more likely to see all aspects and receive a better 
picture of the research (Neuman, 2003). 
 
4.8.2 Bias  
A number of biases will exist in this research. Heath (1998) indicates that managers and 
personnel participating in the research may have several biases that can influence 
studies and evaluation of crisis events or exercises. Egocentric bias might lead a 
respondent to report that his organisation was better prepared for a crisis than it really 
was, otherwise it would be acknowledging one‟s own failures (Carmeli & Schaubroeck, 
2008). Hindsight bias can be seen in many critiques of contemporary issues and 
perceptions on resilience as the organisation and the individual becomes wise after the 
event. There is also a bias of perception that the individual may have never experienced 
an organisational crisis but has a „reality‟ of perception that all has been planned and 
the reality maybe different if an event occurred (Carmeli & Schaubroeck, 2008). These 
biases will be difficult to evaluate. The questionnaire and the semi-formal interview 
will reduce these biases as experiences and perception of individuals may occur and 
any differences revealed.  
4.8.3 Reliability – Dependability 
Reliability means dependability or consistency. Qualitative researchers use a variety of 
techniques (eg interviews, participation, document analysis etc) to record their 
observations consistently (Neuman, 2003). Validity/Authenticity is an extension of 
reliability which means truthful. Authenticity means giving a fair, honest and balanced 
account of social life from the view point of someone who lives it every day. 
Reliability is necessary for validity and is easier to achieve than validity (Neuman, 
2003). A measure can produce the same result over and over again therefore is reliable 
but not valid. This research indicates a consistent level of reliability by the different 
forms of data gathering and the use of triangulation. The goal of reliability is to 
minimise errors and bias in the research (Yin, 2003). 
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4.8.4 Credibility  
Credibility is a major criterion in evaluation of case studies and can be viewed as 
equivalent to internal validity (Simons, 2009; Yin, 2003). Internal validity is only 
concerned with causal (or explanatory) case studies where the researcher is trying to 
determine an events cause and effect. There are a number of checks to enhance the 
research credibility including triangulation through the use of multi-data sources and 
information from internal key informants. The organisations are also generally 
providing the same service in different location so abnormalities can be further 
investigated.  
 
Also Replication is a much underestimated contribution to theory development (Dul & 
Hak, 2007). Dul et al (2007) criticises the „one-shot‟ study but also mentions the 
proven „significance‟ of these types of case studies in which evidence confirms a 
hypothesis as a valuable contribution to theory development. Results should always be 
treated with caution because of two reasons. Firstly the erroneous conclusions that 
might be drawn regarding the „instance‟ being studied and secondly, one instance or 
one group of instance is not representative of the domain (Dul & Hak, 2007). 
Comparative case study is a study in which a small number of cases in their real life 
context are selected and scores obtained from these cases are analysed in a qualitative 
manner (Dul & Hak, 2007). 
4.8.5 Limitations  
As with any research there are limitations associated with the choice of research design 
or methodology. Subjectivity of the researcher is not often seen as a concern but 
ensuring a discipline approach to the research is in place should be a requirement in 
qualitative research. Too much personal involvement can also be a concern (Simons, 
2009).  
 
The multiple data collection methods should assist in offering confidence to the 
approach and investigation methods selected in this thesis.  The quantity of information 
obtained from each organisation was different due to accessibility. Some organisations 
gave more access than others and this may of limited depth and details of analysis of 
that particular organisation. This may result in observations in certain organisations that 
are not completely investigated. The researcher has confidence that findings would still 
be indicative of the industry at this time. The number and combination of organisations 
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involved in the research is regarded as significant. There are four organisations out of 
the possible 14 PPP organisations currently in Australia managing transport road 
projects.  
4.8.6 Ethical Issues and Commercial Confidentiality 
The research was conducted and approved in accordance with Queensland University 
of Technology ethical standards. For privacy and reputation reasons, no organisation 
was identified in any formal documents associated with this research. It was agreed that 
the companies participating in the research would not be identifiable, due to the nature 
of the research, the commercial nature of these companies, the service to the public and 
the possible misinterpretations of data if the information was made available to the 
public. A report on any findings will be offered to the organisations participating in the 
research. All participates were required to give informed consent before participating in 
the research. 
 
The main researcher is currently employed within this sector of the Transport industry. 
This was declared to all participating organisations and stated on the application for 
QUT ethical clearance. An information sheet was also supplied to all participates. All 
interviews were recorded and will be destroyed in accordance with QUT‟s guidelines at 
the completion of this research. Two companies requested that confidential documents 
need to be agreed before the research commenced.  
 
4.9 Conclusion 
This chapter begun by introducing the companies being researched and then discussed 
appropriate paradigm and methodology for this type of research and the justification of 
the selection. This was followed by a discussion on the methodology of case studies 
and the data gathering collection tools and procedures. The chapter also discussed the 
research design and the measures that were taken to ensure accuracy in collecting data, 
the credibility and dependability of the information gathered and understanding any 
possible bias within the research. Finally the Chapter discussed limitations, ethics and 
the commercial confidentially issues that were considered during this research. The 
next chapter presents the results of the data collected using the combination of 
collection methods discussed in this chapter.  
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Chapter 5 - Results and Discussion 
5.0 Introduction 
The previous chapters provided an introduction to the research problem, an overview of 
the current literature on crisis and risk management and its possible application to 
enhancing road networks. Chapter 3 provided a theoretical basis for this research and 
the underlying set of beliefs. Chapter 4 introduced the companies being researched, 
detailed the scientific paradigm, methodological choice and research design employed 
in this thesis. The chapter later presented a discussion on bias, limitations, ethics and 
the commercial issues associated with this research. This chapter presents the results 
and an analysis of data collected at the four researched locations. 
 
Restating from Chapter 1, the objective of this research is to investigate the 
implementation of crisis response capability within transportation networks. The 
research specifically sought to examine impediments to the implementation of effective 
risk and crisis management within selected Transportation Network organisations. 
Specific questions to be addressed were: 
 What gaps exist within the current crisis planning protocols in large 
technical systems (such as surface and underground transport systems), and 
 Options that might be adopted to manage and enhance crisis preparedness 
and response in organisations managing such systems. 
 
This chapter presents findings collected during the research work and provides analysis 
of a range of material from the various data collection techniques used. The chapter 
will conclude with a discussion of the results and key points from all data collection 
methods and a discussion of the implications of the findings. The next chapter will 
finalise the thesis. 
5.1 Research Results 
5.1.1 Online Survey Results 
As mentioned in chapter 4, the online survey was established using a Queensland 
University of Technology web based survey tool called Key Survey. Ten participants 
contributed to the overall research with nine people from four different organisations 
participating in the online survey. Eight people completed every question in the survey 
and one person skipped particular questions. The person who did not start the survey 
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indicated he had not been in the organisation long enough to complete the survey but 
when interviewed appeared to have a thorough knowledge of the incident and response 
mechanisms of the company.  
 
The survey
19
 constituting 42 questions was divided into seven broad themes. The 
themes were:  
 Governance/General  
 Planning  
 Role of Management  
 Culture  
 Learning and Testing  
 Threat Assessment 
 Employees (any issues associated with training and their positions)  
 
All general monitoring and reporting from each researched site followed these themes. 
Again ten people from four organisations were given access to the survey
20
 with nine 
people agreeing to the participation. The online results below are general assessments 
for all sites grouped within the themes. The individual site discussion of results takes 
place in future sections. The survey responses are detailed by theme below
21
.  
 
Governance/General. All organisations self-rated above „good‟ for how well Risk 
Management (RM) is managed within their company with the average being „very 
good‟ also all participants rated their organisation as resilient.  
The adoption or knowledge of RM or BCM standards was „above average‟ for a self-
assessment with varying comments on the priority or focus risk is placed within their 
company. Examples of written responses are: 
“Risk management is part of all facets of the business from monetary control to 
traffic control”.  
“Risk is managed through a Risk Management Plan; Business Continuity Plan; 
ITS Disaster Recovery Plan; Crisis Management Plan; Incident Manual; 
Comprehensive Risk Register. Priority is high and the Risk watch list is reviewed 
at monthly management Board meetings”. 
                                                 
19
 Appendix A displays an example of the survey. 
20
 Appendix B shows the Key Survey results and summary of all responses. 
21
 Appendix C indicates a Tabulated summary of all results. 
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“Risk is considered in all business activities with particular attention and focus 
on projects and functions that are not considered business as usual operations. 
“Risks are documented through an online risk register with treatment plans or 
mitigation identified. A risk matrix is set at the Board level and identifies the 
parameters of risk consequences (Risk Appetite) that the organisation works 
within. Risks with a high and very high residual risk rating are reported to Board 
level. All other risks are formally reviewed bi-annually or more frequently if 
there are material changes to the risk”. 
 
What could be enhanced to improve Crisis Management, induced varying responses. 
“Systems for low level risk are good and responded well. But for crisis events 
that go beyond the "norm" the reporting relationship and roles for key decision 
makers off site are not understood or aligned. Complications arise due to the 
complex and disparate leadership arrangements for the company. To clear this 
up an aligned high level crisis plan with clear responsibilities is required.”  
“I don't know we have not experienced a crisis that we have not been able to 
satisfactorily manage.” 
“Increased desk top simulations to test the veracity of the documented plans.” 
“Integrated exercises at a managerial level with our client.” 
“At each annual review of our plans we continue to expand our documented 
response to an "all hazards" response and move away from a terrorism focus.”  
“Crisis Management may be enhanced by increasing resources in this area 
however there is a need to balance overall service costs with incremental benefits 
to the improvement of Crisis Management. The Motorway is actively involved in 
the development of Crisis and Emergency Management Plans to ensure there is 
an ongoing development and review of Plans and Procedures.” 
 
Planning. All sampled organisations have safety/risk or project plans. All organisations 
indicated they all had well established RM and/or BCM plans covering emergency 
events. Examples of informant responses for the project plans are: 
“Evacuation, Terrorist, Fire, Motor Vehicle Accident.” 
“Traffic incidents, injuries in the tunnel, loss of equipment causing tunnel 
closures, external events that impact on tunnel operations.” 
“Traffic incidents, injuries in the tunnel, loss of equipment causing tunnel.” 
 Chapter 5 - Results and Discussion  
89 
 
 
Six responses of the total nine indicated they have a crisis management team that is 
raised in a crisis. All respondents indicated they all participate in some way in a crisis 
event. The type of tasks the respondents performed were: 
“Act as the liaison between Control room operators (first responders) and 
emergency services.” 
“Emergency services liaison and traffic management.” 
“In my role, I act as an advisor to the Crisis Leader in matters of Risk & Safety 
and People Management.” 
“Assessment of potential risks to Roadside Operations. Provide communication 
channel between Operations & Maintenance Contractor to Crisis Team Leader. 
Liaise with relevant regulatory authorities.” 
 
Seven respondents indicated their organisations have plans that address phases of a 
crisis and the recovery of a crisis. Also seven respondents indicated they have an 
emergency management plan. Six respondent organisations consider security as an 
element and protocols are in place for managing security of their site during a crisis 
event. One comment indicated that their last exercise highlighted the issue of enhancing 
their security procedure. Five respondent organisations have response (grab) bags that 
management or key staff can collect in an emergency exist within their organisations.  
 
Role of Management. With a discussion on the managerial level of participation in the 
governance of risk and safety management planning comments were: 
 
“For each functional business area, Managers and Executive Managers are 
involved in the Risk Management and Safety Management process. Building a 
culture for Risk and Safety Management starts at the top whilst ensuring non-
management staff are empowered to contribute to the risk and safety 
management.”  
“In specific regard to my role, active participation with the Operations & 
Maintenance Contactor's risk and safety management processes to ensure 
transparency and alignment of risks and safety is critical in ensuring the 
company‟s legislative responsibilities are met.” 
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“Reports to the EGM, participates in senior management review meetings and 
other relevant meetings / workshops.” 
“In my role as (removed for possible identification) Manager, I am a direct 
report to the MD / CEO and report through to the Audit Risk & Compliance 
Committee. I have overall carriage for people safety and facilitate risk 
management across each of the departments.” 
 
Seven respondent organisations indicated they have a Safety/Risk manager and the 
individuals participating in the research indicated they have participated in crises like: 
“Significant closure due to truck fire and associated damage, seasonal flooding 
of roads, closures due to bushfires.” 
“Major computer failure resulting in closure of tunnel.” 
“Serious road crashes in the tunnel. Unplanned tunnel closures. Media 
Management during serious incidents, this includes radio interviews and TV 
appearances.” 
All organisations indicated they have a communications plan and the contact list is 
regularly maintained. Six respondents indicated they have been involved in media 
training and for two of these personnel it is a requirement of their roles. 
 
Culture. All respondents indicated their staff are aware and know how risk and safety 
is applied in their organisation and risk as a practice is embedded as a company 
process, comments include: 
“A formal, documented Risk Management Plan is in place. Risk Management is 
incorporated into all project planning activities and tasks that are not considered 
business as usual activities. Risk is considered at all planning meetings and risks 
are documented and recorded on an electronic risk register.”  
“Quarterly review of the risk register; monthly review of the "risk watch list”. 
“Ongoing functional area reviews with HIGH and EXTREME risks reviewed on 
a monthly basis.” 
Seven respondents indicated their organisation does not have risk performance 
measures or key performance indicators which translated to three sites. Also seven 
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respondent organisations have plans that address crisis planning and recovery and an 
emergency management plan. 
 
Learning and Testing. Five respondents indicated they have formal training plans for 
employees in risk or CM which translated to two organisations. Three respondent 
organisations indicated their organisation is audited regularly. All organisations carry 
out post incident reviews with all employees being briefed on outcomes. Incidents 
being reviewed and briefed include „public‟ suicides in the field and vehicles accidents. 
Seven respondents indicated they have regular emergency exercises. 
 
Six respondents indicated they have had some form of RM training. All organisations 
had some form of emergency response exercises but the interviews concluded only 
three of the four organisations had six monthly or yearly exercises. 
When asked to what extend are exercises, simulations or training used to evaluate 
company process, the responses were: 
“We only exercise traffic emergencies. This is mainly done by simulation with a 
live exercise approximately every 18 months.” 
“The Motorway conducts two simulated desktop crises scenarios annually and 
every three years participate with our contractor in a practical roadside exercise 
which involves emergency services and members of the public. The simulated 
desk top exercises involve extensive research and preparation in the development 
and writing of an exercise. This is reviewed and approved by the Department of 
Transport and State Police before the exercise can proceed. The triennial 
practical exercise involves senior police, fire brigade and ambulance together 
with other road operators and simulates a crisis situation which must enable and 
enact emergency plans. In both exercise types, the effectiveness of the plans, 
response and communications are tested.” 
“Role plays. Actual incident simulation including all relevant emergencies.” 
 
Threat Assessment. All respondents responded „above average‟ in how their 
organisations assessed any threat. When asked were any threats identified as part of the 
planning process some responses are below: 
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“Each department manager is responsible for reviewing their own area formally 
every 6-months and identifying emerging issues, risks and threats. If these arose 
earlier, there are forums to raise these before the formal review. Typically threats 
may be identified during planning, project or team meetings and are then 
documented.” 
“Yes, infrastructure failure, financial threats are included.” 
“Only threat profiles are assessed on known/experienced threats.” 
“No - low level operational threats only.” 
 
Employees. Five respondents indicated their position descriptions include crisis 
management responsibilities with seven respondents indicating that key members of the 
team all receive training and are tested in CM roles. When asked about the level 
employees understand the importance of Safety/Risk Management the response was 
just „below excellent‟. 
 
It was evident that the Online survey detailed effective results that can be verified with 
the other methods of data collection. The responses varied in detail but offered concise 
reliable information that was further explored in the interview process and 
documentation analysis.  
5.1.2  Site Specific Documentation Analysis 
The access to documentation varied for each site. The following process below guided 
the analysis of the documentation which was first reviewed before the interview where 
access was available. A more detailed review was carried out after the interview. If 
further clarification was required, respondents made themselves available for further 
amplification. The process was:  
 Confirm any significant facts from the online survey and interviews that 
needed to be further investigated. 
 What was the documentation „plan‟ purpose and how did it support the 
organisation with regard to crisis management? 
 Was there a framework or guidance that the organisation followed for this 
document? eg adopted a standard.  
 Each organisation‟s documentation was reviewed for and understanding of 
the phases of crisis management and any consideration of response plans? 
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 How was the organisations threat analysis or business impact assessment 
carried out? Was the organisation situational aware of threats facing the 
organisation? 
 Had the organisation considered training, review and learning from 
incidents? 
 How does the organisation test its plans? 
The summary of documentation received is set out in Table 5.1 below. 
 
Site Documentation Supplied and Observations  
A  *Viewed Crisis Management & Recovery Plan, Risk Management Plan, Business 
Continuity Plan, Emergency Response Procedure, Critical Infrastructure Plan (also 
labelled Security Risk Management Plan) and Incident Management Plan. 
*Obtain detailed Index of Plans 
*Job Start document for field risk assessments  
*Observed „testing‟ IT attack on the company‟s IT system 
 
B  *Project Business Continuity Plan, Crisis Management Plan, Emergency Management 
Plan, Incident Management Plan and CIPP 
* Take Five document for field risk assessments 
*Previously observed a full day exercise (outside research period) 
 
C  *Incident Management Plan (IMP), Emergency Plan included in IMP 
*No BCP existed 
 D *Emergency Management Plan, Incident Management Plan 
* Motorway Disaster Plan 
*Site Security Plan 
*Observed a full day exercise 
*Take Five document for field risk assessments 
* No BCP existed being reviewed 
 
 
Table 5.1 Documentation Analysis 
 
Site ‘A’. This site documentation appeared very mature and had the following 
documentation:  
 
 Crisis Management & Recovery Plan (CM&R plan),  
 Risk Management Plan,  
 Business Continuity Plan (Master and Department),  
 Emergency Response Procedure,  
 Critical Infrastructure Plan (also labelled Security Risk Management Plan) 
 Incident Management Plan (IMP). 
 „Job Start‟ document for field risk assessments 
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The researcher reviewed all the above documentation under supervision. The CM&R 
plan contained company interfaces, the composition of the Crisis Management Team 
(CMT), the trigger for when a crisis is declared and the phases of a crisis. It also 
discussed Terrorism Alert levels, training, exercising the plan and the review process. 
The Appendices contained the CMT contact list, the CMT roles and responsibilities, 
the Communications plan, forms logs and checklists. 
 
The Risk Management Plan contained the organisational structure with the risk 
alignment to the key governance roles within the company. It detailed the risk 
methodology from planning, identification, analysis, treatment, ratings and 
prioritisation and the residual risk management process. This plan also contained 
management responses and reporting requirements. 
 
The Emergency Response Procedure covered the emergency drills and evacuation 
procedures for the sites including bomb and substance threats, improvised explosive 
devices (IEDs), airborne contaminants, customer threat and armed hold ups. A very 
comprehensive site document. The Critical Infrastructure Plan is an extensive 
document covering the critical infrastructure protection planning requirements from 
government, the site risk and threat assessment, alert levels, security systems, training 
and exercises, emergency incident response and recovery, communications and 
infrastructure repairs. 
 
The Master Business Continuity Plan (BCP) outlined the roles and responsibilities, the 
BCM process situation analysis, recovery and post incident reviews. The Plan is 
structured around the Australian National Audit Office BCM and Australian Standards 
Handbook 292 for BCM. The Department BCP outlined the business impact 
assessment for each area, any critical processes and recovery plans. It also had prepared 
business continuity & disaster recovery plans. This site was not aware of the new 
AS/NZS standard 5050 – Business Continuity.  
 
The IMP contained more than 20 tactical incident control plans that assisted the first 
responders and incident management manage the day-to-day incidents on site. Types of 
incidents included vehicle accidents, security breaches, animal management, tunnel and 
ventilation incidents. The site also had a Safety Management Plan which supported the 
issues associated with workplace health and safety. A „Job Start‟ document is used by 
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staff in the field for quickly reassessing a task if it was out of the usual work 
environment. This document is used in connection with Safe Work Method Statements 
(SWMS). SWMS‟s are a work safety assessment which is a requirement of the 
Workplace Health and Safety Act 2012. 
 
Site „A‟s documentation was very comprehensive. It collaborates and strengthens the 
data from the interviews and online survey. The management personnel interviewed 
had an extensive knowledge of incident and emergency management.  
Site ‘B’. The site had the following documents available for review: 
 
 Site Critical Infrastructure Protection Plan (CIPP) 
 Site Business Continuity Plan (BCP) 
 Site Crisis Management Plan 
 Emergency Management Plan 
 Incident Management Plan incorporating 26 Incident Control Plans (ICP) 
 „Take Five‟ document for field risk assessments. 
 
The researcher was given access to all documentation. The site BCP covered three site 
organisations and is the primary output from the BCM process
22
. It focused on the 
requirements for sustaining the Company‟s critical business functions during and after 
a disruption. The BCP comprised a number of elements which, collectively, defined the 
approach to dealing with a break in business continuity, and prescribed the steps the 
company and/or its contractors or related entities will take to recover lost business 
functions through the use of:  
 Incident Response Procedures (IRP)  
 Crisis Management Procedures (CMP)  
 Disaster Recovery Plan (DRP)  
The referenced document was the Australia Standards Handbook 293, Executive guide 
to Business Continuity Management.  
The CIPP has been developed in a manner that is consistent with Australian National 
Strategy for Critical Infrastructure Protection and the governments guidelines called 
“Securing Critical Infrastructure: Guidelines for Owners/Operators”. The processes in 
„Australian Standard AS/NZS 4360:2004 Risk Management‟, had been adopted and in 
                                                 
22
 Site B documentation 
 Chapter 5 - Results and Discussion  
96 
 
particular, risk assessments had been conducted to develop a Security Risk Treatment 
Plan. The site has also ensured that the strategy follows the recommendations of the US 
Federal Highways Administration Blue Ribbon Committee on Bridge and Tunnel 
Security. 
The CMP provides the formalised higher level instruction for managing major 
protracted incidents that are beyond the capability of a small team deployed to respond. 
It goes further to identify the structure and positions within the site „Company‟ to be 
deployed in order to obtain the most robust response and interface with external 
stakeholders. The CMP outlines the activation process, company response, planning 
and recovery. The Appendices have checklists for command centre issues, crisis/event 
response procedures, incident check lists, media management and log sheets for 
different roles and responsibilities.  
 
The IMP is the sites tactical first responders plan. It has 26 Incident Control Procedures 
(ICP) that detail flowcharts for day-to-day incidents on site; examples are vehicle 
accidents, security issues, pedestrians in tunnel, earthquakes, terrorist incident etc. 23 
types of the ICP‟s have been activated over the last three years. 
 
The site also had an Occupational, Health & Safety Management Plan which supported 
the issues associated with workplace health and safety for the site. A „Take Five‟ 
document is used by staff in the field for quick assessment and re-evaluation of a task 
when they arrive at the work site. All work tasks have Safe Work Method Statements 
(SWMS) in accordance with the Workplace Health and Safety Act 2012. 
 
Site „B‟s documentation was comprehensive. It collaborates the data from the 
interviews and online survey.  
 
Site ‘C’. The site had the following documents available for review: 
 Incident Management Plan 
 Emergency Management Plan 
 Shared Crisis Management Plan 
 
The Incident Management Plan (IMP) incorporated the Emergency Management Plan. 
The project Operations Manual was the senior document for the site. The Crisis 
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Management Plan was a local NSW requirement with shared ownership of the 
document which incorporated the local authorities and council accountabilities as these 
organisations were on the boundaries of the site. The CMP was not reviewed. The IMP 
included the site safety and risk management. The IMP had 26 ICP‟s for managing 
incidents in the tunnel which were recently reviewed and subsequently reduced to 10 
processes. The site was focused on Workplace Health and Safety driving their 
emergency improvement.  
 
Site C documentation appeared adequate and supported the company‟s current 
situation. 
Site ‘D’. The site had the following documents available for review: 
 Emergency Management Plan 
 Incident Management Plan 
 Motorway Disaster Plan 
 Site Security Plan 
 „Take Five‟ document for field risk assessments. 
 
The Emergency Management Plan and Incident Management Plan incorporated more 
than 20 Incident Control Procedures (ICP). No BCP existed however it was being 
redeveloped and discussed during the group interview for this site. 
 
The EMP in its introduction is called the “first five minutes plan” for all staff and 
people when an emergency situation arises. The purpose of the document is to guide 
employees across the motorway area of operations in emergency management, 
reporting and evacuation procedures. It covered concisely emergency roles and 
responsibilities, the response plans, training, disaster recovery, security and the review 
process. There was no exercise or testing discussed in any documents. The Appendices 
discussed reference documents (some did not exist anymore), contact details, types of 
emergencies, evacuation plans and assembly areas. The majority of the document 
centred on the building emergency processes.  
  
The IMP detailed the sites tactical first responders plan. It had over 20 Incident Control 
Procedures (ICP) that detail flowcharts for day-to-day incidents on site. The ICPs 
covered the first responders‟ actions for incidents including traffic congestion, vehicle 
accident, animal on motorway and flooding. 
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The documentation in its current configuration appears adequate however the 
management have identified deficiencies and were addressing the „outstanding issues‟.  
 
5.1.3 Findings from Informants 
An earlier section described the general combined results of the online survey. This 
section will provide the results and analysis from all sources of information including 
the face-to-face interviews between individuals, company key informants and group 
interviews of the four different project sites. The results of the online survey provided 
guidance and shaped the discussion of the interviews. 
5.1.3.1  Site ‘A’ Results  
The researcher performed two interviews at Site A. One interview was with the key 
informant, the HR/Risk and Compliance manager, the other interview was with the 
Operations and Maintenance organisation, Operations manager. The summary of the 
interviews are detailed below and follow similar themes to the online survey. 
 
General. The site had a well-established business governance framework which 
reflected into their crisis management structure. The site had a Crisis Management and 
Recovery Plan, an Emergency Management Plan (building specific) and Incident 
Management Plan (IMP). The IMP is managed by the Operations and Maintenance 
provider which is where the risk is managed more effectively and was a contractual 
requirement. The site also has a Crisis Infrastructure Protection Plan (CIPP) also known 
as a Security Risk Management Plan. This plan is required by the State government 
contract. The concessionaire site company also has a Business Continuity Plan (BCP) 
which identifies the top six key business continuity events in business and the 
mitigations. The site also has a Disaster Recovery Plan for their IT systems. The BCP 
has a number of template letters to departments, media releases, staff communication, 
employee holding statements and a communication strategy all drafted ready for 
modification to the crisis event. 
 
The site Crisis management and Strategic management philosophies are interlinked as 
quoted by the compliance manager:  
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“You have to plan in our business for crisis events to occur & if you don‟t 
incorporate them into your strategy, plan to fail, fail to plan but absolutely they 
are linked so in our business we have considered it as it can occur at any given 
time”.  
 
Australian Standards that have been adopted are around the risk framework – AS 4350 
Risk Management and ISO 18001 Occupational Health & Safety Standard. 
 
Planning. The risk management process utilises a risk register online tool
23
. Each 
company department is responsible for risk identification and allocation of the risk to 
an owner and regularly review each risk every six months unless there is a material 
change. Any risk with a residual risk of high or above sits on the „risk watch list‟. The 
site currently had 74 risk events of which seven risks are on the watch list. The watch 
list is reviewed every two weeks at managerial meetings and every two months at 
company Board meetings. 
 
The BCP has six key business continuity processes for critical events focusing on four 
main areas; the facility, the asset, people & technology. In detail, these plans look at the 
loss of the building that operates the call centre, loss of the contact centre and breach of 
KPI with the government (the concessionaire have 28 KPIs with the State government) 
with penalties starting from five million dollars escalating to $19M. The telephone 
system plays a big part in their business so they have a business continuity process in 
place for their telephony system. Planning is shortly underway to upgrade the system to 
a full redundant telephony system. Other BCP plans exist for loss of tunnels, loss of toll 
point and in particular toll entry point No.1 which takes in 40% of the company 
revenue. This asset has been labelled a critical piece of infrastructure for the company. 
The Disaster Recovery Plan (DRP) is designed for IT recovery. This complete process 
appears rather sophisticated however the motivation for these plans started in 2010 
when they had an exercise with a government department. Apparently there was a lot of 
talk and no real planned outcomes so at the end of the exercise the site had 55 key 
processes to develop out of the issues identified during the exercise. The result is their 
current crisis management process. 
 
                                                 
23
 Risk as used by informants in the term „Risk Register‟ of this thesis refers to a disturbance/event register. Such event types are 
assessed in terms of their likelihood and consequence related to the degree of loss or disturbance to the road system.  
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Role of Management. The site has Management Response Plans (MRP) which 
identified managerial responses and is interlocked with the Risk Management Plan. All 
risks rated above high are reported to the company board of directors; the Audit and 
Risk Compliance Committee (ARCC) which is a subset of Board. All senior 
management are on the Crisis Management Team (CMT). All management possess a 
grab kit as part of their role on the CMT. The team had a succession plan or a „number 
2‟ person if the number 1 person in that CMT role was not available. 
 
The site has a duty manager system on a 7 day roster and each person on the senior 
management team will, at some stage be on that roster. The escalation process starts 
with the first responders (Tollroad Operators of the site), to the Operations and 
Maintenance duty manager to the site duty manager which proceeds to senior executive 
management as required. The intranet web site shows their process for notification and 
escalation in a step by step function. The CMT goal was to protect human life, protect 
the environment, protect assets and reputation with 80% of the thinking and planning 
hopefully been completed within their plans. Personal networks are seen as important 
as they assist getting „things‟ done through managerial networks. Also collaboration 
with industry groups was regarded as important part of the companies. Only four 
people are trained and authorised to speak to the media. Budget management takes into 
account operational (3 year forecasts) and capital planning plus a contingency fund for 
crisis management. 
 
Learning and Testing. A recent external and internal audit assessed them as a mature 
risk management organisation. The site organisation is not required to be certified to 
any standard though they operate their risk management system and compliance 
program in line with AS4360 – Risk Management and ISO 18001 - Occupational, 
Health and Safety standards. Exercises are carried out annually. When incidents take 
place in the operational environment feedback on how the incident was managed is 
often fed back to the staff. This information feedback is governed by the confidentially 
of the incident. Over the last 12 months the site has managed 5726 incidents from 
chemical spills, roadside fires, motor vehicle accidents to breakdowns. Not all these 
incidents escalated to a crisis however a small portion of incidents did need critical 
management at the time. 
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Threat Assessment. The site has not had what they term a crisis event yet though they 
have had two deaths on the motorway and a long term closure of the site to the public. 
Other site management consideration has recently included a risk management kit for 
terrorism which they follow in accordance with state government requirements. 
 
The concessionaire company has only one source of revenue – toll collection. Their 
plant and operational control systems are isolated from the internet to reduce the 
opportunity for any cyber-attacks. Cyber threats are taken seriously. They periodically 
employ an organisation to try and obtain access to their business systems via simulated 
cyber-attack.  
 
Unforeseeable risks are seen as risks the site has no control over, like a utility loss of 
supply be it water or power. These events are on the sites risk register. Other examples 
of consideration are carbon tax, industrial action, public disturbance, threat to water 
source, finance risks (loss of earnings), legal and contract risk of their deeds (contracts) 
and licensing issues. 
 
Employees. There is no formal risk management training however the majority of 
senior management have been trained from previous organisations. This has been 
recognised as a company success employing the right people. Staff succession planning 
of key personnel has been considered. The site has 87 policies in seven categories 
covering bullying, sexual harassment & diversity, safety and environment as examples. 
The operations and incident response staff within the operational environment have 
position competencies, safety and workplace training requirements. The operations and 
maintenance provider had a detailed training plan for their staff.  
Summary. Site A had a well-established governance framework which was driven 
from the senior management of the organisation. The site had: 
 well-established, high quality crisis management and BCM documentation 
though the organisation had not used AS/NZS 5050 Business Continuity - 
Managing disruption related Risk standard 
 operated a mature risk management framework and risk reviews were 
regularly completed by the concessionaire company Board 
 well-developed senior management response plans under the four stages of 
CM 
 well established first level incident response 
 tested their crisis management plans annually, and 
 the organisation had a contingency fund 
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5.1.3.2 Site ‘B’ Results  
The researcher interviewed three people at Site B. A group interview with the CEO and 
Engineering manager and the other interview was with the Operations and Maintenance 
organisation, senior Operations and Maintenance manager. The summary of the 
interviews are detailed below and followed similar themes to the online survey. 
 
General. The site had an established business framework for governance which was 
also evident in the document review which is discussed in the next section. The 
framework had only recently been re-established due to a managerial change. 
Communications is a critical function and connected to this process is the escalation 
function from an incident to emergency to crisis management if required. CEO quoted 
in a discussion about escalation and incident management:  
 
“Like a crack in the pavement (road) as an incident, when it starts to become a 
hole it becomes an emergency but when it sucks the whole building in it becomes 
business continuity issue”.  
When the current CEO arrived, risk frameworks were in disrepair for various reasons. 
Since his arrival he has re-instated the risk committee and the OH&S committee (now 
Workplace Health & Safety) and other board reporting being the ARCC – Audit and 
Risk Compliance Committee which was a subset of the Board. Escalations methods are 
critical for managing the incidents. All the management team recognise if events are 
managed early any incident hopefully will not become a crisis. 
CEO commented that some of the extensive risk and crisis management documentation 
is really a „recent thing‟ in corporate history due the litigious society that we have been 
living in for some years. When discussing a topic of unknown risks, the CEO quoted it 
is about an insurance plan to survive:  
 
“Microsoft‟s a great example, they keep 2 years revenue in cash because they 
reckon Apple might come out with some devastating operation system that 
instantly devastates their business but in 2 years they can get back. If you have 
your ultimate disaster plan right it doesn‟t matter what causes it”. 
 
The company management recognised they might not know exactly what is going to 
happen or the type of incident but the most important issue, the result should more than 
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likely end up being the same. So generally speaking the business continuity type plans 
should cater for most situations. Due to a current situation, the management team think 
their organisation could be performing a lot better. No one was familiar with the BCM 
standard, AS 5050 but the system development centred around ISO 31001 - Risk 
Management and the Business Continuity HandBook 293. 
 
All the management team recognised personal networking through collegues was 
critical to achieve certain outcomes quickly and it also assisted when working towards 
common goals. Relationships with other similar type organisations are seen as critical. 
It is also part of business creditability and subsequently trust between organisations and 
staff within those organisations. 
 
Planning. Risk committees and WHS committee has just been reinstated due to 
external drivers which previous believed to be not required. The CEO believes these 
committees are a normal part of corporate governance. For the concessionaire 
company, the risk structure is very good and all staff have an avenue for participation 
and input. The team believed it is the basis for running a business and what are the 
likely impacts of probability and severity. They also consider good risk management 
explains what reserves you need and insurance cover. The site manages the same risk 
level scales/matrix between all contractors on site as they had previously been 
operating on different levels which caused some minor complications in the safety 
management process. The site also operates a „risk watch list‟ and performs joint risk 
reviews with all site senior management. The senior management team review their risk 
register every quarter and report to the Board with their high risks every month. 
 
The concessionaire company has a site BCP, Crisis Management Plan and the Incident 
Management Plan (IMP). These are contractual requirements. The IMP is managed by 
the Operations and Maintenance provider for the site and it deals with everything from 
earthquakes to floods. The IMP breaks down these critical incident types into 26 
Incident Control Plans which are basically decision making flowcharts and checklists. 
Incident response is a function which is business as normal as it starts with monitoring 
of motorists inside the tunnel. This is similar for all researched organisations. The 
Emergency Management Plan (EMP) is the second stage of escalation from the IMP 
and fits in the major response area which is outside the day to day, first response 
personnel in the control room along with media management  
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A desktop exercise is planned every six months to test their preparedness. They 
acknowledge post exercise reviews could be achieved a little better from immediate 
review of the incident in the field and sign off that the asset is safe and subsequently  
ready to open again. The site has a pre-organisation conference room that has setup 
incident locations, WIFI and storage for all expected emergency services personnel in 
the event of incident escalating to an emergency. Grab bags exist for incident response 
and technical staff for when an incident takes place. Pre-position survival kits exist in 
the tunnel for people caught underground. An investigator grab bag exists in the 
administration area as well.  
 
All senior management discussed the importance of the escalation process, how it is 
enacted and understand the importance of keeping people informed. As previously 
mentioned the site has standard responses and believe these response would cover or 
manage most unknown risks. Incident notification to senior management is an 
automated system for the first stage of incident management using Short Message 
Service (SMS) broadcast technology from the tollroad operators – the first responders. 
The Tollroad operator completes a checklist of questions and this subsequently SMS 
(texted) to appropriate managers informing them about the incident, including the 
severity. The PPP companies manage their sub-contractors carefully as the main 
service provider see subcontractors as a large safety risk. All contractors are well 
briefed before they attend the site to perform work. They have multiple subcontractors 
for most of their subcontracted activities so there is an attempt to manage their 
subcontractor risk.  
 
Role of Management. Communications between external and internal organisations 
has been key to some of their success of this site. Personal networking to support 
higher level achievements is necessary to achieve certain responsive outcomes. All site 
PPP companies recognise this characteristic though it is not formalised except through 
communication arrangements between control rooms. The site operates a flexible 
information flow between both the Concessionaire Company and the Operations and 
Maintenance organisation. The management team meet three times a week to discuss 
the previous day‟s activities with regard to incidents on the project. The senior 
management team believe good risk management should be intrinsic and documenting 
the process of review is now part of their corporate history. Media issues are not really 
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a concern however systems are in place to manage any media issue if they arise. 
Refinancing concerns and restructuring at this stage is an important concern for the site. 
The site has a Contingency fund of $50M. 
 
Learning and Testing. Training for BCP is performed with dummy scenarios. The site 
recently completed an IT failure and recovery exercise which discovered there would 
be a loss of operational IT servers for 3 days if a failure eventuated. 
“Because we have gone through these steps (business continuity and recovery) 
we feel confident if something were to happen today”.  
 
The CMP plans for enactments and desktops exercises. First responders have 
competency assessments including the field response crews and the site preforms post 
incident investigations. The site position descriptions have no reference to crisis 
management but they have formal risk management training plans. The experiences to 
date are assessed as lessons learnt for the future unknown risks. Out of their 26 pre-
planned incident response scenarios, the site have experienced 23 of them in the first 2 
years of operation. Over the last 12 months the site has experienced 7114 incidents. 
The site recognises not all incidents require critical management but they are mindful 
that some incidents if not managed well can escalate into crisis events. The operational 
staff also have an Operational Management Control System (OMCS) simulator which 
is actively used to present changing scenarios to operators while a supervisor adapts the 
situations as it arises.  
 
Threat Assessment. As mentioned by site management on two occasions, the plans 
should be able to cater for all unknowns risk. It does not matter what really caused the 
business to fail. The senior manager indicated:  
 
“So generally speaking your business continuity type plans & everything else 
should cater for most unknowns‟‟.  
 
The site had considered cascading faults and influences from neighbouring projects if 
they had to close their site. The main concern or risk is loss of revenue and privacy of 
data for customers. They also regularly consider HR issues, potential competitors, 
credit card fraud and are also concerned about regulatory and environmental risk. They 
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believe their technology risk is low but feel they are „above average‟ due to the 
involvement of joint venture parent companies from the operations and maintenance 
provider. The site systems have duplication and redundancy built into all the data 
systems. When asked do they feel the organisation is resilient? 
 
“ Yes the redundancy we got is incredible”. 
 
Employees. The management team are well experienced with a high level of trust and 
succession planning with their staff if key people are not present. The management 
team indicated from death of employee, fires and flooding brings different stresses to 
the organisation and believe the site should be able to cope. If an incident happens to 
one employee, the staff and management recognise it is not just one person affected. 
Also any major incident can affect employees in a different way. There was extensive 
discussion on the effect incidents and crises can have on staff.  
 
All operations staff had formal training and there are requirements of currency and 
compliance training for the first responders and incident response personnel. The 
average age of the first responders (operations controllers) is 48 years old with their 
average experience in the current role of four years and four months. 
Summary. Site B had an established governance framework which was driven from 
the senior management of the organisation. The site had: 
 a refreshed business governance framework therefore their site crisis 
management maturity was low 
 high quality crisis management and BCM documentation however were not 
aware of the „Business Continuity - Managing disruption related Risk 
AS/NZS 5050‟ standard. 
 operated a good risk and safety management framework and reported to the 
Company Boards of both the concessionaire and O&M companies regularly 
 established senior management response plans under the four stages of CM 
 well established first level incident response 
 tested their crisis management plans annually 
 an established contingency fund 
 
5.1.3.3 Site ‘C’ Results 
The researcher had three interviews at Site C. A site key informant interview (general 
manager) and two other individual interviews with the site engineering manager and 
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site operations manager. The summary of the interviews are detailed below and 
followed similar themes to the online survey. 
 
General. When the key informant was asked how he felt about his organisation being 
resilient, the senior manager positively gave a yes. As an example he went through a 
recent scenario and indicated that one the first responders was supposed to close the 
site as per the Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) recently during an incident. 
However the first responder offered me options which I supported and approved and 
subsequently the tunnel stayed opened. He indicated this type of thinking is outside the 
box and makes a key element of a resilient organisation. 
 
Corporate governance has been improved over recent years and the recent 2012 WHS 
regulations have made the site focus more on corporate governance in particular Safety. 
The site recently performed an external audit using an industry support group. The 
focus of the audit was not just on safety but also on risk management. The management 
team, in particular, the key informant, has a good appetite for risk though no formal 
framework had been adopted. The site appears to manage their risks and strategies 
however does not document the outcomes and any actions well. Mature capital works 
plans and durability plans are well funded ready for site handover to the government 
which is some years away. A recent software and hardware upgrade has improved the 
resilience of this site through a consultative design process which has given their 
technical systems multiple redundancies.  
 
Planning. Staff are involved at different levels of risk management awareness from 
toolbox talks (information sessions) and staff briefings to active safe work method 
statement reviews. First responders follow SOP‟s which are regularly reviewed. The 
site has a call out/contact list which is regularly maintained. The crisis management 
plan is a NSW location specific document and the IMP is embedded in the Operations 
Manual. The IMP also covers safety and risk processes. Security is also a key element 
of site management. The IMP has recently gone from 26 Incident Control Plan‟s for 
managing incidents in the tunnel to ten generic incident plans.  
 
Escalation management and definitions of incident and emergency management is 
often blurred and site one manager indicated a lack of site documentation but 
everybody knows the process. Next level of management interviews appear that any 
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risk questions were answered with safety focus. However it did appear the organisation 
applies the standards ISO 31000/AS4350 - Risk Management and the risk process. 
 
Role of Management. The site has a Board of Directors which is focused on 
Workplace Health and Safety commitments due to the new 2012 Workplace Health & 
Safety legislation change. Generally a smaller
24
 site when compared to other sites, their 
Crisis Management Team is the general manager and his direct reports. Many staff 
have dual roles like operations, safety and risk management which are incorporated in 
other roles. The senior management believe there is nothing that needs much more 
improvement. The site organisation is member of local emergency management which 
involves the city council. Decision making training for first responders is to the SOPs 
but any variations from the plans are decided jointly between management and the 
operators. Media management is overseen by the site general manager. 
 
Learning and Testing. The current redesign of the new incident system involved 
feedback from the operators (first responders) during the early design process. The end 
result was a quicker and decisive support system, enabling the operators the ability to 
diagnose issues faster. The site has a formalised training plan with professional 
recognised training. The alarm system has been recently designed during the upgrade 
and it prioritises alarms and subsequently reduces workload in the first responders. 
The site is reviewed to safety, quality and environment standards but not accredited. 
The site carries post incident reviews mainly in the operations areas and also completes 
emergency drills but this is not a contract requirement. The first responders carry out 
six month desktops reviews and have formalised task books to monitor their 
competencies. The site completes desktop reviews with emergency services and carries 
out annual field exercises.  
 
Threat Assessment. The site had not carried out a complete threat assessment or 
business impact assessment. The 24/7 control room staff are on site to assist in 
technical breakdowns and monitor the asset. The contractor supply risk is low with 
multi-subcontractors able to be sourced for critical functions that are subcontracted 
outside the organisation. The site recognised it does not keep on top of any regulatory 
                                                 
24
 The site management indicated they were a small organisation when compared to other PPP organisations. The research believes 
this to be incorrect.  
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risks. The site management are extremely comfortable and do not foresee other risks 
materialising. No technical software plant control system is connected to the internet.  
 
Employees. The level of confidence between senior management and staff (first 
responders) is high. The level of trust within the organisation allowed open discussion 
on issues and mistakes that come up. These learning‟s are viewed as opportunities to 
improve the process however incidents appear to be investigated through no formal 
process. All management feels their employees are aware of risk and understand their 
role. The staff seniority for the site is high with their operators having an average age 
50 with an average experience in the current type of role of ten years. The organisation 
appears resilience to the first level of incident response, one of the support to the site is 
the longevity of the staff. However there are opportunities to enhance crisis 
management on this site through a better understand of planning and governance.  
 
Summary. Site C had a developing safety framework driven from the senior 
management of the organisation. The site had: 
 concise incident and emergency management documentation 
 operated a safety management framework still maturing in to a proactive 
risk management system 
 well established first level incident response 
 no documented senior management or higher level response plans however 
management and staff have experience at managing incidents and 
emergencies 
 crisis management interfaces on the boundaries of their project 
 tested their emergency management plans annually 
 well-developed capital management plans and contingency fund 
 knowledgeable and experienced staff and company board commitment. 
 
5.1.3.4 Site ‘D’ Results 
The researcher had one group interview at Site D. The interview involved the site 
infrastructure manager and site Operations and Maintenance manager. The summary of 
the interviews are detailed below and followed similar themes to the online survey. 
 
General. The two managers interviewed had experience in engineering and operational 
management. They were interviewed together and both recognised that the near miss 
experiences of their past made them a better and more knowledgeable manager today. 
Examples of these recent crises included system computer failure closing a tunnel, 
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structural failure and protestors causing peak hour closures involving the police and 
media. 
 
There site is audited against the quality (ISO 9001), safety (AS 4801) and Environment 
(ISO14001). The site just experienced an operational audit recently which was 
organised by the site Board of Directors. The site has a general escalation and out of 
hours management process which appears to operate satisfactory due to the 24/7 
control room staff (the first responders). The management were not generally aware of 
any possible warnings signs for a crisis event due to the operational nature of the site 
being very reactive. The site had managed many incidents over the years which at this 
stage did not reach a crisis event. A crisis would be a sudden event being not 
manageable by the operational staff for example a tolling or asset failure resulting in 
loss of revenue would be a crisis depending on duration and amount. The tolling is the 
site projects only source of revenue. Generally the site believes when compared to 
similar organisations, they would rate well amongst their peers. 
 
Planning. The site uses the risk management process in line with the standard ISO 
31000 - Risk Management and currently has no approved BCP. The current BCP which 
previously focused on finance issues only is being updated. A committee has been 
organised to update the BCP which has taken approximately eight months. One 
manager indicated being part of this committee has moved the site risk planning from 
fair to good over the last few months. The future site BCP will be focusing on high 
level management issues. It apparently will discuss threats, roles and responsibilities 
and the crisis organisational structure and it also explains what to do when a crisis 
event happens and discusses manager responses.  
 
Others site plans stem from their asset management plan, these plans being the risk, 
safety and crisis management plans. Call out strategies and contact lists were regularly 
maintained. The site has an IMP which focuses on tactical incident control plans. The 
EMP contains the Motorway Disaster Recovery Plan and Site Security Plan. The 
EMP‟s purpose is to guide employees in the motorway area of operations in emergency 
management, reporting and evacuation procedures. These plans have had two revisions 
since 2005. 
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The IMP deals with 22 pre-planned incidents. The site Operations and Maintenance 
PPP contractor operates a risk register with a few 100 risks focusing on operational and 
maintenance issues. The concessionaire has 20 risks including customer and asset risks. 
A year ago a senior manager assessed their operational management as adequate (first 
response) however there has been a focus of operational improvement over the last 6 to 
12 months. 
 
Role of Management. Both site PPP organisations report „high‟ risks to their company 
Boards quarterly and carried out a risk review every six months. The site has a 
communications plan dealing with call outs processes, contacts and phone lists (which 
are regularly updated) and who can communicate with which external organisations. 
The site has a single managerial focus even though there are two PPP organisations 
assisting in managing the motorway. The concessionaire company has recognised the 
importance of a single focus for all site employees and has made considerable 
investment, change and focus on joint planning. This was apparent during the interview 
process due to the co-operative nature and awareness of what each organisation was 
doing. The site GM has performed media training with external support when required. 
 
Learning and Testing. A recent example of a near miss and vehicle accident were 
discussed during the interview. A serious vehicle accident ended up with a series of 
local issues resulting from the apparent suicide of the driver. It was a good example of 
an emergency which was just below a crisis as it had many flow on effects from traffic 
issues to serious concerns about employees (that attend the scene) some days later. The 
people involved in the process were debriefed as is often the case.  
 
The management are concerned about their operational staff being in support of vehicle 
accidents involving any deaths due to the nature of the exposure and the duty of care 
for their employees. The management team understand that they need to manage events 
as good incident management prevents a crisis. They do not assess their organisation as 
highly resilient but as quoted: 
 “We are not at the top level of resilience, we have got a lot of issues we are 
dealing with but we could take a hit and still be in reasonable area”.  
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Another manager indicated while discussing incident management and resilience:  
 
“I think the organisation by the very nature is resilient, though I think it is more 
fluke than good management however we do have good processes and our staff 
understand and follow them well”.  
 
The management team interviewed understand they are on a learning curve and every 
incident gives them that opportunity to learn. The site carries out post incident reviews 
and briefs the employees on any outcomes they can release. The site has only carried 
out one exercise which the researcher was invited to observe. Carrying the exercise is 
not a contractual requirement for this site. 
 
Threat Assessment. The site recognises that it should improve their hazard 
identification jointly. As quoted by one manager, “It is not too good yet”. The PPP 
Operations and Maintenance organisation has their own hazard identification and risk 
management process. The issue of unforeseeable risks has not really been considered 
however they believe they have a process that would manage most incidents. The site 
understand the importance of the organisational structure and the escalation process 
which starts at the 24/7 control room – first responders. The site organisations jointly 
recognise:  
 
“the reality is your organisational structure should be in any emergency crisis 
structure and it should be built to manage any risk”. 
Risks cover HR, media, contract/compliance, re-finance, tolling and have recently 
considered bush fires. The PPP subcontractor has multiple suppliers therefore is 
managing their supply and service risk. The operational control systems are not 
connected to the internet and manage major access issues through a permit system. This 
site has had a few serious incidents and has not enacted the CMT however they have 
had to meet daily to manage the occasional issue. They recognise as the asset ages the 
asset risk keeps increasing and therefore the asset will need more investment. 
 
Employees. Operational employees are aware of the importance of risk and safety. The 
management team have full confidence with the staff in the field – the first responders 
and field incident management. The site has a high safety focus which stems from the 
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parent companies of the PPP contractor. They recognise improved safety does not 
necessarily mean improved organisational/site resilience. 
 
The site key roles are; risk and quality manager, environment and stakeholder 
communications manager, safety manager and maintenance superintendent. Employees 
down to supervisor periodical participate in risk reviews for the PPP contractor and all 
employees participate in safe work method statement (SWMS) reviews. SWMS‟s are a 
safety/risk review document for work carried out in the field. The average age of the 
first responder is 44 years old with the operational experience being 6.6 years. 
 
There is a Crisis Management Team that is basically the site executive team. This is 
being formalised in the BCP when it is released.  
Summary. Site D had an established risk governance framework which was driven 
from the senior management of both site organisations. The site had: 
 a risk and safety management framework reporting to the Company Boards 
of both the concessionaire and O&M company. 
 a well-established documented safety, environment and quality 
management systems 
 well established first level incident response 
 no BCM processes however recognised their organisations had more 
resilience building capacity to develop 
 recognised they need to improve their threat analysis to improve company 
capability to manage crises 
5.2 Detailed Findings of this Research 
The detailed findings of this research used triangulation through combining multi-data 
sources and information from internal key informants. The various forms of data 
collection allowed observation of  varying levels of detail within informant 
information. Firstly, the online survey assisted the researcher to understand the 
companies being investigated and further prepared for the interview. The 
documentation analysis allowed a more detailed understanding of the sites expectations 
and the escalation processes in place when incidents took place. A shortcoming of this 
documentation review has been some variability in the completeness of access to 
material.  This was balanced by greater complementary of details accessed in the 
interviews and amplified in responses from the online survey and added validity to the 
gathered data. The open-ended questioning technique allowed detailed answers.  
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Three of the sites A, B and D used a schematic of how their documentation and 
procedures operated. Figure 5.1 displays an example from Site A. 
 
Figure 5.1 Indicative documentation layout (from the site IMP) 
 
The details of Figure 5.1 are similar for sites A, B and D and in each case outlined the 
IMP as a central document for the site. This diagram is often essential as it offers a 
picture in the reader‟s mind (staff member) of the criticality of each tactical and 
strategic document and how they all fit together. Higher level documents are often not 
included as they can confuse the desired meaning of the diagram for the site, as the 
IMP is expected to be the tactical tool for site personnel to thoroughly understand.  
 
Sites A and B had contractual requirements for a BCP, CMP and Risk Management 
Plans. All sites had contract requirements for an IMP and supporting EMP 
documentation requirement, their contracts did not specifically indicate what each 
document should contain but made comments on „best industry practice‟. The IMP was 
similar for all researched sites and had a requirement for first response and 
subsequently the field first incident response process in supporting the public safety 
within the projects boundary. All sites keep detailed records of the first responses and 
duration of recovery. The researcher reviewed incident data from three of the four sites 
on incident responses. The fourth site indicated they kept detailed records but they were 
 Chapter 5 - Results and Discussion  
115 
 
unavailable for review. The data reviewed from these incidents included accident 
hotspots, type of incidents and KPIs for incident response and site clean-up.  
 
Site C‟s documentation appeared to be limited and lacked some detail possibly due to 
many factors being the age of the project and there is no requirement under the 
contract. Nonetheless there was apparently a good level of confidence in the 
management of the site by the government department. This was explained to the 
researcher during the interview process. The researcher believes site C‟s practise of 
minimal documentation appeared to centre on the expertise of one person being the site 
general manager. This was not the practice of the other organisations in the research. 
This possibly presents a significant unknown risk if this person is not available. The 
other apparent risk for site C was their situational awareness and high confidence level 
giving a possible complacency risk. It was different to the other three organisations 
who were situational aware but cautious in their approaches to risk and safety. 
However site C‟s experienced operations staff did also have a high level of 
independence being if a decision was required, they were ready to make it. Does this 
present a level of staff complacency? How does the site manage if the key crisis 
manager is not available? These questions were answered positively by site 
management however it does appear to be a possible gap in the sites strategic crisis 
management.  
 
Though not fully explored (by reviewing detailed resumes) but observed and discussed 
during the interview process was the experience level of the site senior management. 
This varied from each site with a higher level of business planning from the sites that 
operated concessionaire companies thus having a high focus on strategic long term 
issues and business planning. This was further reflected in sites A and B documentation 
with site D still in the process of developing strategic foundations in their organisation.  
 
All organisations were aware of the following standards and applied them on their sites 
to varying degrees: 
 ISO 31000 Risk Management 
 ISO 9001 Quality Management 
 ISO 14001 Environment Management 
 ISO 18001/AS4801 Safety Management Systems 
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Site B had the only certified Quality, Safety and Environment systems.  The other sites 
indicated they followed the intent of the Quality and Safety standards. Two 
organisations, site A and B, used the Business Continuity Handbooks to raise their 
BCP‟s but all organisations were not aware of AS 5050 - Business Continuity standard. 
Three organisations (Site A, B, & C) have regular exercises with a combination of 
desktops and field exercises. Site C has no contractual requirement but recognised the 
importance of having a training opportunity to test systems and staff. Site D had one 
exercise which was observed by the researcher. This was their first exercise in seven 
years. They recognised the importance of the exercise however had no contractual 
requirement to plan an exercise.  
Learning from incidents was an opportunity that all sites recognised however this was 
achieved to different levels. Two sites (B & D) had formal investigation formats for all 
major incidents (level 1) involving staff, equipment and major incidents and accidents 
involving the public. All offered appropriate feedback to staff involved in any incident. 
Sites A and C had less formal methods which were more generalised with the feedback 
offered through staff discussions. Site B and D used notice board to release appropriate 
investigation information and interviews with staff when required. 
 
All companies‟ Board of Directors are involved and appeared to be monitoring the sites 
from a risk, safety and a varied business continuity point of view. Only two sites (A & 
B) have structured Business Continuity governance formats though the other two sites 
(C & D) have an understanding and culture of safety, risk and/or business strategic 
management. All sites understood the importance of managing the media particularly 
from a political view point. They all indicated in some form they did not want to appear 
on the front page of the local newspaper. Media training was limited amongst the senior 
management group and appeared to be a skill gathered from previous experiences.  
 
No site used any form of social media to keep their customers informed. Site A was 
considering it and was aware of the transport departments in the States of Victoria, 
NSW and Queensland are starting to use social media to keep customers (once 
registered on a web site) informed about traffic congestion. Site A believed it will be 
using a form of social media very soon. Site B used SMS broadcast messaging 
technology to inform senior management and their Board members of incidents which 
are categorised in severity levels. 
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Personal senior management networking was a mechanism that was discussed in all site 
interviews. The advantages of having professional networks to „cut corners‟ and/or 
develop quick knowledge on an issue to solve matters should not be discounted. All 
participants indicated that professional networks had assisted them to solve many issues 
in difficult times. These were interesting discussions and would make an interesting 
research topic in its own right however at this stage all participates recognised they 
could not be an effective manager without their professional informal networks. Three 
of the site organisations participated in an „informal‟ industry tunnel organisation called 
the Australian Tunnel Operators Group. This group is not a registered organisation but 
solely exists to provide a forum to discuss tunnel issues particularly to share ideas on 
improving safety to employees and the travelling public.  
 
Threat Analysis was carried out differently for all sites and this was confirmed in the 
documentation analysis. Sites A and B carried out detailed business impact assessments 
and threat assessments as part of their BCP and CMP development and further 
developed planned crisis responses. Site A, B, and D had detailed Risk Management 
Plans and risk registers. All risks were reviewed at regular intervals by the site 
management and reported to their Board of Directors at each Board meeting. Site D 
carried a broad threat assessment as part of the EMP development. Site C completed 
risk assessments and planned for generic responses within their general response 
planning. During the interview at Site A, the researcher observed the employment of an 
organisation testing the sites security processes and fire wall by attempting to attack the 
IT system on the site. This organisation saw cyber-attacks as a real and ever present 
threat. Threat assessments appear to vary due to site management awareness and 
experience levels. 
 
5.2.1  Qualitative Assessments 
Chapter three introduced two analytical approaches to operationalise the methodology 
taken in this study which has been modified for this research. Figure 3.2 indicates the 
theoretical framework from a modified BCM strategy. The Risk Maturity Matrix 
(Table 5.2) and Labaka‟s Key Risk Management Evaluation (Table 5.3) have been used 
to assess the researched organisations.  
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Risk Maturity Matrix (RMM) was adapted from an Aon organisational risk maturity 
matrix. Table 5.2 provides the RMM results of the assessment against the 16 criteria for 
each organisation. As a general observation sites A and B have well defined 
assessments against the measures. This can be observed on the organisational 
measurement scale of the matrix. Sites C and D had varying indicators however their 
systems appear to performed adequately. The assessment indicates the large differences 
between the four organisations due to contractual requirements and managerial 
experiences. Sites A and B assessments indicated that the sites were performing above 
the „defined‟ and „good‟ levels of the risk measurement scale. Sites C and D were 
performing at a less defined level of development or crisis management maturity. It can 
be judged that these sites have less established frameworks and level of BCM processes 
are still developing.  
This maturity matrix could be viewed as an „opportunity for improvement‟ tool to be 
used to assess an organisation for possible deficiencies. The matrix also provides a 
simple assessment and snapshot for consideration when comparing similar 
organisations. One of the strengths of this assessment is it contains an organisational 
measurement scale for comparing similar organisations or sites. 
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Risk Maturity Matrix 
 
Legend – The organisational measurement scale indicates where the site appears on the scale. 
 
Organisation 
Maturity Model 
Initial  Basic  Defined  Operational  
 Smallest ------------------------------------------------------------Scale--------------------------------------------------------Highest 
1. Current stage of 
development of 
organisations risk 
strategy and 
framework  
 
Limited risk management 
activities exist, are very 
limited in scope. 
 Capabilities exist to identify, 
assess, manage and monitor 
risks in some business areas.  
(maybe Board direction but not 
drived to all managerial levels) 
Sufficient capabilities to 
identify, measure, report and 
monitor major risks. Polices 
and techniques are defined 
across the organisation. 
(Board direction and managers 
are focused on RM). 
Consistent ability to identify, 
measure, manage report and 
monitor risks consistent 
application of policies and 
techniques across the 
organisation are driven at all 
staffing levels. 
Organisational 
Measurement Scale 
Smallest -C-----------------------------------D------------------------------A--B-------------------------------Highest 
2. Measuring 
framework and 
review methodology 
Limited Follows Principles of ISO 
standard 
(does not have to be the same 
measure) 
Follows Principles of ISO 
standard and has reviews  
 
Follows Principles of ISO 
standard and has regular 
documented reviews of major 
risks. 
Organisational 
Measurement Scale t 
Smallest -------------------------------------C-D-----------------------------A--B-------------------------------Highest 
3. Organisation carries 
out reviews of 
identified risks or 
BIA  
 
Risks identifed and review 
annually or by Board 
Risks identified and scheduled 
for review but meetings are 
occasionally missed to higher 
business issues 
Risks identified and scheduled 
for review. All meetings are 
minuted. (management and 
other key staff are involved) 
Risks identified and scheduled 
for review. All meetings are 
minuted. Risk management is 
imbedded in the decision 
making of the business 
Organisational 
Measurement Scale 
Smallest ----C------------------------------------------------------------------ABD-------------------------------Highest 
4. Application of risk 
processes across 
business areas. 
(business areas include support 
areas like safety, legal, 
environment and finance)  
Applied in one area of the 
business only eg Safety or 
OH&S 
Applied in 2 or more areas of 
the business 
Applied in most areas of the 
business 
Applied in all business areas 
and senior management apply 
it in their decision making 
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Organisational 
Measurement Scale 
Smallest --------------------------------------------C----------------------ABD----------------------------------Highest 
5. Processes exist and 
are documented for 
crisis events  
Limited processes exist. Processes and plans exist Documented plans and 
processes exist and are 
exercised 
Well documented plans and 
processes exist and are 
exercised 
Organisational 
Measurement Scale 
Smallest --------------------------------------D-----C------------------------------------------------------AB----Highest 
6. Personnel Culture 
towards risk and 
safety management  
No or little awarenesss 
within the organisation Board 
has issued direction but still 
to be applied at other levels 
within the organisation. 
Board, senior mangement 
understand and apply the RM 
model and its application 
Board, senior management and 
supervisors/some staff 
understand the RM model and 
its application. 
All levels of staff understand 
the RM model and its 
application 
Organisational 
Measurement Scale 
Smallest ------------------------------------C-------D-----------------------AB----------------------------------Highest 
7. The organisation has 
regular exercises and 
tests their plans  
No testing or exercise  Has had an exercise but is not 
regularly tested  
Has regular tested exercises 
other stakeholders 
Has regular well tested 
exercises including other 
stakeholders and shares the 
learnings 
Organisational 
Measurement Scale 
Smallest -------------------------------------D-----------------------------ABC----------------------------------Highest 
8. Threat identification  One individual identified and 
assessed the threats 
Key managerial individuals 
identified and assessed the 
threats 
A committee of individuals 
from different parts of the 
organisation identified and 
assessed the threats and 
occasional reviewed 
A committee of individuals 
from different parts of the 
organisation identified and 
assessed the threats and 
regularly reviewed 
Organisational 
Measurement Scale 
Smallest ----------------------------------------C-------------------------DB----------A-------------------------Highest 
9. Are risk/safety roles 
identified in the 
organisation 
Eg safety/risk manager  
Little or no roles are 
identified 
Some roles are identified and 
shared 
One key senior role is 
identified and the rest are 
shared 
Several roles exist with many 
roles shared within the 
organisation 
Management and staff shared 
roles within the organisation. 
Organisational 
Measurement Scale 
Smallest ------------C-----------------------BD------------------------------A------------------------------------Highest 
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10.  Reporting of 
hazards and risks  
No reporting exists A 
reporting culture exists but 
little is actioned 
A reporting culture exists and 
hazards and risks are actioned 
when time permits 
A reporting culture exists and 
hazards and risks are reported, 
documented and actioned 
A reporting culture exists and 
hazards and risks are reported, 
documented and actioned. The 
Board monitors reports. 
Organisational 
Measurement Scale 
Smallest --------------------------------------------C------------------------ABD------------------------------Highest 
11. How well is risk 
applied in the 
organisation?  
Poor Fair Good Very Good Excellent  
Organisational 
Measurement Scale 
 CD AB   
12. How effectively is the 
implementation of 
Risk and OH&S 
management systems 
in the company?  
Low  Average  High 
Organisational 
Measurement Scale 
 C BD A  
13. To what level do all 
employees 
understand the 
importance of Safety 
or Risk 
Management?  
Poor  Average  High. The importance 
of safety and risk 
management is part of 
all employees work 
ethic 
Organisational 
Measurement Scale 
  ABCD   
14. To what level does 
the organisation 
follow Risk 
Management and 
BCM standards? 
Poor  Average  High. The importance 
of safety and risk 
management is part of 
all employees work 
ethic 
Organisational 
Measurement Scale 
  ABCD  
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15. Managerial 
Support for Risk 
and/or BCM 
practices  
Little or no risk or 
BCM practices in the 
company 
 Risk/BCM receives 
executive and senior 
managerial support but 
not really applied due to 
lack training, awareness 
or just too busy. 
 High. Risk/BCM 
receives executive and 
senior managerial 
support and is applied 
within the organsiation.  
Organisational 
Measurement Scale 
   CD AB 
16. Has the 
organisation a 
considered 
Emergency 
Response process. 
(this is from first 
order to higher order 
responses) 
Little or no 
consideration of any 
Emergency response 
 Emergency Response 
has been considered and 
is maturing. Some 
process exist. 
 Emergency response is 
well considered and 
communicated to staff. 
Consultation with 
Emergency Services. 
Organisational 
Measurement Scale 
  D ABC  
 
 
Table 5.2 –Risk Maturity Matrix developed for this Research 
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The Key Risk Management Evaluation (KRME) framework is a higher level 
assessment then RMM. Table 5.3 details a summary of the tool. The researcher found 
using the KRME assessment required more detailed information which on some 
organisational sites was not entirely available. Due to the possible limited information 
available through this research method, the assessment is viewed as a more general 
assessment. The ten practices were assessed using a scale of low risk to high risk level 
and comparing the definition description. Generally the organisational sites all were 
assessed as below a medium level of risk with the majority of categories assessed in 
„low‟ or „low to medium‟. A justification of each assessment was also noted from the 
researcher to support the assessment.  
As previously discussed in chapter three, to have the most influence and ability to vary 
any practices need to be considered early within the planning and design phases of new 
infrastructure. Attempting to modify some of these practices at a later stage may be 
problematic due to cost implications and construction difficulties. Other practices 
reviewing maintenance, CI crisis budget, workforce training and commitment, and first 
responders training could be assessed and possibly modified if required. Also this 
ability to make changes to any of the practices would vary from project to project.  
The level of assessment offered a level security of how each organisation was 
performing however unlike RMM which provides the reviewer with an additional „feel‟ 
for the organisations status or crisis maturity. KRME could be more advantageous on a 
more mature (aged) piece of infrastructure as the practices like „CI design and 
construction and Public crisis response equipment availability‟, practices may deteriorate 
over time and therefore this evaluation could present different assessments of time for 
key practices as the infrastructure ages. 
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Key Risk Management Evaluation using elements of Labaka’s research. 
 
Legend – Evaluation was low risk to high risk level.  
 
Dimension Practices  Definition Site A Site B Site C Site D 
Technical 
resilience 
CI design and 
construction 
 
This refers to the quality, robustness, 
redundancy and security of the design and 
construction of the infrastructure or element 
that the CI is responsible for. This should 
include increase security of the system by 
increasing the number of systems and/or 
redundancy 
As per original 
design, limited 
redundancy. 
OMCS security 
managed by site. 
Low to Med 
Computers are 
good and senior 
believe they 
have in 
creditable 
redundancy. 
Low to Med 
The computer 
systems are 
going through 
an upgrade. 
Priority 
alarming. Civil 
inspections 
more freq. 
Low to Med 
As per original 
design, limited 
redundancy. 
OMCS security 
managed by site. 
Med 
 CI 
maintenance 
As part of design is the ability to perform 
high quality maintenance activities in order 
to improve the systems performance and 
reliability. Part of these criteria also 
complies with new legislation.  
* CMMS means Computerised 
Maintenance Management System 
Maintenance is 
performed under 
the PPP contract 
and reported 
monthly. Capital 
works is 
planned. Site 
has a CMMS. 
Low 
Maintenance is 
performed under 
the PPP contract 
and reported 
monthly. Capital 
works is 
planned. Site 
has a CMMS. 
Low 
Has well 
defined budgets 
and monitoring 
for maintenance. 
Site has a 
CMMS and 
sinking fund for 
Capital works 
Low 
Maintenance is 
performed under 
the PPP contract 
and reported 
monthly. Capital 
works is 
planned. Site 
has a CMMS. 
Low 
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Dimension Practices  Definition Site A Site B Site C Site D 
 CI data 
acquisition and 
transmission 
system 
 
This practice deals with the quality, 
reliability and effectiveness of the sensors 
and computer equipment that should be set 
up to supervise and control the CI. This 
includes adequate software to control the 
system. 
Systems are as 
per design. No 
change. 
Adequate for 
site but aging 
computer 
systems greater 
than 3 years old. 
Medium 
Systems are as 
per design. No 
change. 
Adequate for 
site but aging 
computer 
systems greater 
than 3 years old  
Medium 
New designed 
system has 
multiple master 
computers and 
dual network. 
System designed 
with feedback 
from Operations 
Low 
Systems are as 
per design. No 
change. 
Adequate for 
site but aging 
computer 
systems greater 
than 3 years old  
Medium 
 Public crisis 
response 
equipment 
availability 
The availability, quality, redundancy, 
reliability and security level of the technical 
equipment belonging to public bodies, first 
responders and society is essential in order to 
face a crisis, repair damage and respond to 
emergency situation. 
Security of site 
is good. 100‟s 
CCTV‟s and 
door 
monitoring. 
First responders 
well trained. 
Emergency 
services train 
with staff. 
Low to Med. 
Security of site 
is good. 100‟s 
CCTV‟s and 
door 
monitoring. 
First responders 
well trained. 
Emergency 
services train 
with staff. 
Low to Med. 
Security of site 
is good. 100‟s 
CCTV‟s and 
door 
monitoring. 
First responders 
well trained. 
Emergency 
services train 
with staff. 
Low to Med. 
Immediate 
building security 
is good. Limited 
CCTV 
coverage. Site 
extremely open. 
First responders 
well trained. 
Med. 
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Dimension Practices  Definition Site A Site B Site C Site D 
Organisational 
Resilience  
CI capacity for 
crisis detection, 
communication 
and analysis  
This corresponds to the capacity of 
operators to detect, communicate and 
analyse a crisis, proposing new 
preventative measure for the future. This 
includes training and learning systems. 
Control system 
designed to 
detect, 
communicate 
and analyse to a 
degree the 
incident. System 
prompts 
operators for 
choices 
therefore risk is 
controlled. 
Incident 
response part of 
the equation to 
response with 
first responders. 
Have a senior 
manager duty 
system to 
support site. 
Low. 
Control system 
designed to 
detect, 
communicate 
and analyse to a 
degree the 
incident. System 
prompts 
operators for 
choices 
therefore risk is 
controlled. 
Incident 
response part of 
the equation to 
response with 
first responders. 
Low to Med. 
 
The system able 
to detect, 
communicate 
and analyse a 
crisis however 
the risk is higher 
for this asset 
even though the 
system is newer 
with good alarm 
system.  
Analysis could 
improve. 
Low to Med. 
Control system 
designed to 
detect, 
communicate 
and analyse to a 
degree the 
incident. System 
prompts 
operators for 
choices 
therefore risk is 
controlled. 
Incident 
response part of 
the equation to 
response with 
first responders. 
Low to Med. 
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Dimension Practices  Definition Site A Site B Site C Site D 
 CI workforce 
training and 
commitment 
Workers at the CI must be adequately trained 
prior to the occurrence of a crisis so they 
know how to respond. They should be aware 
and know of the procedures and protocols 
when something unexpected occurs. 
Responding in a timely manner and in a 
coordinated manner can reduce time during 
the crisis and any negative effects. 
Operations staff 
trained well. No 
official training 
program for 
risk/crisis 
management 
though the site 
senior 
management 
perform 
exercises and 
have 
documented 
roles. Limited 
documentation 
but records kept 
on currency of 
training. Site 
well 
documented and 
staff high level 
of commitment. 
eg SOP‟s 
Low 
Staff trained 
well. 
Documentation 
and training 
records are kept 
on currency and 
competency of 
staff. Site well 
documented and 
staff high level 
of commitment. 
eg SOP‟s 
Low 
First responders 
well trained. 
Log books 6 
monthly 
reviews. Staff 
made aware 
through toolbox 
talks. Site has 
low level SOP‟s 
and high level of 
staff 
commitment. 
Low 
Staff trained 
well. Limited 
documentation 
but records kept 
on currency of 
training. Site 
well 
documented and 
staff high level 
of commitment. 
eg SOP‟s 
Low to Med 
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Dimension Practices  Definition Site A Site B Site C Site D 
 First responders 
training 
This training has to do with how first 
responders are prepared to face a crisis. 
This includes training and familiarity of the 
organisation/site. „Actions on‟ can detail 
and reduce a dangerous unknown situation 
to a known and more familiar less 
hazardous situation.  
Site is well 
documented and 
first responders 
as well as 
incident 
response are 
well trained. 
Examples of 
recent responses 
for both 
positions. 
Low 
Site is well 
documented and 
first responders 
as well as 
incident 
response are 
well trained. 
Examples of 
recent responses 
for both 
positions. Have a 
simulator. 
Low 
Site is good 
documented and 
first responders 
are well trained. 
Incident 
response staff 
support first 
responders 
adequately. 
Low 
Site is good 
documented and 
first responders 
as well as 
incident 
response are 
well trained. 
Examples of 
recent responses 
for both 
positions. 
Low 
 Government 
preparation 
A governments main role is to properly 
communicate the situation to the public and 
give advice as this will diminish the 
public‟s anxiety. They should also lead and 
coordinate all the entities and deal with the 
crisis. 
Formally 
contractual 
however appears 
more 
consultative an 
informal JV 
established 
between site 
companies. good 
communication 
and networks 
with emergency 
services. 
Low to Med 
Formally 
contractual 
however appears 
more 
consultative. 
Good 
communication 
and networks 
with emergency 
services. 
Low to Med 
Formally 
contractual 
however appears 
more 
consultative. 
Good 
communication 
and networks 
with emergency 
services. 
Low to Med 
Formally 
contractual 
Med 
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Dimension Practices  Definition Site A Site B Site C Site D 
Economic 
resilience 
CI crisis budget CI‟s should have funds set aside in order to 
cover repairs and replacements should a 
crisis occur. This assists their economic 
resilience level but also allows the CI to 
bounce back by reducing their response and 
recovery times. 
Site has long 
term budgets. 
The site has an 
Asset Mgt plan 
covering Capital 
& Maint works. 
Relatively new 
asset. 
Low 
Appears 
adequately 
budgeted. Has 
Asset Mgt plan 
covers Maint 
works. New 
asset. Site has 
contingency 
fund 
Low  
Well budgeted 
and planned 
capital and 
Maint. works 
programs. 
Recent upgrades. 
Site has 
contingency 
fund 
Low 
Appears 
adequately 
budgeted. Has 
Asset Mgt plan 
covers Capital & 
Maint works. 
Relatively new 
asset. 
Low to Med 
Social 
resilience 
Legal and 
regulatory issues 
This relates to the maturity level of the 
crisis regulations in order to take preventive 
measures and define protocols. An incident 
being caused by a lack of maintenance 
often leads to legalities when not carried 
out to „best‟ practice. This area also deals 
with the regulations that companies are 
required to meet. 
Site has well 
established 
procedures and 
defined SOPS 
for first and 
incident 
response. 
Low 
Site has well 
established 
procedures and 
defined SOPS 
for first and 
incident 
response. 
Low 
Site has well 
established 
procedures and 
defined SOPS 
for first and 
incident 
response. 
Med 
 
Site has well 
established 
procedures and 
defined SOPS 
for first and 
incident 
response. 
Med 
Table 5.3 Key Risk Management Evaluation using elements of Labaka‟s research.   (Labaka et al., 2013) 
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5.2.2 Summary of the Outcomes by site 
The organisations are generally well equipped in the Australian context however there 
are many shortfalls. The theoretical framework utilised BCM principles which used 
three components of proactively managing elements of risk, threat analysis, managing 
readiness and agility to effectively highlight and discover the crisis management 
functions of the organisations being researched. 
Site A. The site investigation reported the following: 
 a well-established risk and business continuity frameworks and 
understanding of the phases of a crisis event. This process followed an out-
dated Australian Standard not the more recent AS 5050 standard 
 a well-established Safety, Crisis and Risk Management systems and 
associated documentation 
 a higher level of contractual requirement for emergency, risk and crisis 
management plans when compared to other sites (C&D) 
 best practice methodologies in their everyday business practice  
 regularly reviewed their threat analysis and risk register which was 
segmented by department  
 a good level of preparedness and practice of their first level response 
 a good incident investigation process which reported limited outcomes 
 a recent audit declaring their risk systems as mature 
 had no formal risk management training. 
Site B. The site investigation reported the following: 
 a well-established risk and business continuity frameworks and 
understanding of the phases of a crisis event. This process followed an out-
dated Australian Standard not the more recent AS 5050 standard. 
 a well-established Safety, Crisis and Risk Management systems and 
associated documentation 
 a higher level contractual requirement for emergency, risk and crisis 
management plans when compared to other sites (C&D) 
 best practice methodologies in their everyday business practice  
 regularly reviewed their threat analysis and risk register which was 
managed by senior management 
 a good level preparedness and practice of their first level response 
 a good incident investigation process and reported outcomes 
 operated certified Quality, Safety and Environmental systems 
 no formal risk management training 
 recognised their processes are still developing. 
  
 Chapter 5 - Results and Discussion  
131 
 
Site C. The site investigation reported the following:  
 a maturing safety management framework and broadly understood the 
phases of a crisis events 
 limited documentation however the site incident response performance was 
high 
 the contract was relatively silent on risk and crisis management 
requirements 
 best practice methodologies were in their business practice  
 operated a broad risk register but had no threat analysis or business impact 
assessment 
 performed no threat analysis or business impact assessments. The site did 
report key business risks to the Company Board. 
 a good level and practice of their first level response 
 empowered staff due to experience levels 
 no formal risk management training. 
Site D. The site reported the following:  
 a maturing risk management framework and broadly understood business 
continuity management 
 documentation was good  
 the contract was relatively silent on risk and crisis management requirement 
 best practice methodologies were in their business practice  
 operated a risk register but had no formal threat analysis or business impact 
assessment. The site did report key business risks to the Company Board. 
 a good level and practice of their first level response 
 recently identified shortfalls within their systems 
 no formal risk management training. 
Overall. All sites were not aware of AS 5050, Business Continuity managing 
disruption Risk, however two organisations had adopted the out-dated BCM process of 
an older Australia Standard handbook. This older BCM process had clearly enhanced 
their organisations ability to respond to crisis incidents by the detailed development of 
management response plans and therefore enhancing their organisation‟s ability to 
respond to crisis events. The other two organisations were not aware of the industry 
practices, though they had real life experiences to first response events and effectively 
responded to incidents daily. The level of resilience and crisis management functions of 
sites C and D is clearly different to sites organisations A and B.  
All sites had a good ability of first order incident response. This was a contractual 
requirement and all sites performed well above their KPI requirements. The general 
awareness of safety was high on all sites but this did not transfer to effective risk 
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management on all sites. Sites A and B had good risk management practices with site D 
aware of their deficiency and still on the developing path. 
 
The research suggests that organisations often do not learn from previous incidents. 
The organisations researched have varying degrees of operational feedback and 
incident investigation to their staff and individuals involved in incidents or accidents. 
Sites B and D had incident investigation processes where site A and C had a more 
informal process. The general investigation process appears to be improving within the 
transport sector as incident investigations are becoming the „norm‟. This is to capture 
any learnings and to ensure incidents area not repeated. This was reaffirmed in the 
interview with sites B and D.  
Reviewing the BCM strategy and theoretical framework for the holistic assessment of 
these organisations, sites A and B proactively manage risk and perform regular threat 
assessments within their organisations. This presents a good level of readiness and 
maturity of crisis management functions when compared to sites C and D. 
5.3  Conclusion 
This chapter has detailed that all researched sites had varying degrees of risk, business 
continuity planning and crisis management preparedness. These organisations were all 
well equipped to respond effectively to first level responses due to their contractual 
requirements and experiences at preforming these services. Only two sites had well 
documented Business Continuity frameworks and plans that translated into documented 
response plans providing a higher level of preparedness and ability to response beyond 
the first level response.  
 
This chapter presented the results of the data collection which used a combination of 
methods including online survey, group interviews, internal key informants, and 
documentation analysis. The chapter then provided a summary of the data collected 
from the interview process and documentation analysis. This triangulation 
methodology improved the validity of data collected. The chapter concluded with a 
discussion of the results and the implications of the findings. The next chapter reports 
on the objectives of the research and finalises the thesis with a discussion on future 
research options and the limitations of this research. 
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Chapter 6 – Conclusion 
 
6.0 Introduction 
The previous chapters provided an introduction to the research question, an overview of 
the current literature on crisis and risk management and its application to enhancing 
road networks. Chapter 3 provided a theoretical basis for this research and introduced a 
qualitative assessment methodology. Chapter 4 detailed the scientific paradigm, 
methodological choice and research design employed in this thesis and presented a 
discussion on bias, limitations, ethics and the commercial issues associated with this 
research. Chapter 5 presented the results of the data collection which used a 
combination of methods using an online survey, group interviews, internal key 
informants and a broad documentation analysis.  
 
This chapter will evaluate the research question by summarising the outcomes of the 
objectives of this thesis. This research specifically examined the impediments to 
effective risk and crisis management and provided further information on enhancing 
crisis and emergency management within Australian transport infrastructure managed 
by private public partnership (PPP) organisations. This research detailed: 
 What gaps existed within the current crisis planning protocols in large 
technical systems (such as surface and underground transport systems), and 
 Options that might be adopted to manage and enhance crisis preparedness 
and response in organisations managing such systems. 
 
The research will provide information on options for enhancing crisis and emergency 
management within Australian transport infrastructure managed in private public 
partnership organisations. 
6.1 Final Results  
This thesis investigated the theories, models and concepts of risk and business 
continuity management and subsequently crisis management. The research begun with 
a NAT and HRT theory discussion and drew comparisons between both theories and 
the ongoing debate between these two theories. The literature then investigated 
concepts and practices of Risk Management, Business Continuity Management and 
Planning and then considered the available standards and government strategy 
documents.  
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The literature review then provided an overview of the application of risk planning to 
the transportation sector and management of critical infrastructure considering 
approaches to organisational resilience. This was with the view of improving crisis 
response within transport organisations managing road transport systems. Three 
examples or approaches were discussed from the models of McManus, Heath and 
Labaka. The four commercial PPP organisations were then studied to observe and 
decipher the key practices of these organisations. All organisations degree of crisis 
preparedness varied with only two organisations understanding and documenting in 
their plans the fundamentals of the three stages (pre-crisis, crisis peak and post-crisis) 
or four phases (mitigation, preparation, response and recovery) of a crisis event. No 
two organisations were the same however the two newer commissioned sites had 
similar requirements and outcomes.  
The research sought to answer two specific questions, with the background of crisis 
management within the transport industry. Each question will be discussed as follows: 
RQ1. Identify gaps within the current crisis planning protocols in large technical 
systems (such as surface and underground transport systems) 
 
Due to the contractual requirements of the PPP arrangements (maturity of the 
PPP contracts over time) there were inconsistencies between how each 
organisation is required to manage and prepare for crisis events. This specific gap 
created differences of how each organisation prepared for crisis events. At the 
tactical level, each organisation preformed similar levels of first response as it 
was generally detailed in their scope of work as part of their requirements. At the 
strategic, higher level of response as an organisation transitions from incident to 
an emergency to a possible disaster situation, only two organisations had the 
higher level of service and preparedness. Site A and B have well documented 
managerial processes for planning and reacting to these higher order crises. Site 
A have detailed media releases and planning ready to be enacted. Site C have less 
documentation and processes to guide their staff. The local management thought 
less documentation was good however this offers an unknown risk if the 
management structure within that site changed. If there was a change of 
management, this site would lose their corporate knowledge due to no well-
documented and higher level rehearsed crisis management processes. Site D have 
an improved risk management process but did not have detailed threat assessment 
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analysis to support any business continuity process. This translated into poor 
threat assessments at both site C and D.  
 
Differences in professional experience of the senior management are a factor 
across the industry sector. Management obviously have an influence on what 
systems, processes and documentation that are developed and implemented on 
each site. All sites have different business frameworks though three of the sites 
operated the same PPP model. On sites A and B, these past experiences offered 
insights to ensure crisis management was a key strategic requirement. This was 
apparent due to the referencing to a solid business continuity framework and 
detailed planning and preparation for crisis events within these organisations. 
These two sites carried out detailed threat analysis and/or business impact 
assessments. This tendency to prepare can be directly related to the experience of 
key senior managers within sites A and B. This is critical to the foundation of CM 
therefore all organisational sites should have an awareness and managerial skill to 
perform a detailed threat analysis. This may also link back to any formal risk 
management training or awareness. 
 
A key element within the current research is the application from past events and 
learning from these experiences. The investigatory process is taking place in all 
organisations but to different levels. Due to the public nature of managing public 
CI a detailed methodology of capturing all learnings from internal and external 
incidents would better prepare the future managers of large transport systems. 
This needs to be carefully managed due to possible future legal ramifications 
however the level of preparedness would increase due to the increase in 
managerial awareness of incidents and crises.   
 
The commercial objectives of PPP organisations managing public infrastructure 
have to be a consideration. These commercial organisations may only apply 
capital investments to improve their crisis management responses if there is a 
contractual requirement or a commercial imperative. Any additional 
infrastructure requirements to improved crisis management within PPP managed 
infrastructure would more than likely need to be funded by the respective 
government agency. A gap can develop if technological improvements in 
materials or processes are not implemented due to cost implications. Contractual 
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arrangements need to better consider „best industry practice‟ to ensure all 
organisations keep abreast of any technological efficiencies and operational 
improvements.  
 
The second questions relates to the improvements that could be made within the 
transport organisation. 
 
RQ2. Detail options that can be adopted to manage and enhance crisis 
preparedness and response in organisations managing such systems. 
As Boeri (2013) suggests mitigation plans should exist and be rehearsed by key 
players and approved at the highest levels. All four sites had varying levels of 
testing and exercising of their emergency response capability. Current 
expectations across the industry are that this is a standard practice. All sites had 
tactical incident response plans with only two sites having the more strategic 
Crisis Management and Business Continuity higher order action plans. This does 
not make the sites without these plans inferior. However if a site implements 
crisis management plans it would improve the opportunity of a quicker recovery 
due to the consideration and having prepared responses plans.  
Reacting without a plan in place is like trying to recapture all the oil spilled 
into the Gulf. However as easy as misinformation can spread, useful 
information can also be shared.   (Boeri, 2013) 
The BCM principles assist management to proactively manage the elements of 
risk, threat analysis, managing readiness and agility of which all underlines crisis 
management functions of an organisation. Embracing or improving basic risk 
management principles would assist all organisations across the many business 
disciplines. Adopting a standard BCM framework similar to AS 5050 Business 
Continuity disruption of Risk standard would assist organisations in enhancing 
their preparedness and responses to crisis events. The results suggest the 
organisations (A and B) that adopted BCM practices are better prepared however 
there are deficiencies in knowledge and effective BCM and CM practices in the 
researched organisations. As detailed in section 5.2, sites A and B have deeper 
capability then sites C and D.  
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Senior leaders need training and awareness of the criticality of crisis readiness 
capacity to have a sustained organisational capacity. There are core challenges in 
managing and planning the crisis management systems and risk management 
options need to be evaluated to ensure resilience in the CI networks and systems 
are maintained. Risk Management which is now forming a fundamental skill of 
Company Boards, is often ignored to the peril of the individuals on the Board 
performing their governance duties. As Smith and Fischbacher (2009) 
commented there is insufficient academic attention focused on the issues 
surrounding the management of risks across the various borders within 
companies pointing out the „silos‟ that can exist. An organisations capability 
having an increased awareness of risk management will ensure it learns from its 
experiences. To prevent repeating mistakes, organisations should learn from their 
own experiences, review and document these lessons and where possible share 
these findings. Effective public-private sector coordination in critical 
infrastructure planning continues to face these challenges (Givens & Busch, 
2013) due to the commercial behaviour within these organisations.  
All researched organisations had an effective first response process. This was a 
contractual requirement of their projects however their higher order responses for 
sites C and D could be in doubt. Site A and B had detail managerial response 
plans and detailed threat assessments. Sites C and D were not able to display or 
did not express how they operated at the Strategic level and could be because it 
did not exist or the nature of the informants.  
 
6.2 Implications of the Findings 
This research provides areas where transportation networks can enhance their crisis 
responses to large scale system failures. Crises and disasters are all part of the human 
everyday life so learning to prevent, mitigate and manage them should not 
unnecessarily affect our everyday life. People at all levels in the workplace, from 
labourers and operators to supervisors and top executives, have representations of risks 
and why they exist. Each person has ideas about what causes accidents and how to 
prevent them (Kouabenan, 2009). Minimising the financial losses as a result of system 
failures and disasters is an essential function of any organisation and business. Sadly 
this is still to be part of the day to day business functions of every organisation as this 
core risk business skill and requirement develops into a normal part of the business 
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governance framework. Protection of business functions not only benefits the business 
but also stakeholders depending on that business services and outputs (Al Hour, 2012). 
Taking an extension of Boin (2006), public authorities must prevent known risks from 
materialising without unintentionally introducing new threats. They must prepare for 
the worst without scaring the population (Boin & Smith, 2006). The businesses that 
prevailed in a crisis were those with comprehensive insurance, business continuity 
plans and swift stakeholder‟s engagement (Regester & Larkin, 2008). 
Areas of managerial awareness and general organisational preparedness were reviewed 
and analysed and offered methods of enhancement. Organisations are increasing their 
focus on the management of risks across a broader base however the awareness and 
training of current and future leaders needs to consider risk management as a core skill. 
A leader and manager effectively managing risk within an organisation is strategically 
managing for the future of the organisation.  
This research revealed that there are different levels of crisis preparedness within 
transportation network organisations. This was due to many factors including: 
 Maturity of PPP contracts when the government engaged in the contract as 
the newer contracts considered BCM and CM principles. 
 Knowledge and awareness of managers within the organisations to the 
principles of risk, business continuity and crisis management.  
 The commercial awareness of the senior manager having more exposure to 
different commercial experiences. 
The general knowledge and awareness of safety, risk management and incident 
management was high. However the application of risk management as a process 
varied from site to site. All organisations had different business frameworks and all 
focused on health and safety to various degrees. Senior managers need to be aware of 
these issues as, „you only know what you know‟ as quoted by a senior manager 
interviewed for this research. The contractual requirements of all the organisational 
sites varied and had an influence on the planning requirements. One factor is the 
general experience levels of the management teams with respect to risk management 
and it applications in the business continuity and crisis management areas. Most risk 
awareness was not achieved through any formal training but based managers previous 
experience. Risk management forms the basis of good crisis management which also 
forms a discipline with Strategic Management. 
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The contractual requirements of the newer contracts (more recent) have further 
enhanced the application of risk, business continuity and crisis management with 
Transport networks. This requirement needs to be recognised within the industry and 
other essential CI services as older government contracts appear to be lacking in risk 
and crisis management application. This would further refine future „best practice‟ 
methodologies to ensure a continued improvement and application of CM across a 
variety of industries. 
 
The two evaluation models modified for this research have proven useful in supporting 
an evaluation against the theoretical framework. Both models provided different 
degrees of understanding and this was mainly due to the availability of information 
obtained and applied to the model during this research. The Risk Maturity Matrix 
(RMM) offered a snapshot of the researched organisations and was relatively simple in 
it applications. It is a subjective operational process and relies upon the experience 
level of the assessor. When applied across an industry using a similar review process, it 
is an effective tool in reporting an organisations crisis/risk management capability and 
maturity level against another.  
The Key Risk Management Evaluation (KRME) tool was broader and generalised the 
criteria however required more detail of each organisation. The tool could be enhanced 
by having a more contextually rich and specific descriptive content in the dimension 
and practices categories. Also more detailed information could be gathered by better 
access to the internal mechanisms and make-up of the organisation being reviewed. The 
KRME considered other categories of asset capital development during the 
construction phase of asset. A key element of these assessment tools is the assessors (in 
this case researchers) experience and therefore application of the risk categories and 
practises from RMM and KRME, to the organisation being researched. 
 
6.2.1 Research Limitations  
The application of this research may be constrained and only be applied to Road 
Transport Systems (RTS) PPP‟s in Australia and possibly commissioned within certain 
timeframes as the development of these types of PPP contracts are always being 
adapted for future requirements. The findings have indicated that newer governmental 
contracts are applying improved crisis management and response requirements on 
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newer built infrastructure. It may be interesting to review the findings and compare 
them to other government transport organisations but expectations are that PPP 
commercial influence would have a difference in organisational practices. Similarly, 
due to the type of CI being investigated, the research findings may not apply to other 
forms of CI outside road transport systems. The findings may be informative to other 
PPP contracts in other CI industries and services, eg water, sewerage or hospitals, 
however the circumstances in this research would need to be compared to the situation 
on that particular industry. 
 
The level of access and depth of analysis was different for each organisation. This was 
due to the commercial nature of these organisations therefore one or more sites could 
have reported better crisis management practices. The researcher believes this is not 
likely to be the case in this study as several methods of assessment and sources of data 
offered a high level of confidence in the findings being replicated by another research 
undertaking a similar study.  
 
6.2.2 Future Research 
Crisis Management as a disciple is developing and future leaders and managers need to 
understand the future implications for their organisations on effective risk management 
strategies. Critical Infrastructure organisations within the road transport systems are 
responsible for essential services and when not available have critical implications for 
society. Future research could consider: 
 
 That the requirement for CM within public transport infrastructure capacity 
will only grow as our populations increase and capital infrastructure 
budgets become challenged. The digitisation of systems has produced new 
hazards and failure modes with our interdependencies on services and 
neighbouring projects becoming more networked within the 21
st
 century. 
Future research needs to focus on these types of interdependencies within 
our society and the unknown threats or potential for disruption they portray. 
 The benefits and need for private and public organisations to co-operate and 
not generally act in isolation. Further research on the immediate reactions 
of operations staff and the managerial thinking in crisis situation would 
further expand our understanding of immediate behaviours in crisis 
response. Personal networking between private/commercial organisations 
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appears to be well understood with possibly government organisation not 
taking the full advantage of personal networking opportunities. This 
research clearly indicates that the senior management take full advantage of 
networking to improve their organisations. Research in this area may have 
interesting findings within selected industries. 
 Further investigation into elements an organisation requires to be resilient. 
This type of research will expand the knowledge base and awareness of 
personnel and subsequently organisations capability and preparedness. Few 
studies have explored transport systems as a resilient organisation even 
though they account for a large portion of government costs and 
management time and are essential to Australia‟s economic well-being. 
This research has indicated that though these organisations operate 
individually they appear resilient in how they manage incidents and 
emergencies. They generally have informal relationships of support to 
neighbouring organisations and the interdependencies need to be better 
understood. 
 The benefit of future research examining how other industries have 
implemented crisis management and improved their organisation business 
resilience, eg water or power industries and how this type of research and 
knowledge could be applied to multiple industries. 
 That future research further develops the analytic tools, Risk Maturity 
Matrix and Key Risk Management Evaluation, to assess an organisations 
preparedness and ability to manage crisis events. There appears to be no 
tools to support the understanding of crisis readiness for any organisations. 
6.3 Conclusion  
Challenges exist for transport infrastructure owner/operators in forming and 
implementing response and subsequent recovery planning for significant disturbances. 
Many owner/operators of road transport systems organisations are not adequately 
prepared to manage crises whose effects might range from reduced traffic flow causing 
traffic congestion throughout road network(s), loss of income to businesses, and 
potentially complete loss of an asset.  
 
This research examined four PPP sites managing key critical infrastructure within three 
Australian states. The levels of awareness of Risk Management practices was varied 
with the application of Business Continuity Management practices in two of the four 
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sites. The research indicated that the application of risk management and threat analysis 
can be improved and is an essential element of corporate governance. Increased 
resilience of these organisations could be improved by first understanding and being 
aware of their organisations preparedness capability and recovery situation. This would 
be achieved by applying detailed threat analysis and business impact assessments under 
the BCM framework. This will subsequently improve their crisis management 
processes and subsequently crisis readiness for their site. 
 
The organisations researched recognise that poor incident management can lead to a 
crisis in the making and loss of their reputations. These organisations are aware that 
Crisis Management is all about proactively implementing plans so that a crisis can 
quickly be contained and controlled (Campbell, 1999; Regester & Larkin, 2008). 
 
In Australia, the frameworks of protection are still maturing for human intended 
threats. This could be attributed to the realism of the threat not being urgent. The 
planning for natural and human intended threats need to be exercised. Government 
needs to take a lead role in enhancing CI resilience. This includes active leadership in 
ensuring managers of CI have effective BCM and crisis management processes. 
This qualitative research added awareness to the existing literature by exploring the 
application of concepts and theories through emerging crisis management frameworks 
to transportation networks. The thesis also investigated the current business practices in 
PPP organisations managing public infrastructure in the application of Crisis 
Management, Emergency Management and Business Continuity Planning within the 
Transport sector. This research further examined the challenges to applying effective 
crisis management practices in large-scale Australian road transport systems operating 
under private public partnership settings and enhancing these organisations for the 
benefit of society. 
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Key Survey Questionnaire 
 
  
Enhancing Crisis Responses to Large-scale System
failures within the Transportation Networks
This project is being undertaken as part of a Masters Study for Andrew Wheatley.
The purpose of this project is to research the industry gap in crisis response to
Large-scale System failures within Transportation Networks.  This research seeks
to identify gaps within the transport infrastructure industry and provide
opportunities to improve the resilience for the public infrastructure that your
organisation owns or manages on behalf of the government.
You are invited to participate in this project because your organisation is part of
the business sector being researched and you take part in some form, in the
recovery of your organisation to business as 'normal.'
Glossary of Terms
Resilience is the tendency of organisations to withstand the effects of
disturbances (natural or manmade) and regain lost functionality  rapidly or within
set timelines.
Risk the potential of an event taking place that will disturb the intended direction /
outcomes of an organisation or event.
Threat is defined as the indication of imminent danger or potential disturbance. If
an organisation is being threatened it would be viewed as some  likelihood of an
event happening that would cause a non desirable event.
Vulnerability is a situation or a state that Critical Infrastructure  has a limitation or
weakness  which could be taken advantage of or cause a failure thus rendering
the system not operationally functional.
Business Continuity Plan (BCP) guides the actions of responders to a
disturbance as they recover critical operations following a significant disturbance
– often with specific  systems becoming functional in a required order.
Emergency is a situation that poses an immediate risk to health, life, property or
environment.
Crisis is any event that is, or expected to lead to, an unstable and dangerous
situation affecting the organisation
1. Your participation in this project is entirely voluntary. If you do agree to participate, you can
withdraw from the project at any time without comment or penalty. Any identifiable information
already obtained from you will be destroyed. Your decision to participate, or not participate, will in no
way impact upon your current or future relationship with QUT or with Andrew Wheatley. This survey
has been designed around QUT ethics requirements. If you have any issues with this survey or would
like further information on QUT ethics requirements, Andrew can be contacted on
ab.wheatley@student.qut.edu.au to answer any of your questions.
All comments and responses will remain confidential.  The names of individual persons are not
required in any of the responses. Do you wish to continue?
Yes
No
Page 1 of 10
General/Governance
2. Which organisation do you work for?
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
3. What is the role of your position in the company?
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
4. How well is the responsibility for Risk Management structured in your organisation? 
Excellent
Very Good
Good
Fair
Poor
5. Do you feel your organisation is Resilent if a crisis event took place today?
Yes
No
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6. How is risk management applied and what priority is placed on it within your company? (In all
functions not only safety)
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
7. To what level does your organisation follow Risk Management and Business Continuity Australian
standards ISO31000/AS4350 or HB221?
Low Average High
8. In relation to the previous question, what could be enhanced to improve Crisis Management?
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
Planning
9. Does your organisation have management plans? Eg Risk, OH&S, Maintenance, Project, etc).
Please comment which plans you are aware of.
Yes
No
 Comments
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
10. Are they available for review by the researcher?
Yes
No
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11. Does your organisation have well established Risk Management and/or Business Continuity
Plans? Eg covering Industrial Action, Bomb alerts, Epidemic’s and/or PR issue (add any comments)
Yes
No
Comments
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
12. What crises/emergency events do these plans cover? 
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
13. Does your organisation have a dedicated Crisis Management Team structure that is formed or
stood up in a crisis?
Yes
No
14. What are the key roles in your organisation during a crisis response? (eg Site Crisis Manager etc)
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
15. Do you participate or have a role in crisis events?
Yes
No
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16. What tasks do you perform in a crisis event?
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
17. Does your Business Continuity Plan (or any plan) address planning, the actual crisis and post
recovery of crises?
Yes
No
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
18. Does your organisation have an Emergency  Management  Plan or Sub Plan?
Yes
No
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
19. Do your key staff position descriptions include crisis management responsibilities ?
Yes
No
20. Is security considered during a crisis?
Yes
No
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
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21. If yes to previous question are their protocols or Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) covering
security? (add any comments)
Yes
No
Comments
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
22. Are the key response personnel in your organisation equiped with response bags or key packs
that assist them in a response crisis?
Yes
No
Role of Management
23. Does  your organisation have a safety or risk manager?
Yes
No
 Comments
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
24. To what levels and roles of management do you/they participate in the goverance of risk and
safety management planning?
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
25. What types or crises have you been involved in with this company and your past experiences?
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
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26. Does your company have a communications plan to contact company personnel or communicate
with the public in a crisis?
Yes
No
27. With regard to the previous question, who maintains the contact list?  How often is it reviewed?
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
28. Do you have media training for relevent staff?
Yes
No
Culture
29. Is your organisation (or staff) aware of how safety and/or risk management is applied in your
organisation? (eg commitment from the Board/senior management)
Yes
No
Comments
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
30. Is Risk Management embedded as a company process?  Is How?
Yes
No
Comments
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
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31. Are key performance measures related to risk management outcomes included in the staff
performance evaluation process or any reporting process?
Yes
No
 Comments
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
Learning and Testing
32. Do you have a formal training plan for employees involved in risk or crisis management in the
delivery of these outcomes?
Yes
No
33. Is your organisation audited for Quality, Safety, Environment and/or Emergency response
capability? 
Yes
No
 Comments
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
34. Does your organisation carry out post incidents reviews?
Yes
No
35. Are employees briefed on lessons learnt from incidents? If so could you give some examples of
incidents?
Yes
No
 Comments
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
36. Does your organisation perform emergency response exercises regularly and test any plans?
Yes
No
Threat Assessment
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37. How effectively is the implementation of Risk and OH&S management systems in your company?
Low Average High
38. Were any threats to your organisation identified during any planning process? eg financial
stockmarket crash, long term infrastructure failure etc  If so how? (group of staff, brainstorming........)
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
Employees
39. To what level do all employees understand the importance of Safety or Risk management?
Poor Good Excellent
40. Are Key members of your Crisis Management Team or others trained and understand the crisis
management process?
Yes
No
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
41. If so have they been tested in their role?
Yes
No
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42. To what extent are excerises or similuations used to evaluate company processes? eg staff
training, desktops, role plays etc.
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
.................................................. .................................................. .................................................. .....................................
Page 10 of 10
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
Appendix B  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key Survey Summary Report 
  















  
 
 
 
Appendix C  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tabulated Summary of online results 
 
  
 
  
  
 
Tabulated Summary of Online Survey Results  
 
General/ 
Governance 
Planning Role of 
Management 
Culture Learning and 
Testing 
Threat 
Assessment 
Employees 
*All organisations 
self-rated above 
good for how well 
RM is managed 
within their 
company where 
the average was 
very good. 
*All rated their 
organisation as 
resilient 
*The adoption or 
knowledge of RM 
or BCM standards 
was above average 
for a self-
assessment 
All organisations 
have safety/risk or 
project plans. 
* all organisations 
had well 
established RM 
and/or BCM plans 
*six of the nine 
respondents 
indicated they have 
a crisis 
management team 
that is stood up in a 
crisis. 
*All respondents 
indicated they all 
participate in some 
way in a crisis. 
*six of the nine 
respondents 
organisations 
consider security 
as an element and 
they have protocols 
for covering 
security as well. 
*six of the nine 
respondents have 
response bags. All 
organisations have 
communications 
plan or SOP to 
contact key 
personnel in the 
event of a crisis. 
* seven of the nine 
respondents had 
safety or risk 
managers. 
* six of the nine 
respondents have 
some form or 
media training and 
of two of those 
personnel media 
training is required 
of their roles.  
*All respondents 
indicated they have 
a role within crisis 
events 
* six of the nine 
respondents which 
translated to all 
organisations have 
plans that address 
crisis planning and 
recovery and an 
emergency 
management plan. 
*Some 
organisations 
address CM in 
their Position 
descriptions 
*All respondents 
indicated RM is an 
embedded process 
within their 
organisations. 
*All respondent 
organisations are 
fully aware of how 
Safety or Risk Mgt 
is applied in the 
organisation. 
*CM/RM KPI‟s 
are not used by 
most organisations.  
*five of the nine 
respondents had 
some form of RM 
training and six of 
the nine 
respondents 
organisations are 
audited against 
HSEQ standard. 
*All organisations 
carried out post 
incident reviews 
With employees 
briefed on the 
outcomes – lessons 
learnt. 
*All organisations 
had some form or 
emergency 
response exercise 
but the interviews 
concluded only 
three of the four 
organisations had 6 
monthly or yearly 
exercises. 
 
*All respondents 
responded above 
average in how 
their organisations 
assessed any threat. 
*only threat 
profiles are 
assessed on 
known/experienced 
threats. 
*All employees of 
respondent 
organisations 
responded above 
good for 
employees 
understand of the 
important of Risk 
or Safety 
Management 
within their 
organisations. 
*most respondents 
understood knew 
that key members 
of the Crisis Mgt 
Team are trained 
and tested in CM 
process. 
*seven of the nine 
respondents 
participated in 
exercises or 
simulations to 
evaluate their 
company process. 
  
 
 
